My primary positions are Drummond Professor of Political Economy, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College.


I am also Distinguished Professor Emeritus and Research Professor in the Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego.


Email will continue to be monitored in all three places.


My main contacts are:

All Souls College

Oxford OX1 4AL

United Kingdom


44-1865-279339 study direct

44-1865-279379 messages (lodge)

44-1865-279299 fax


electronic mail: vincent.crawford "at"

home page


Department of Economics

University of Oxford

Manor Road Building

Manor Road

Oxford OX1 3UQ

United Kingdom

44-1865-271953 office direct

44-1865-271089 messages

44-1865-271094 fax


electronic mail: vincent.crawford "at"

home page


When in San Diego my alternative contacts are:

Department of Economics
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA  92093-0508

(858)-534-3452 office direct
(858)-246-1222 fax (not private)

Electronic mail: v2crawford "at" (but both this and my Oxford addresses are monitored year-round; no need to duplicate emails)

My physical San Diego office is now in the Rady School of Management, Wells Fargo Building, Room 4W118.


home page


2003 photo by Zoe Crawford


Photos by Zoe Crawford from the 2003 Induction Ceremony at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Stockholm 2012:


1999 photos by Dorothy Hahn (more photos)


Curriculum Vitae (includes "A Game of Fair Division," Review of Economic Studies 44 (June 1977), now a major motion picture!)


Current-year courses (jump to past courses) 


Papers (scroll down or jump to interviews and presentations; jump to older downloadable papers)

Google Scholar page

ResearchGate page

(A few of my papers are also available on Academia, and IDEAS, but not nearly as many as on Google Scholar or researchGate.)




"Gray Eminence?", in Eminent Economists II-Their Life Philosophies, editors Michael Szenberg and Lall Ramrattan, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Political Economy

Slides for “Information, Voting and the Quality of Governance”, Public Panel Event to welcome Abhijit Banerjee as Sanjaya Lall Visiting Professor at Oxford, with a presentation by Banerjee and discussions by Roger Myerson and myself, moderated by John Vickers, 19 May 2015

Video (my part starts about 53 minutes into the podcast, following Myerson's which starts about 34 minutes in; my part refers to the above slides, which are not visible in the video) 


Behavioral and experimental economics and game theory

Newly and extensively revised version of 14 March 2016, correcting significant errors in the first version and obtaining stronger results, of Vincent P. Crawford, "Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading" slides

First version of 18 April 2015, Vincent P. Crawford, "Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading"

Presented as a John von Neumann Distinguished Lecture at Brown University's 250th Anniversary Symposium



Panel discussion/Sweat box session with Mark Satterthwaite  and Brown graduate students

Links to other lectures and panel discussions in Economics, Physics, Compuer Science, and Philosophy

Also presented as the Economic Journal Lecture, Royal Economic Society Conference, London, April 2011


Vincent P. Crawford, "A Comment on 'How Portable is Level-0 Behavior? A Test of Level-k Theory in Games with Non-neutral Frames' by Heap, Rojo-Arjona, and Sugden"

Vincent P. Crawford, "Boundedly Rational versus Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games," Journal of Economic Literature 51 (June 2013), 512-527.

Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri, "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature 51 (March 2013), 5-62.


Abstract: Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people's initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium "level-k" or "cognitive hierarchy" models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics.

First Version, "Strategic Thinking," December 2010

Michèle Belot, Vincent P. Crawford, and Cecilia Heyes, "Players of Matching Pennies Automatically Imitate Opponents’ Gestures Against Strong Incentives," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 110(8) (19 February 2013), 2763-2768.



Vincent P. Crawford and Juanjuan Meng, "New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income," American Economic Review 101 (August 2011), 1912-1932. Better version of Figure 1. Final version of web appendix, June 2010.


Lecture Slides, November 2010; Lecture Slides, July 2009; Previous Version, 9 March 2010, Previous version, 16 July 2009; Original version of paper, 23 July 2008; Original version of Lecture Slides, 23 July 2008



Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, Vincent P. Crawford, and Nagore Iriberri, "Comparing Models of Strategic Thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Coordination Games," Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009), 365-376.


Web appendix: "Limiting LQRE as a Model of Limiting Outcomes in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination Games"


Vincent P. Crawford, Tamar Kugler, Zvika Neeman, and Ady Pauzner, "Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: An Example and Some Observations," Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009), 377-387.


Vincent Crawford, Uri Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich, "The Power of Focal Points is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures," American Economic Review 98 (2008), 1443-1458; Web Appendix


Vincent P. Crawford, Preliminary version of "Let's Talk It Over: Coordination Via Preplay Communication With Level-k Thinking" and Lecture Slides, plenary lecture at the 26th Arne Ryde Symposium,"Communication in Games and Experiments," 24-25 August 2007, Lund, Sweden (poster)


Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri, "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica 75 (November 2007), 1721-1770; Final version of Web Appendix with detailed calculations and other supporting materials; Lecture slides (ppt)

Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri, "Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," American Economic Review 97 (December 2007), 1731-1750; Web Appendix; Data Appendix (zip); Lecture slides (ppt)


Reference (without screen credit, and with no real appreciation of the importance of level-k thinking...) on 2005 episode of the CBS series Numb3rs, "Assassin," first aired 10/21/2005 (courtesy of William Nguyen Phan; YouTube Clip; Text; Moriarti Comment


Charlie: Hide and seek.

Don: What are you talking about, like the kids' version?

Charlie: A mathematical approach to it, yes. See, the assassin must hide in order to accomplish his goal, we must seek and find the assassin before he achieves that goal.

Megan: Ah, behavioral game theory, yeah, we studied this at Quantico.

Charlie: I doubt you studied it the way that Rubinstein, Tversky and Heller studied two person constant sum hide and seek with unique mixed strategy equilibria.

Megan: No, not quite that way.

Don: Just bear with him.


Thoughts on Hide and Seek games played on naturally occuring "landscapes" from Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter (complete story)


General principles:


"…But he perpetually errs by being too deep or too shallow, for the matter in hand; and many a schoolboy is a better reasoner than he. I knew one about eight years of age, whose success at guessing in the game of 'even and odd' attracted universal admiration. This game is simple, and is played with marbles. One player holds in his hand a number of these toys, and demands of another whether that number is even or odd. If the guess is right, the guesser wins one; if wrong, he loses one. The boy to whom I allude won all the marbles of the school. Of course he had some principle of guessing; and this lay in mere observation and admeasurement of the astuteness of his opponents. For example, an arrant simpleton is his opponent, and, holding up his closed hand, asks, 'are they even or odd?' Our schoolboy replies, 'odd,' and loses; but upon the second trial he wins, for he then says to himself, the simpleton had them even upon the first trial, and his amount of cunning is just sufficient to make him have them odd upon the second; I will therefore guess odd'; --he guesses odd, and wins. Now, with a simpleton a degree above the first, he would have reasoned thus: 'This fellow finds that in the first instance I guessed odd, and, in the second, he will propose to himself upon the first impulse, a simple variation from even to odd, as did the first simpleton; but then a second thought will suggest that this is too simple a variation, and finally he will decide upon putting it even as before. I will therefore guess even' guesses even, and wins. Now this mode of reasoning in the schoolboy, whom his fellows termed 'lucky,' --what, in its last analysis, is it?"


"It is merely," I said, "an identification of the reasoner's intellect with that of his opponent."


(glossary: "arrant simpleton" = L1 (conditional on shared history, which makes one choice focal in a way that would attract L0); "simpleton a degree above the first" = L2; boy with all the marbles = L2 or L3, depending on his assessment of how simple his opponent is)


Specific application:


"At length my eyes, in going the circuit of the room, fell upon a trumpery filigree card-rack of pasteboard, that hung dangling by a dirty blue ribbon, from a little brass knob just beneath the middle of the mantelpiece. In this rack, which had three or four compartments, were five or six visiting cards and a solitary letter. This last was much soiled and crumpled. It was torn nearly in two, across the middle --as if a design, in the first instance, to tear it entirely up as worthless, had been altered, or stayed, in the second. It had a large black seal, bearing the D-- cipher very conspicuously, and was addressed, in a diminutive female hand, to D--, the minister, himself. It was thrust carelessly, and even, as it seemed, contemptuously, into one of the upper divisions of the rack.


"No sooner had I glanced at this letter, than I concluded it to be that of which I was in search. To be sure, it was, to all appearance, radically different from the one of which the Prefect had read us so minute a description. Here the seal was large and black, with the D-- cipher; there it was small and red, with the ducal arms of the S-- family. Here, the address, to the Minister, was diminutive and feminine; there the superscription, to a certain royal personage, was markedly bold and decided; the size alone formed a point of correspondence. But, then, the radicalness of these differences, which was excessive; the dirt; the soiled and torn condition of the paper, so inconsistent with the true methodical habits of D--, and so suggestive of a design to delude the beholder into an idea of the worthlessness of the document; these things, together with the hyperobtrusive situation of this document, full in the view of every visitor, and thus exactly in accordance with the conclusions to which I had previously arrived; these things, I say, were strongly corroborative of suspicion, in one who came with the intention to suspect."

Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Vincent P. Crawford, "Studying Cognition via Information Search in Two-Person Guessing Game Experiments," paper still in progress.

Lecture Slides, Berkeley Psychology and Economics Seminar, 6 March 2007, and the Barcelona JOCS Seminar, 26 March 2007; focusing on cognitive and experimental issues; earlier version of Lecture Slides, Chicago, 2007, AEA Meetings; focusing on cognitive and experimental issues

Lecture Slides, Workshop on Econometrics and Experimental Economics, Northwestern University, 28 April 2006; focusing on econometric issues

Lecture Slides, "Studying Strategic Thinking by Monitoring Search for Hidden Payoff Information and Interpreting the Data in the Light of Algorithms that Link Cognition, Search, and Decisions," NSF Workshop on "Behavior, Computation, and Networks in Human Subject Experimentation," Del Mar, California, July 31-August 1, 2008

Lecture Slides, Cemmap/ELSE Workshop on "Experimental Analysis of Procedural Rationality in Games and Decisions," University College London, 4 March 2009

Lecture Slides, "Studying Strategic Thinking Experimentally by Monitoring Search for Hidden Payoff Information," Behavioral, Social and Computer Sciences Seminar, Calit2, University of California, San Diego, 10 June 2009


Vincent P. Crawford, "Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments" (based on joint work with Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Bruno Broseta), in Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, editors, Perspectives on the Future of Economics: Positive and Normative Foundations, Volume 1 in the series Handbooks of Economic Methodologies, Oxford University Press, 2008

Lecture Slides presented at the Conference on the Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, New York University, 25-26 April 2008

Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Vincent P. Crawford, "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review 96 (December 2006), 1737-1768; Web Appendix (zip) (A. Instructions for Baseline and Robot/Trained Subjects Treatments; B. Description of Pilots; C. Preliminary Statistical Tests; D. Figures Showing Subjects' Aggregate Guess Distributions, Game by Game; E. Subjects' Guess and Look-up Data; F. Specification Tests and Analysis of Clusters; G. Supplementary Tables; H. Analysis of Search); Data Appendix (zip); Lecture slides (ppt)

Old Appendix I. Selected Subjects' Information Searches and Types' Search Implications

Figures showing aggregate frequency distributions of guesses game by game (with games identified by the codes from Table 2):

2A-B, 2C-D, 2E-F, 2G-H, 2I-J, 2K-L, 2M-N, 2O-P

Sara Robinson extensively discusses this paper in her article, "How Real People Think in Strategic Games," in the January/February 2004 issue of SIAM News.

Vincent P. Crawford, "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review 93 (March 2003), 133-149; Lecture slides

Mike Royko's column


"The truth deserves a bodyguard of lies." -- Winston Churchill, Teheran, 1943

"The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States, especially in the MiddleEast and North Africa. In fact, the information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often, it was frustratingly vague.

Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and Summer:

• 'Unbelievable news in coming weeks'

• 'Big event ... there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar'

• 'There will be attacks in the near future'

Troubling, yes. But they don’t tell us when; they don’t tell us where; they don’t tell us who; and they don’t tell us how."

-- Condoleeza Rice, Opening Remarks to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 8 April 2004.

My question for Rice, Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld: If Al-Quaeda had sent you a message saying "We're going to hijack airplanes and crash them into the World Trade Center--the one in New York City--on September 11--this coming September 11", would you have believed them?


Vincent P. Crawford, "Introduction to Experimental Game Theory" (Symposium issue), Journal of Economic Theory 104 (May 2002), 1-15.


Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Bruno Broseta, "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica 69 (September 2001)), 1193-1235; Correction of minor typos in Table 2 of published version (p.1216)

Preliminary version (UCSD Discussion Paper 98-22, includes appendices)

extensively revised version plus Appendix A (UCSD Discussion Paper 2000-02R)

Appendices B, C, D, and E

Lecture slides

MouseLab home page


Vincent P. Crawford, "Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games," in Ugo Pagano and Antonio Nicita, editors, The Evolution of Economic Diversity (papers from Workshop X, International School of Economic Research, University of Siena), London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 133-163; Lecture slides


Readers (and potential Routledge authors) should note that Routledge eliminated crucial parts of Figure 6.2(b), making it meaningless. There should be a closed dot at (2,0) and an open dot at (0,0), as in the UCSD Discussion Paper 97-19 version linked above. Potential authors: Routledge also doesn’t give you even the opportunity to buy reprints.


Vincent P. Crawford and Bruno Broseta, "What Price Coordination?The Efficiency-enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play," American Economic Review 88 (March 1998), 198-225.






Vincent P. Crawford, "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction," in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. I, Econometric Society Monographs No. 27, Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 206-242; reprinted with minor changes and additions in Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, editors, Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, 344-373.






Vincent P. Crawford, "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory 78 (February 1998), 286-298.






Vincent P. Crawford, "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica 63 (January 1995), 103-143.






Vincent P. Crawford, "An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination," Games and Economic Behavior 3 (February 1991), 25-59.





Vincent P. Crawford, "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 80 (May 1990), 213-219.






Vincent P. Crawford, "Equilibrium without Independence," Journal of Economic Theory 50 (February 1990), 127-154.






Vincent P. Crawford, "Learning and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games," Journal of Theoretical Biology 140 (23 October 1989), 537-550.







Matching Markets







Vincent P. Crawford, "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66 (2008), 149-160.


Sara Robinson's August 24, 2004 New York Times article about the proposal, "Tweaking the Math to Make Happier Medical Marriages" and the graphic published with the article.


Patricia Morén's March 29, 2007 Diario Medico article about the proposal, "La flexibilidad salarial del residente mejora su asignación a distintos centros".







Vincent P. Crawford and Elsie Marie Knoer (deceased), "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica 49 (March 1981), 437-450.






Alexander S. Kelso, Jr., and Vincent P. Crawford, "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica 50 (November 1982), 1483-1504.







Vincent P. Crawford, "Comparative Statics in Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory 54 (August 1991), 389-400.








Vincent P. Crawford and Ping-Sing Kuo, "A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52 (August 2003), 427-442; Lecture slides.

Zoe Crawford's photographs of the Hu-Lin (Tiger-Forest) Street Evening Market, including the dual Dutch auctioneer and the numeraire. 

"The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Stuffiness" or "Who is Gerard Wanrooy and why did he (and his boss at Elsevier, Joop Dirkmaat), overriding JEBO editor Barkley Rosser's decision, refuse to publish one of these photographs in the article or to post them as accompanying materials linked on JEBO's website; and why did they try even to refuse us the right to publish a link in JEBO to the photographs posted on this website?"






Vincent Crawford, "John Nash and the Analysis of Strategic Behavior," Economics Letters 75 (May 2002), 377-382; UCSD Discussion Paper 2000-03; reprinted in Greek translation, with minor changes, as "O John Nash και η ανάλυση της στρατηγικής συμπεριφοράς," in Θεωρια Παιγνιων: Αφιερωμα στον John Nash (Game Theory: A Festschrift in Honor of John Nash), Constantina Kottaridi and Gregorios Siourounis, editors, Athens: Eurasia Publications, 2002.







Vincent P Crawford, "Review of Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge by Michael Suk-Young Chwe," Journal of Economic Literature 40 (June 2002), 577-578; html.






Vincent P. Crawford, "Review of Games of Strategy by Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath," Journal of Economic Literature 39 (September 2001), 904-905; html.


Interviews, press, and presentation slides that do not go with completed papers


Vox, Center for Economic Policy Research, August 2008 interview by Romesh Vaitilingam on "Behavioural game theory: how real people think in strategic interactions" (audio only)


"Συνέντευξη του Διακεκριμένου Καθηγητή του Πανεπιστημίου της Καλιφόρνια, Σαν Ντιέγκο, Professor Vincent P. Crawford: Στο εργαστήριο μαθαίνουμε πώς λαμβάνονται οι αποφάσεις," Εφημερίδα ΤA ΝΕΑ 15/03/2005, ειδικό ένθετο MBA Ανοιχτό: ("Interview of Distinguished Professor at the University of California, San Diego, Professor Vincent P. Crawford: In the Laboratory We Learn How Decisions are Made", in the special inset "MBA Open" of the Greek newspaper "The News," 15 March 2005 (interviewed by Constantina Kottaridi (Lecturer in Economics, University of Peloponnese) (html archive link in Greek; doc in English


Informal talk on "Strategies for Getting Papers Published in Journals" (audio only, hard to hear), National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan, October 2008


Sara Robinson's August 24, 2004 New York Times article about the proposal, "Tweaking the Math to Make Happier Medical Marriages" and the graphic published with the article, discussing:


Vincent P. Crawford, "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66 (2008), 149-160.


Sara Robinson's articles on matching markets in the April 2003 and July 2003 issues of SIAM News, discussing:



Vincent P. Crawford and Elsie Marie Knoer (deceased), "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica 49 (March 1981), 437-450.



Alexander S. Kelso, Jr., and Vincent P. Crawford, "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica 50 (November 1982), 1483-1504.


Sara Robinson’s article, "How Real People Think in Strategic Games," in the January/February 2004 issue of SIAM News, discussing


Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Vincent P. Crawford, "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review 96 (December 2006), 1737-1768.


Brief interview by Scott Horsley on NPR's Morning Editon, Business, 26 October 2006, in "Game Theorists Watch OPEC Production Moves"


Patricia Moren's 29 March 2007 Diario Medico article about the “Flexible Salary Match proposal, "La flexibilidad salarial del residente mejora su asignación a distintos centros".


Discussion of Crawford-Sobel 1982 Econometrica paper "Strategic Information Transmission" by Jeff Ely on 1 May 2009 on Sandeep Baliga's and Jeff Ely's blog Cheap Talk.


Link to Crawford-Sobel 1982 Econometrica paper "Strategic Information Transmission" in 15 June 2009 guest column by Justin Wolfers on Freakonomics blog (link is at "cheap talk" at the very end).


Vincent Crawford, "Modeling Behavior in Novel Strategic Situations via Level-k Thinking," slides for lecture presented in the Marketing Seminar, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, 3 April 2008; the Applied Micro Theory Workshop, University of Pennsylvania, 28 April 2008; and as a “semi-plenary” lecture at GAMES 2008, Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 14 July 2008.

Vincent P. Crawford, "Level-k Thinking," slides for plenary lecture presented at the 2007 North American Meeting of the Economic Science Association, Tucson, October 18-21.

Vincent P. Crawford, Lecture Slides for "Outguessing and Deception in Novel Strategic Situations," SESS Distinguished Lecture, Singapore Management University, November 2004; Lecture Slides for version presented at Northwestern University, October 2005.



Past Courses (only most recent year is shown for undergraduate courses)

























In memory of my father, Bennett Crain, 1930-2006



Great-great-great-great-uncle Bill (William Harris Crawford, 1772-1834) 



Last modified 28 March 2016.

Copyright © Vincent P. Crawford, 2016. All federal and state copyrights reserved for all original material presented on this site, or in the courses it refers to, through any medium, including lecture or print.
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