Economics 200C: Games and Information, Second
Half, Spring 2009
Economics 200C: Games and Information concludes the
microeconomics core. It provides an introduction to noncooperative game
theory,
developing methods for analyzing how people make decisions when their
consequences are influenced by other peoples’ decisions, and showing
how to use
those methods to analyze strategic and informational questions in
microeconomics. My half of the class focuses on the last group of
topics.
Your grade for 200C will be a simple aggregate of your
grades on Joel Sobel’s and my semi-finals.
Lectures: Tuesdays and Thursdays 8:00
(promptly)-9:50
in Economics Room 300; first meeting of my part Thursday, May 7
Semi-Final Exam: The semi-final, 80
minutes,
closed-book, will be in Econ 300, Thursday, June 11th, from 8:00 to
9:20 a.m.
Practice Problems: There are no formal
homework
assignments, but it is strongly recommended that you do these practice
problems and the textbook problems listed here. (pdf)
Syllabus (pdf)
Lecture notes (for this part of the course) (pdf)
Textbooks: The lectures will mainly follow readings in Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford 1995, the required text ("MWG"), and for some topics David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton 1990 ("Kreps"). There are also some useful readings in John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers, Oxford 1992, and Hal Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, W. W. Norton 1992 (third edition).
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic
Theory,
Kreps, A Course in
Microeconomic Theory,
I have also listed some readings in:
McMillan, Games,
Strategies, and Managers,
Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, W. W. Norton 1992 (third edition) (“Varian”)
I suggest that you do all the readings in MWG and Kreps below plus whatever else you find helpful. (Varian is helpful, but is not an adequate substitute for MWG and Kreps for our purposes.)
1. Adverse Selection
MWG 436-450; Kreps 625-629; Varian 466-469
George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,”
Quarterly
Journal of Economics (August 1970)
George Akerlof, “Behavioral macroeconomics
and macroeconomic
behavior,” American Economic
Review (June 2002)
2. Signaling and
Screening
MWG 450-467; Kreps 629-652; Varian 469-471
Michael Spence, “Job Market Signalling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1973)
Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay
on the Economics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 1976)
Joseph Stiglitz, “Information and the change
in the paradigm
in economics,” American Economic
Review (June 2002)
3. Agency
MWG 477-506; Kreps 577-614 and 661-674; Varian 441-466; McMillan 91-129
4. Incentives and
Mechanism Design
MWG 857-910; Kreps 661-703; McMillan 133-159
Vincent Crawford / UCSD Department of Economics / last modified 6 May 2009
Copyright © Vincent P. Crawford, 2009. All federal and state
copyrights
reserved for all original material presented in this course through any
medium,
including lecture or print.