IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS:
IT'S ALL IN THE TIMING*

VALARIE A. RAMEY

Standard vector autoregression (VAR) identification methods find that government spending raises consumption and real wages; the Ramey–Shapiro narrative approach finds the opposite. I show that a key difference in the approaches is the timing. Both professional forecasts and the narrative approach shocks Granger-cause the VAR shocks, implying that these shocks are missing the timing of the news. Motivated by the importance of measuring anticipations, I use a narrative method to construct richer government spending news variables from 1939 to 2008. The implied government spending multipliers range from 0.6 to 1.2. JEL Codes: E62, N42.

I. INTRODUCTION

How does the economy respond to a rise in government purchases? Do consumption and real wages rise or fall? The literature remains divided on this issue. Vector autoregression (VAR) techniques in which identification is achieved by assuming that government spending is predetermined within the quarter typically find that a positive government spending shock raises not only GDP and hours, but also consumption and the real wage (or labor productivity) (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford 1992; Blanchard 2008).

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Whether government spending raises or lowers consumption and the real wage is crucial for our understanding of how government spending affects GDP and hours, as well as whether “stimulus packages” make sense. It is also important for distinguishing macroeconomic models. Consider first the neoclassical approach, as represented by papers such as Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993). A permanent increase in government spending financed by nondistortionary means creates a negative wealth effect for the representative household. The household optimally responds by decreasing its consumption and increasing its labor supply. Output rises as a result. The increased labor supply lowers the real wage and raises the marginal product of capital in the short run. The rise in the marginal product of capital leads to more investment and capital accumulation, which eventually brings the real wage back to its starting value. In the new steady-state, consumption is lower and hours are higher. A temporary increase in government spending in the neoclassical model has less impact on output because of the smaller wealth effect. Depending on the persistence of the shock, investment can rise or fall. In the short run, hours should still rise and consumption should still fall.¹

¹ Adding distortionary taxes or government spending that substitutes for private consumption or capital adds additional complications. See Baxter and King (1993) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) for discussions of these complications. Barro (1981) tests predictions from a neoclassical model, but one in which hours do not vary.
The new Keynesian approach seeks to explain a rise in consumption, the real wage, and productivity found in most VAR analyses. For example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) propose models with oligopolistic (or monopolistic) competition and increasing returns in order to explain the rise in real wages and productivity. In the Devereux et al model, consumption may rise only if returns to specialization are sufficiently great. Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2006) show that only an “ultra-Keynesian” model with sticky prices, “rule-of-thumb” consumers, and off-the-labor-supply curve assumptions can explain how consumption and real wages can rise when government spending increases. Their paper makes clear how many special features the model must contain to explain the rise in consumption.

This paper reexamines the empirical evidence by comparing the two main empirical approaches to estimating the effects of government spending: the VAR approach and the Ramey–Shapiro narrative approach. After reviewing the set-up of both approaches and the basic results, I show that a key difference appears to be in the timing. In particular, I show that both the Ramey–Shapiro dates and professional forecasts Granger-cause the VAR shocks. Thus, big increases in military spending are anticipated several quarters before they actually occur. I show this is also true for several notable cases of non-defense government spending changes. I then discuss how failing to account for the anticipation effect can explain some of the differences in the empirical results of the two approaches.

Although the Ramey–Shapiro military variable gets the timing right, it incorporates news in a very rudimentary way. Thus, in the final part of the paper, I construct two new measures of government spending shocks. The first builds on ideas by Romer and Romer (2010) and uses narrative evidence to construct a new, richer variable of defense shocks. Romer and Romer use information from the legislative record to document tax policy changes. I instead must rely on news sources because government documents are not always released in a timely manner and because government officials have at times purposefully underestimated the cost of military actions. Using Business Week, as well as several newspaper sources, I construct an estimate of changes in the expected present value of government spending. My analysis extends back to the first quarter of 1939, so I am able to analyze the period of the greatest increase in government spending in U.S.
history. For the most part, I find effects that are qualitatively similar to those of the simple Ramey–Shapiro military variable. When World War II is included, the multiplier is estimated to be around unity; when it is excluded it is estimated to be 0.6 to 0.8, depending on how it is calculated.

Unfortunately, the new defense news shock variable has very low predictive power if both WWII and the Korean War are excluded. Thus, I construct another variable for the later period based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters. In particular, I use the difference between actual government spending growth and the forecast of government growth made one quarter earlier as the shock. This variable is available from 1969 to 2008. VARs with this variable indicate that temporary rises in government spending do not stimulate the economy.

Recent research on the effects of tax changes on the economy complements the points made here. In an early contribution to this literature, Yang (2005) points out the differences between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes in a theoretical model. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) show the pitfalls of trying to use a standard VAR to identify shocks when there is foresight about taxes. Mertens and Ravn (2008) use the narrative-approach tax series constructed by Romer and Romer (2010) to distinguish anticipated from unanticipated tax changes empirically, and find very different effects. These papers provide additional evidence on the importance of anticipation effects.

II. Fluctuations in Government Spending

This section reviews the trends and fluctuations in the components of government spending. As we will see, defense spending accounts for almost all of the volatility of government spending.

Figure I shows the paths of real defense spending per capita and total real government spending per capita in the post-WWII era. The lines represent the Ramey and Shapiro (1998) dates, including the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, augmented by 9/11. These dates will be reviewed in detail below. The major movements in defense spending all come following one of the four military dates. Korea is obviously the most important, but the other three are also quite

2. Per capita variables are created using the entire population, including armed forces overseas.
noticeable. There are also two minor blips in the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s.

Looking at the bottom graph in Figure II, we see that total government spending shows a significant upward trend over time. Nevertheless, the defense buildups are still distinguishable after
the four dates. The impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has a delayed effect on total government spending, because non-defense spending fell.

Some have argued that the Korean War was unusually large, and thus should be excluded from the analysis of the effects of government spending. To put the Korean War in context, Figure II shows the defense spending per capita back to 1939. The Korean War, which looked so large in a post-WWII graph, is dwarfed by the increases in government spending during WWII.

Figure III returns to the post-WWII era and shows defense spending, nondefense federal spending, and state and local spending as a fraction of GDP (in nominal terms). The graph shows that relative to the size of the economy, each military buildup has become smaller over time. Federal nondefense spending is a minor part of government spending, hovering around 2 to 3 percent of GDP. In contrast, state and local spending has risen from around 5 percent of GDP in 1947 to over 12 percent of GDP now. Since state and local spending is driven in large part by cyclical fluctuations in state revenues, it is not clear that aggregate VARs are very good at capturing shocks to this type of spending. For example, California dramatically increased its spending on K-12 education when its tax revenues surged from the dot-com boom in the second half of the 1990s.
What kind of spending constitutes nondefense spending? Government data on spending by function shows that the category of education, public order (which includes police, courts and prisons), and transportation expenditures has increased to 50 percent of total government spending. The standard VAR approach includes shocks to this type of spending in its analysis (Blanchard and Perotti 2002). Such an inclusion is questionable for several reasons. First, the biggest part of this category, education, is driven in large part by demographic changes, which can have many other effects on the economy. Second, to the extent that the government provision of these services is more efficient than private provision, then an increase in government spending might have positive wealth effects. Thus, including these categories in spending shocks is not the best way to test the neoclassical model versus the Keynesian model.

3. Some of the analyses, such as Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) and Perotti (2007), have tried to address this issue by using only “government consumption” and excluding “government investment.” Unfortunately, this National Income and Product Account distinction does not help. As the footnotes to the NIPA tables state: “Government consumption expenditures are services (such as education and national defense) produced by government that are valued at their cost of production…. Gross government investment consists of general government and government enterprise expenditures for fixed assets.” Thus, since teacher salaries are the bulk of education spending, they would be counted as “government consumption.”
In sum, defense spending is a major part of the variation in government spending around trend. Moreover, it has the advantage of being the type of government spending least likely to enter the production function or interact with private consumption. It is for this reason that many analyses of government spending focus on military spending when studying the macroeconomic effects of government spending, including early contributions by Hall (1980, 1986) and Barro (1981) as well as more recent contributions by Barro and Redlick (2010) and Hall (2009).

III. IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS: VAR VERSUS NARRATIVE APPROACHES

III.A. The VAR Approach

Blanchard and Perotti (2002) have perhaps the most careful and comprehensive approach to estimating fiscal shocks using VARs. To identify shocks, they first incorporate institutional information on taxes, transfers, and spending to set parameters, and then estimate the VAR. Their basic framework is as follows:

$$Y_t = A(L)Y_{t-1} + U_t,$$

where $Y_t$ consists of quarterly real per capita taxes, government spending, and GDP and $A(L)$ is a polynomial in the lag operator. Although the contemporaneous relationship between taxes and GDP turns out to be complicated, they find that government spending does not respond to GDP or taxes contemporaneously. Thus, their identification of government spending shocks is identical to a Choleski decomposition in which government spending is ordered before the other variables. When they augment the system to include consumption, they find that consumption rises in response to a positive government spending shock. Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) use this basic identification method in their study which focuses only on government spending shocks and not taxes. They estimate a VAR with additional variables of interest, such as real wages, and order government spending first. Perotti (2007) uses this identification method to study a system with seven variables.  

4. See the references listed in the introduction to see the various permutations on this basic set-up.
III.B. The Ramey–Shapiro Narrative Approach

In contrast, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a narrative approach to identify shocks to government spending. Because of their concern that many shocks identified from a VAR are simply anticipated changes in government spending, they focus only on episodes where Business Week suddenly began to forecast large rises in defense spending induced by major political events that were unrelated to the state of the U.S. economy. The three episodes identified by Ramey and Shapiro were as follows:

Korean War. On June 25, 1950 the North Korean army launched a surprise invasion of South Korea, and on June 30, 1950 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff unilaterally directed General MacArthur to commit ground, air, and naval forces. The July 1, 1950 issue of Business Week immediately predicted more money for defense. By August 1950, Business Week was predicting that defense spending would more than triple by fiscal year 1952.

The Vietnam War. Despite the military coup that overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963, Business Week was still talking about defense cuts for the next year (November 2, 1963, p. 38; July 11, 1964, p. 86). Even the Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2, 1964 brought no forecasts of increases in defense spending. However, after the February 7, 1965 attack on the U.S. Army barracks, Johnson ordered air strikes against military targets in North Vietnam. The February 13, 1965, Business Week said that this action was “a fateful point of no return” in the war in Vietnam.

The Carter–Reagan Buildup. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 led to a significant turnaround in U.S. defense policy. The event was particularly worrisome because some believed it was a possible precursor to actions against Persian Gulf oil countries. The January 21, 1980 Business Week (p.78) printed an article entitled “A New Cold War Economy” in which it forecasted a significant and prolonged increase in defense spending. Reagan was elected by a landslide in November 1980 and in February 1981 he proposed to increase defense spending substantially over the next five years.

These dates were based on data up through 1998. Owing to recent events, I now add the following date to these war dates:

Week forecasted that the balance between private and public sectors would shift, and that spending restraints were going “out the window.” To recall the timing of key subsequent events, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan soon after 9/11. It invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.

The military date variable takes a value of unity in 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3, and zeroes elsewhere. This simple variable has a reasonable amount of predictive power for the growth of real defense spending. A regression of the growth of real defense spending on current and eight lags of the military date variable has an R-squared of 0.26. To identify government spending shocks, the military date variable is embedded in the standard VAR, but ordered before the other variables.

III.C. Comparison of Impulse Response Functions

Consider now a comparison of the effects of government spending increases based on the two identification methods. In particular, two versions of the following system are estimated:

\[
X(t) = A(L)X(t - 1) + U(t),
\]

where \(X(t)\) is a vector stochastic process, \(A(L)\) is a vector polynomial in the lag operator, and \(U(t)\) is a vector of the reduced form errors. The standard VAR orders government spending first, followed by other economic variables, and uses a standard Choleski decomposition to identify shocks to government spending. The Ramey–Shapiro method augments the system with the military date variable, ordered first, and uses shocks to the military date variable (identified with the Choleski decomposition) as the shock. The military date takes a value of unity in 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3.

In both instances, I use a set of variables similar to the ones used recently by Perotti (2007) for purposes of comparison. The VAR consists of the log real per capita quantities of total

5. The R-squared jumps to 0.57 if one scales the variable for the size of the buildup, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004).
6. The original Ramey and Shapiro (1998) implementation did not use a VAR. They regressed each variable of interest on lags of itself and the current and lagged values of the military date variable. They then simulated the impact of changes in the value of the military date variable. The results were very similar to those obtained from embedding the military variable in a VAR.
7. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) allow the value of the dummy variable to differ across episodes according to the amount that government spending increase. They obtain very similar results.
government spending, GDP, total hours worked, nondurable plus services consumption, and private fixed investment, as well as the Barro and Redlick (2010) tax rate and the log of nominal compensation in private business divided by the deflator in private business.\textsuperscript{8} Chained nondurable and services consumption are aggregated using Whelan’s (2000) method. I use total hours worked instead of private hours worked based on Cavallo’s (2005) work showing that a significant portion of rises in government spending consists of increases in the government payroll. Total hours worked are based on unpublished BLS data and are available on my web site. Complete details are given in the data appendix. Also, note that I use a product wage rather than a consumption wage. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) show both theoretically and empirically why it is the product wage that should be used when trying to distinguish models of government spending. Defense spending tends to be concentrated in a few industries, such as manufactured goods. Ramey and Shapiro show that the relative price of manufactured goods rises significantly during a defense buildup. Thus, product wages in the expanding industries can fall at the same time that the consumption wage is unchanged or rising.\textsuperscript{9} Both VARs are specified in levels, with a quadratic time trend and four lags included.\textsuperscript{10} I compare the effects of shocks that are normalized so that the log change of government spending is unity at its peak in both specifications.

Figure IV shows the impulse response functions. The standard error bands shown are only 68\% bands, based on bootstrap standard errors. Although this is common practice in the government spending literature, it has no theoretical justification.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{8} The results are very similar if I instead use Alexander and Seater’s (2009) update of the Seater (1983) and Stephenson (1998) average marginal tax rate. The Alexander–Seater tax rates are based on actual taxes paid, whereas the Barro–Sahasakul series uses statutory rates. The new Barro–Redlick series includes state income taxes, whereas the Alexander–Seater series only has federal income and social security tax rates.

\textsuperscript{9} The main reason that Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) find that real wages increase is that they construct their real wage by dividing the wage in manufacturing by the implicit price deflator. Ramey and Shapiro show that the wage in manufacturing divided by the price index for manufacturing falls during a defense buildup.

\textsuperscript{10} I use a quadratic time trend to account for the demographically-induced U-shape in hours per capita, as discussed by Francis and Ramey (2009).

\textsuperscript{11} Some have appealed to Sims and Zha (1999) for using 68\% bands. However, there is no formal justification for this particular choice. It should be noted that most papers in the monetary literature use 95\% error bands.
Comparison of Identification Methods: Response to a Government Spending Shock (Standard error bands are 68% confidence intervals)
FIGURE IV
(CONTINUED)
I only use the narrow error bands because the wider ones make it difficult to see the comparison of mean responses across specifications. In the later analysis with my new variables, I also show 95% error bands.

The first column shows the results from the VAR identification and the second column shows the results from the war dates identification. The first part of Figure IV shows the effects on government spending, GDP, and hours. The results are qualitatively consistent across the two identification schemes for these three variables. By construction, total government spending rises by the same amount, although the peak occurs several quarters earlier in the VAR identification. This is the first indication that a key difference between the two methods is timing. GDP rises in both cases, but its rise is much greater in the case of the war dates identification. Hours rise slightly in the VAR identification, but much more strongly in the war dates identification. A comparison of the output and hours response shows that productivity rises slightly in both specifications.

The second part of Figure IV shows the cases in which the two identification schemes differ in their implications. The VAR identification scheme implies that government spending shocks raise consumption, lower investment for two years, and raise the real wage. In contrast, the war dates identification scheme implies that government spending shocks lower consumption, raise investment for a quarter before lowering it, and lower the real wage.

Overall, these two approaches give diametrically opposed answers with regard to some key variables. The next section presents empirical evidence and a theoretical argument that can explain the differences.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING

A concern with the VAR identification scheme is that some of what it classifies as “shocks” to government spending may well be anticipated. Indeed, my reading of the narrative record uncovered repeated examples of long delays between the decision to increase military spending and the actual increase. At the beginning of a big buildup of strategic weapons, the Pentagon first spends at least several months deciding what sorts of weapons it needs. The task of choosing prime contractors requires additional time. Once the prime contracts are awarded, the spending occurs slowly over
time. Quarter-to-quarter variations are mostly due to production scheduling variations among prime contractors.

From the standpoint of the neoclassical model, what matters for the wealth effect is the change in the present discounted value of government purchases, not the particular timing of the purchases. Thus, it is essential to identify when news becomes available about a major change in the present discounted value of government spending.

Blanchard and Perotti (2002) worried about the timing issue, and devoted Section VIII of their paper to analyzing it. To test for the problem of anticipated policy, they included future values of the estimated shocks to determine whether they affected the results. They found that the response of output was greater once they allowed for anticipation effects (see their Figure VII). Unfortunately, they did not show how the responses of consumption or real wages were affected. Perotti (2005) approached the anticipation problem by testing whether OECD forecasts of government spending predicted his estimated government spending shocks. For the most part, he found that they did not predict the shocks.

In the next subsection, I show that the war dates as well as professional forecasts predict the VAR government spending shocks. I also show how in each war episode, the VAR shocks are positive several quarters after Business Week started forecasting increases in defense spending. In the second subsection, I discuss theoretical results concerning the effects of anticipations. In the final subsection, I show that delaying the timing of the Ramey–Shapiro dates produces the Keynesian results.

**IV.A. Empirical Evidence on Timing Lags**

To compare the timing of war dates versus VAR-identified shocks, I estimate shocks using the VAR discussed above except with defense spending rather than total government spending as the key variable. I then plot those shocks around the war dates.

Figures V and VI show the path of log per capita real defense spending, the series of identified shocks, and some long-term forecasts. Consider first the Korean War in Figure V. The first vertical line shows the date when the Korea War started. The second vertical line indicates when the armistice was signed in July 1953. According to the VAR estimates, shown in the middle graph, there was a large positive shock to defense in 1951:1. However, as Business Week made clear, the path of defense spending during these
FIGURE V
Comparison of VAR Defense Shocks to Forecasts: Korea and Vietnam

Notes. The top and middle panels are based on log per capita real defense spending on a quarterly calendar year basis. The bottom panels are nominal, annual data on a fiscal year basis.

three quarters was anticipated as of August and September of 1950. The bottom graph shows Business Week’s forecasts of defense spending. The June 1950 forecast, made before the Korean War started, predicted that defense spending would remain at about $15 billion per year. Two months later in August 1950, Business Week correctly predicted the rise in defense spending through fiscal year 1952. By September 1950, it had correctly predicted the rise through fiscal year 1954. Thus, it is clear that the positive VAR shocks are several quarters too late. It is also interesting to note that while Business Week was predicting a future decline in defense spending as early as April 1953 when a truce seemed imminent, the VAR records a negative defense spending shock in the first quarter of 1954. Thus, the VAR shocks are not accurately reflecting news about defense spending.
Forecasts were not as accurate for Vietnam. As of August 1965, several noted senators were forecasting much higher expenditures than the Johnson Administration was quoting. The forecasts kept rising steadily for some time. Thus, while it is true that there were a number of positive spending shocks in the first years of the Vietnam War, it is not clear that the VAR gets the timing right.

In Figure VI, the VARs show many positive shocks during the Carter–Reagan build-up through 1985. The bottom panel shows, however, that as of January 1981, the OMB was very accurately predicting spending in fiscal years 1981–1984. On the other hand, the October 1981 forecast over-predicted defense spending in fiscal years 1985 and 1986. However, all of the forecast error for 1985 and 1986 can be attributed to the fact that inflation fell much
more quickly than expected. In real terms, the October 1981 predictions for the 1985 and 1986 fiscal years were very accurate. Yet the VARs produce large positive shocks for those years.

After 9/11 the VAR implies virtually no shocks until the second quarter of 2003. Yet the February 2002 OMB forecast for the next several years was raised significantly relative to the pre-9/11 April 2001 forecast. The February 2003 OMB forecast underpredicted spending, primarily because it assumed no invasion of Iraq, although many believed that it would happen.

As additional evidence of the ability of the private sector to forecast, Figure VII shows the government spending growth forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Before the third quarter of 1981, forecasters were asked to predict nominal defense spending. I convert the forecasts to real defense spending using the forecasts of the GDP deflator. Starting in the third quarter of 1981, forecasters were asked to predict real federal spending. The forecasts shown in the graph for quarter t are the forecast made in t for the growth rate of spending between t - 1 and t + 4. It is clear that forecasters predicted significantly higher defense spending growth for the year ahead starting in the first quarter of 1980, which was just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Similarly, forecasters predicted higher federal spending growth beginning in the fourth quarter of 2001, just after 9/11. Note also that the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 did not lead to a jump up in forecasts in the second quarter of 2003. In fact, the initial invasion went so well that forecasters reduced their forecasts in the third quarter of 2003.

Overall, it appears that much of what the VAR might be labeling as "shocks" to defense spending may have been forecasted. To test this hypothesis formally, I perform Granger causality tests between various variables and the VAR-based government spending shocks. In addition to the military dates variable, I also use estimates from the Survey of Professional Forecasters for real federal government spending forecasts starting in the third quarter of 1981. I use both the implied forecast dating from quarter t-1 of the log change in real spending from quarter t-1 to quarter t and the implied forecast dating from quarter t-4 of the change from quarter t-4 to quarter t.

12. The higher predictions do not show up in the third quarter of 2001 because the forecasters had already returned their surveys when 9/11 hit.
TABLE I
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis tests</th>
<th>p-value in parenthesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do war dates Granger-cause VAR shocks? 1948:1–2008:4</td>
<td>Yes (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do one-quarter ahead professional forecasts Granger-cause VAR shocks? 1981:3–2008:4</td>
<td>Yes (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do four-quarter ahead professional forecasts Granger-cause VAR shocks? 1981:3–2008:4</td>
<td>Yes (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do VAR shocks Granger-cause war dates? 1948:1–2008:4</td>
<td>No (0.115)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. VAR shocks were estimated by regressing the log of real per capita government spending on 4 lags of itself, the Barro–Redlick tax rate, log real per capita GDP, log real per capita nondurable plus services consumption, log real per capita private fixed investment, log real per capita total hours worked, and log compensation in private business divided by the deflator for private business. Except for the professional forecasts, 4 lags were also used in the Granger-causality tests. For the professional forecaster test, the VAR shock in period t is regressed on either the forecast made in period t-1 of the growth rate of real federal spending from t-1 to t for the forecast made in period t-4 of the growth from t-4 to t. The professional forecast regressions were estimated from 1981:3 to 2008:4 because this forecast was only available for that period. The war dates are a variable that takes a value of unity at 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3.
Figure VII
Survey of Professional Forecasters Predictions

Notes. The variable shown at time $t$ is the forecast of the growth rate of real spending from quarter $t - 1$ to quarter $t + 4$.

Table I shows the results. The evidence is very clear: the war dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks but the VAR shocks do not Granger-cause the war dates. Moreover, the VAR shocks, which are based on information up through the previous quarter, are Granger-caused by professional forecasts, even those made four quarters earlier. Thus, the VAR shocks are forecastable.

One should be clear that timing is not an issue only with defense spending. Consider the interstate highway program. In early 1956, *Business Week* was predicting that the “fight over highway building will be drawn out.” By May 5, 1956, *Business Week* thought that the highway construction bill was a sure bet. It fact it passed in June 1956. However, the multi-billion
dollar program was intended to stretch out over 13 years. It is difficult to see how a VAR could accurately reflect this program. Another example is schools for the Baby Boom children. Obviously, the demand for schools is known several years in advance. Between 1949 and 1969, real per capita spending on public elementary and secondary education increased 300%. Thus, a significant portion of nondefense spending is known months, if not years, in advance.

IV.B. *The Importance of Timing in Theory and Econometrics*

Macroeconomists have long known that anticipated policy changes can have very different effects from an unanticipated change. For example, *Taylor (1993, Chapter 5)* shows the effects of a change in government spending, anticipated two years in advance, on such variables as GDP, prices, interest rates and exchange rates. He does not consider the effects on consumption or real wages, however. More recently, *Yang (2005)* shows that foresight about tax rate changes significantly changes the responses of key variables in theoretical simulations.

The predictions of the neoclassical theory of fiscal policy depend on the particular formulation of the model. For example, one of the models considered by *Barro and King (1984)* assumes non-storability of goods, meaning that wealth cannot be transferred intertemporally through investment. In such a model, anticipated changes in future government spending have no effect on current labor or output since their future wealth effects cannot be transmitted to the present. Once intertemporal production opportunities are allowed, anticipated future changes in government spending can have effects in the present. In the simplest Ramsey model, anticipated future increases in government spending lead to immediate increases in labor supply and output and decreases in consumption. Even with rigidities such as adjustment cost on investment, habit formation in consumption and sticky wages and prices, anticipated increases in future government spending have these same qualitative effects. One should be clear, though, that even if the entire path of government spending is perfectly

13. The nominal figures on expenditures are from the *Digest of Education Statistics*. I used the GDP deflator to convert to real.

14. For an example, see the NBER working paper version, *Ramey (2009b)*.

15. For example, in his 2008 discussion of an earlier version of this paper, Lawrence Christiano showed qualitatively similar effects in the *Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)* model.
anticipated, its effect on the paths of output, hours, investment and consumption will depend on the particular timing of that path because of intertemporal substitution effects.

Anticipations of future changes in government policy have serious consequences for econometric models. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) demonstrate the potentially serious econometric problems that result from fiscal foresight. They show that when agents foresee future changes in taxes, the resulting time series have nonfundamental representations. The key problem is that the econometrician typically has a smaller information set than the agents. In this situation, standard VAR techniques do not extract the true shocks. While Leeper, Walker, and Yang study tax policy, their analysis clearly extends to government spending as well. I demonstrated above that agents foresee most major changes in government spending. Leeper, Walker, and Yang’s analysis therefore implies that the standard VAR techniques, such as those used by Perotti (2008), do not correctly identify shocks to government spending.

IV.C. Would Delaying the Ramey–Shapiro Dates Lead to Keynesian Results?

If the theoretical argument of the last section applies to the current situation, then delaying the timing of the Ramey–Shapiro dates should result in VAR-type Keynesian results. To investigate this possibility, I shifted the four military dates to correspond with the first big positive shock from the VAR analysis. Thus, instead of using the original dates of 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3, I used 1951:1, 1965:3, 1980:4, and 2003:2.

Figure VIII shows the results using the baseline VAR of the previous sections. As predicted by the theory, the delayed Ramey–Shapiro dates applied to actual data now lead to rises in consumption and the real wage, similarly to the shocks from the standard VARs. Thus, the heart of the difference between the two results appears to be the VAR’s delay in identifying the shocks.

Alternatively, one could try to estimate the VAR and allow future identified shocks to have an effect. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) did this for output, but never looked at the effects on consumption or wages. Based on an earlier draft of my paper, Tenhofen and Wolff (2007) analyze such a VAR for consumption

16. This idea was suggested by Susanto Basu.
FIGURE VIII
The Effect of Mistiming the Ramey–Shapiro Dates (Standard error bands are 68% confidence intervals)
and find that when the VAR timing changes, positive shocks to defense spending lead consumption to fall.

Thus, all of the empirical and theoretical evidence points to timing as being key to the difference between the standard VAR approach and the Ramey–Shapiro approach. The fact that the Ramey–Shapiro dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks suggests that the VARs are not capturing the timing of the news.

V. A NEW MEASURE OF DEFENSE NEWS

The previous sections have presented evidence that standard VARs do not properly measure government spending shocks because changes in government spending are often anticipated long before government spending actually changes. Although the original Ramey–Shapiro war dates attempt to get the timing right, the simple dummy variable approach does not exploit the potential quantitative information that is available.

Therefore, to create a better measure of “news” about future government spending, I read news sources in order to gather quantitative information about expectations. The defense news variable seeks to measure the expected discounted value of government spending changes due to foreign political events. It is this variable that matters for the wealth effect in a neoclassical framework. The series was constructed by reading periodicals in order to gauge the public’s expectations. Business Week was the principal source for most of sample because it often gave detailed predictions. However, it became much less informative after 2001, so I relied more heavily on newspaper sources. For the most part, government sources could not be used because they were either not released in a timely manner or were known to underestimate the costs of certain actions. However, when periodical sources were ambiguous, I consulted official sources, such as the budget. I did not use professional forecasters except for a few examples because the forecast horizon was not long enough.

The constructed series should be viewed as an approximation to the changes in expectations at the time. Because there were so many conflicting or incomplete forecasts, I had to make many judgment calls. In calculating present discounted values, I used the 3-year Treasury bond rate prevailing at the time. Before the early 1950s, I used the long-term government bond rate since the other was not available.
If the shock occurred in the last week or two of a quarter, I dated it as the next quarter, since it could not have much effect on aggregates for the entire current quarter. The detailed companion paper, “Defense News Shocks, 1939–2008: Estimates Based on News Sources” by Valerie Ramey (2009a), provides more than 100 pages of relevant news quotes and analysis of the expectations during this 70-year time period.

Table II shows the dates and values of the nonzero values of the new military shock series. Figure IX shows the shocks as a percent of the previous quarter’s nominal GDP. Some of the shocks, such as the Marshall Plan estimate in 1947:II and the moon mission announcement in 1961:II, were caused by military events but were classified as nondefense spending. While Roosevelt started boosting defense spending as early as the first quarter of 1939, the first big shock leading into World War II was caused by the events leading up to the fall of France, in 1940:II. Thus, my independent narrative analysis supports Gordon and Krenn’s (2009) contention that fiscal policy became a major force in the economy starting in 1940:II. The largest single defense news shock (as a percent of GDP) was 1941:IV. As the companion paper (Ramey 2009a) discusses, estimates of defense spending were skyrocketing even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Germany had been sinking U.S. ships in the Atlantic during the fall of 1941, and Business Week proclaimed that American entry into a “shooting war” was imminent (October 25, 1941, p. 13). It also declared that the U.S. was set for a Pacific showdown with Japan. The second biggest shock (as a percent of GDP) was the start of the Korean War. Estimates of defense spending increased dramatically within two months of North Korea’s attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950.

Table III shows how well these shocks predict spending and whether they are relevant instruments. As Staiger and Stock (1997) discuss, a first-stage F-statistic below 10 could be an indicator of a weak instrument problem. Unfortunately, most macro “shocks” used in the literature, such as oil prices and monetary shocks, have F-statistics well below 10.

The numbers shown in Table III are for three sample periods: 1939:1–2008:4, 1947:1–2008:4, and 1955:1–2008:4. The first two columns show the R-squared and the F-statistic for the regression of the growth of real per capita defense spending or total government spending on current and four lags of “defense news,” which is the present discounted value of the expected spending change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>PDV of expected change in spending, billions of nominal $</th>
<th>% of previous quarter GDP</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>PDV of expected change in spending, billions of nominal $</th>
<th>% of previous quarter GDP</th>
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### TABLE II
(Continued)

<table>
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<th>Quarter</th>
<th>PDV of expected change in spending, billions of nominal $</th>
<th>% of previous quarter GDP</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>PDV of expected change in spending, billions of nominal $</th>
<th>% of previous quarter GDP</th>
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TABLE III
EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE DEFENSE NEWS VARIABLE

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) R-squared</th>
<th>(2) F-statistic</th>
<th>(3) Marginal F-statistic</th>
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<td>Defense spending</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1939:1–2008:4</td>
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<td>0.551</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955:1–2008:4</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>2.01</td>
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<td>Government spending</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939:1–2008:4</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>37.58</td>
<td>11.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947:1–2008:4</td>
<td>0.518</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955:1–2008:4</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.387</td>
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</table>

Notes. Columns (1) and (2) show statistics from a regression of the growth of real per capita spending on current and four lags of the news shock divided by lagged nominal GDP. Column (3) shows the marginal F-statistic on current and four lags of the news variable in a regression of the growth of real per capita spending on four lags of the following additional variables: log real per capita spending, log real GDP, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the Barro–Redlick average marginal tax rate.

divided by nominal GDP of the previous quarter. The last column shows the F-statistic on the exclusion of the defense news variable from a regression of the growth of real per capita defense spending...
IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS

on four lags of log real per capita defense spending, log real GDP, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the Barro–Redlick average marginal tax rate. These variables will be used in the VARs to follow, so it is important to determine the marginal F-statistic of the new shock variable.

The table shows that as long as WWII or the Korean War is included, the new military shock variable has significant explanatory power and is a strongly relevant instrument. The R-squared for the sample from 1939 to 2008 is 0.42 and from 1947 to 2008 is 0.55. All of the F-statistics in the first two samples are well above 10. On the other hand, for the sample that excludes WWII and the Korean War, the shock variable has much less explanatory power and the F-statistics are well below the comfortable range. All indications are that this variable is not informative for the period after the Korean War.17

I next consider the effect of the defense news variable in a VAR. Since timing is important, I use quarterly data rather than annual data. Therefore, I must construct quarterly data for the 1939 to 1946 period since the BEA currently reports only annual data from that period. Fortunately, a 1954 BEA publication reports estimates of quarterly nominal components of GDP back to 1939. I combined these data with available price indices from the BLS to create real series. I used these constructed series to interpolate current annual NIPA estimates. The data appendix contains more details.

One is always worried when interpolation of data is involved, since the method and data used might make a difference. Fortunately, Gordon and Krenn (2009) have independently created a valuable new dataset for their research analyzing the role of government spending in ending the Great Depression. In their paper, they use completely different data sources and interpolation methods to construct macroeconomic data from 1919 to 1954. In private correspondence, we compared our series for the overlap period starting in 1939 and found them to be remarkably similar.

In order to examine the effect on a number of variables without including too many variables in the VAR, I follow Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s (2004) strategy of using a fixed set of variables and rotating other variables of interest in. The fixed set

17. I also investigated the explanatory power during subperiods, such as 1956–1975 and 1976–2008, and with longer lags, but continued to find low F-statistics.
of variables consists of defense news, the log of real per capita government spending, the log of real per capita GDP, the three-month T-bill rate, and the Barro-Redlick average marginal income tax rate. These last two variables are included in order to control for monetary policy and tax policy. To the fixed set of five variables, I rotate in a series of sixth variables, one at a time. The extra variables considered are total hours, the manufacturing product wage (the only consistent wage series back to 1939), the real BAA bond rate (with inflation defined by the CPI), the three components of consumer expenditures, nonresidential investment and residential investment. Four lags of the variables are used and a quadratic time trend is included. The data appendix fully describes all of the data used in the VAR, including the extensive construction of quarterly data for the WWII era.

Figure X shows the impulse response functions to a shock in the defense news variable. As before, the responses are normalized so that the government spending response to defense news is equal to unity. In the impulse responses shown earlier, I included only 68% standard error bands so that the graphs could be more easily compared across specifications. Here, I also show the more conventional 95% standard error bands. These error bands do not include the additional uncertainty resulting from possible measurement error in the news variable. The statistical appendix shows the results of simulations investigating the effects of adding measurement error to the news series. The results show that adding measurement error induces very little additional uncertainty. Thus, the error bands shown in the graphs would change little if I added this additional noise.

After a positive defense news shock, total government spending rises, peaking six quarters after the shock and returning to normal after four years. GDP also increases significantly, peaking six quarters after the shock and returning to normal after four years. Note that GDP rises before government spending begins to rise, consistent with my hypothesis. The implied elasticity of the GDP peak with respect to the government spending peak is 0.23. Since the average ratio of nominal GDP to nominal government spending was 4.9 from 1939 to 2008, the implied government


19. The tendency for GDP to rise in anticipation of the rise in government spending is also evident in the raw data at the start of WWII and the Korean War.
spending multiplier implied by these estimates is 1.1. If, instead, I calculate the multiplier by using the integral under the impulse response function for the five years after the shock, estimate of the multiplier is only slightly higher, at 1.2.20

Figure X also shows that total hours increases, significantly even by conventional significance levels. A comparison of the peak of the hours response to the peak of the GDP response implies that productivity also increases. McGrattan and Ohanian (2010) argue that the neoclassical model can only explain the behavior of macroeconomic variables during WWII if there were also positive TFP shocks. Positive TFP shocks are one possible explanation, although learning-by-doing (extensively documented during WWII) or composition effects are other possibilities. For example, Nekarda and Ramey (2010) show that while aggregate VARs indicate a positive productivity response to government spending, detailed 4-digit manufacturing industry data show a slightly negative short-run productivity response. The difference between the industry and aggregate results can be explained by Basu and Fernald (1997) finding that reallocation of production toward durable manufacturing can look like increasing returns in the aggregate because durable manufacturing industries have higher returns to scale than other industries (some of which have sharply diminishing returns to scale).

Figure X also shows that the real product wage in manufacturing initially falls and then rises, though it is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The 3-month Treasury bill rate falls slightly after a positive defense news shock, but it is not significantly different from zero. This response is most likely due to the response of monetary policy, particularly during WWII and the Korean War. On average, the income tax rate increases significantly after a positive spending shock.

The second part of Figure X shows six more variables of interest. The first panel shows that the real interest rate on BAA bonds initially falls significantly for a year, then returns to normal. Some of this pattern is likely due to the erratic behavior of inflation. In both World War II and the Korean War, prices shot up on the war news in anticipation of price controls. The next panel shows that nondurable consumption expenditures fall significantly at conventional significance levels. Moreover, they fall

20. The statistical appendix shows that the estimate of the multiplier is not sensitive to error in the measurement of news.
FIGURE X
The Effect of an Expected Change in Defense Spending, 1939–2008 (Both 68% and 95% standard error bands are shown)
FIGURE X
(CONTINUED)
before government spending begins to rise, consistent with my hypothesis regarding the importance of anticipations. In contrast, consumption expenditures on services rise significantly. Oddly, this variable stays well above normal even after GDP has returned to normal. Consumer durable purchases fall significantly. In addition, the stock of consumer durable goods as well as total consumption expenditures (not shown) also fall significantly. Finally, both nonresidential investment and residential investment fall significantly.

To summarize, except for services consumption, all other components of consumption and investment fall, consistent with the negative wealth effect of neoclassical theory. The multiplier is estimated to be between 1.1 and 1.2.

One might be tempted to try to extract unanticipated shocks to government spending by including my news variable in a VAR, and using a Choleski decomposition to identify shocks to quarterly government spending. This procedure would only be valid if my news variable perfectly captured all anticipated changes in government spending. Since it does not, it should not be used in this way.21

One question is how WWII and the Korean War affect the results. To see how the results change for different samples, Figure XI compares the impulse responses from the VARs estimated from (a) the full sample 1939–2008; (b) the sample with WWII omitted, 1947–2008; and (c) the sample with the Korean War omitted, 1939–1949 and 1955–2008. Again, the peak of government spending is normalized to be one. The upper right panel of Figure XI shows the response of GDP is somewhat less when WWII is excluded. Excluding the Korean War does not change the results much. The peak response is 0.23 with WWII included but 0.16 when WWII is excluded. This response implies a government spending multiplier of 0.78. If instead I calculate the multiplier using the integral of the impulse response functions, the multiplier is estimated to be 0.6. As Ohanian (1997) argues, spending

21. To see this, suppose that movements in government spending consist of three types of components: (i) anticipated changes in government spending that are captured by the econometrician in a news variable; (ii) anticipated changes in government spending that are not captured by the econometrician in a news variable; and (iii) unanticipated government spending. If one runs a VAR in which the news variable is included, the identified shocks will consist of components (ii) and (iii), and hence will include anticipated components. Therefore, such an exercise would not accurately show the effects of unanticipated government spending.
FIGURE XI
Comparison of the Effect of Defense Shocks with and without WWII and Korea
FIGURE XI
(CONTINUED)
during WWII was financed mostly by issuing debt, whereas spending during the Korean War was financed in large part by increases in taxes. In fact, the lower right panel shows that tax rates rise much more when WWII is omitted. Thus, the differential multiplier might be attributable to the effect of less use of distortionary business taxes during WWII.

The hours response is also somewhat smaller when WWII is omitted. In contrast to the earlier results, the manufacturing product wage decreases significantly if WWII is excluded. The increase in the manufacturing product wage during World War II could be due to differential strengths of wage and price controls. Finally, the 3-month Treasury bill rate falls much more when WWII is omitted.

The second part of Figure XI compares the responses with and without WWII and the Korean War for real interest rates, consumption and investment. Again, excluding Korea has little effect. The responses of both real interest rates and nondurable consumption are similar with and without WWII. In contrast, services consumption moves little if WWII is excluded. Consumer durable purchases fall in both samples, but there is an initial rise when WWII is excluded. This rise is dominated by the beginning of the Korean War, when consumers with recent memories of WWII feared that rationing was imminent. Finally, residential investment falls much less and turns positive after two years when WWII is excluded.

The results for the sample from 1955 to 2008 (not shown) are unusual. In particular, GDP rises for one period and then becomes negative after a positive defense shock. The standard error bands are very wide, though. As discussed above, the preliminary diagnostics indicate that the defense news variable is not very informative for government spending in a sample that excludes both big wars.

The multipliers estimated here, around 1.1 for the sample with WWII and 0.6 to 0.8 for the post-WWII sample, lie in the range of most other estimates from the literature. In his recent paper, Hall (2009) finds multipliers below unity, although he argues they could be larger near the zero interest lower bound. Barro and Redlick (2010) use annual data from 1914 to 2006 and find multipliers between 0.6 and 1. In contrast, Fisher and Peters (2009), using excess returns on defense stocks find a total government spending multiplier of 1.5. I will discuss details of their paper in the next section.
Several papers have argued that the government spending multiplier is larger when interest rates are near their zero lower bound (e.g., Eggertsson 2001; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009). My data from the WWII era sheds light on this issue. From 1939 to 1945, the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills averaged 0.24 percent, in the same range as three-month T-bill rates during The Great Recession. To determine whether the estimated multiplier is larger when the interest rate is near the lower bound, I estimate a trivariate VAR consisting of the news variable, government spending, and GDP using quarterly data from 1939 to 1949. The implied elasticity of peak GDP is 0.15 and the implied multiplier is 0.7, though the estimates are less precise for this reduced sample. The same trivariate VAR estimated from 1939 to 2008 implies a multiplier of 1. Thus, I find no evidence for the New Keynesian prediction that the multiplier is larger when the interest rate is near zero.

To summarize, the results based on VARs using the richer news variable back to 1939 largely support the qualitative results from the simpler Ramey–Shapiro military date variable. Most measures of consumption fall. Although the product wage in manufacturing rises if WWII is included, it falls when WWII is excluded. The estimates of the multiplier range from 0.6 to 1.2 depending on the sample. The multiplier is not larger when the sample is limited to periods with interest rates near zero.

VI. POST-KOREAN WAR NEWS SHOCKS BASED ON PROFESSIONAL FORECASTS

As discussed in the last section, the defense news variable is not very informative for the post-Korean War sample. Both the R-squared and the first-stage F-statistic are very low. Thus, the VAR finding that output and hours fall after a positive government spending shock in this later period are suspect. In order to study this later time period, I construct a second news variable based on professional forecasters. This variable measures the one-quarter ahead forecast error, based on the survey of professional forecasters. As discussed above, I have already shown that the professional forecasts Granger-cause the standard VAR shocks. Thus, this measure of news is likely to have fewer anticipation effects than the standard VAR shock.
Identifying Government Spending Shocks

Table IV
Explanatory Power of Professional Forecaster Errors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>F-statistic</th>
<th>Marginal F-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government spending</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>233.2</td>
<td>201.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. See notes for Table III. The news shock in this case is the difference between actual real spending growth (measured in logs) and forecasted growth, based on t-1 information. For 1968:4–1981:2, the shock pertains to defense spending; for 1981:3–2008:4, the shock pertains to all federal spending.

From the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 1981, the Survey of Professional Forecasters predicted nominal defense spending. I convert the forecast of nominal spending to a forecast of real spending using the forecasters’ predictions about the GDP deflator. For this period, I define the news as the difference between actual real defense spending growth between t-1 and t and the forecasted growth of defense spending for the same period, where the forecast was made in quarter t-1. From the third quarter of 1981 to the present, the forecasters predicted real federal spending. I construct the news based on the difference in the actual and predicted growth of real federal spending from period t-1 to t. As Table IV shows, this news variable has an R-squared of 60 percent for government spending growth and F-statistics exceeding 200. Thus, it is a potentially more powerful indicator of news.

I then study the effects of this news variable in the same VAR used for the defense news shock, with the forecast error substituted for the defense news shock. All other elements of the specification are the same. Figure XII shows the effects of this shock on the key variables. Unlike the case with defense spending news shocks in which government spending has a hump-shaped response, this shock leads government spending to spike up temporarily and then fall to normal and then negative after a couple of quarters. GDP rises slightly on impact, but then turns negative. The multiplier computed using the peak responses is around 0.8; the multiplier computed using the integral under the impulse response functions is negative. Thus, these shocks lead to rather contractionary effects, similar to those I found for the 1955 to 2008 period with my defense news shocks.

22. I use the forecast errors rather than the forecasts themselves so that I can combine the samples that use defense spending forecasts and federal spending forecasts.

23. These results also hold in a variety of specifications. For example, when I limit the sample to 1981:3–2008:4 so that the news shock variable refers only to federal spending, I find similar results.
The Effect of a Government Spending Shock, 1969–2008 Forecast Errors Based on Survey of Professional Forecasters (Both 68% and 95% standard error bands are shown)
IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS

FIGURE XII
(CONTINUED)
A recent paper by Fisher and Peters (2009) has taken another approach to constructing news series for government spending by using excess returns on defense stocks. Surprisingly, many of the periods of excess returns for defense companies do not match up with the Ramey–Shapiro dates (Levin 2010). For example, excess returns do not jump until three quarters after 9/11. Also, during the second half of the 1970s the cumulative excess returns increase much earlier than the narrative method suggests they should. This particular discrepancy might be explained by the fact that after the 1973 war in the Middle East, defense contractor sales to foreign governments started to increase dramatically until they were one-third the size of the U.S. defense procurement budget (Business Week 12/20/1976, p. 79). Thus, the increase in returns could be due to foreign arms sales rather than anticipations of increases in the U.S. defense budget.

Fisher and Peters (2009) show that after a shock to the cumulative excess returns to defense contractor stocks during the post-Korean War period, government spending begins rising almost immediately, reaches a new plateau after 10 quarters, and shows little indication of falling for at least 20 quarters. On the other hand, output, hours, and consumption either stay constant or decline for five quarters, and then rise with a hump-shape. The consumption response is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels, though. On the other hand, real wages fall significantly and then become indistinguishable from zero. Their multiplier is estimated to be 1.5.

Thus, the shocks identified from Fisher and Peters’ (2009) defense stocks excess returns imply much more persistent rises in government spending and higher multipliers than implied by most other shocks studied, including those from a standard VAR, the defense news variable based on the narrative method, as well as professional forecast errors. In contrast, my news shock based on professional forecast errors implies more temporary changes in government spending and smaller multipliers than the other methods. Therefore, in order to understand why the responses of macroeconomic variables are different, it would be useful to analyze why the responses of government spending to the various shocks have such different persistence.

24. Fisher and Peters (2009) show 68 percent confidence bands. As discussed earlier, there is no econometric basis for using this low level of significance for hypothesis testing.
VII. Conclusions

This paper has explored possible explanations for the dramatically different results between standard VAR methods and the narrative approach for identifying shocks to government spending. I have shown that the main difference is that the narrative approach shocks appear to capture the timing of the news about future increases in government spending much better. In fact, these shocks Granger-cause the VAR shocks. Because the VAR approach captures the shocks too late, it misses the initial decline in consumption and real wages that occurs as soon as the news is learned. I show that delaying the timing on the Ramey–Shapiro dates replicates the VAR results.

Finally, I have constructed two new series of government spending shocks. The first series improves on the basic Ramey–Shapiro war dates by extending the analysis back to WWII and by computing the expected present discounted value of changes in government spending. This variable produces results that are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the simple war dates variable: in response to an increase in government spending, most measures of consumption and real wages fall. However, the implied multipliers are lower: the implied multiplier is unity when WWII is included and 0.6 to 0.8 when World War II is excluded. It should be understood that this multiplier is estimated on data in which distortionary taxes increase on average during a military build-up, and is not necessarily applicable to situations in which government spending is financed differently. Also, this multiplier does not necessarily apply to increases in infrastructure spending, which may increase private productivity.

Since the defense news variable is much less informative for the most recent period, I also construct a second news series, based on forecast errors of professional forecasters. Shocks to this series imply that temporary rises in government spending generally lead to declines in output, hours, consumption and investment. Thus, none of my results indicate that government spending has multiplier effects beyond its direct effect.

APPENDIX I

A. Construction of the New Military Series

B. Data for 1947–2008

Data on nominal GDP, quantity indexes of GDP, and price deflators for GDP and its components were extracted from bea.gov on August 2009. The combined category of real consumption non-durables plus services was created using Wheelan’s (2000) method. The nominal wage and price indices for business were extracted August 2009 from the bls.gov productivity program. The total hours data used in the baseline post-WWII regressions is from unpublished data from the BLS, kindly provided by Shawn Sprague.

C. Data for 1939–1946

NIPA Data: National Income, 1954 Edition, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business presents quarterly nominal data on GNP and its components going back to 1939. Although the levels are somewhat different, the quarterly correlation of these data with modern data for the overlap between 1947 and 1953 is 0.999. To create quarterly real GDP, I first constructed price deflators for various components. The price deflators that were available either monthly or quarterly were the Producer Price Index (available from FRED), the Consumer Price Index (total, non-durables, durables, and services), available from bls.gov, and the price index for manufacturing. For this latter series, I spliced together data from old Survey of Current Business’ with data from bls.gov, which was available from 1986. Based on quarterly regressions of log changes in the various deflators on log changes in these price indexes for 1947 through 1970, I used the following relationships. For each component of consumption, as well as total consumption, I used the relevant CPI index. For nonresidential investment deflator inflation, I used weights on 0.5 each on the CPI inflation and manufacturing inflation. For the residential investment deflator inflation, I used a weight of 0.7 on CPI inflation and 0.3 on manufacturing inflation. The total fixed investment deflator inflation was a weighted average of residential and nonresidential, with the weights varying over time depending on the ratio of nominal nonresidential investment to total fixed investment. For defense (as well as federal and total government spending), I used a weight of 0.3 on CPI inflation and 0.7 on manufacturing inflation. For GDP, I used a weighted average of CPI inflation and manufacturing inflation based on the ratios of the nominal values of defense and investment to GDP, and the component series weights on each type of inflation. Deflators were obtained
taking exponentials of the integrated log changes. I used these constructed real quantities to interpolate the quantity indexes for GDP and its components, extracted August 2009 from the BEA website, with the Baum (2008) Stata module of the proportional Denton method.

D. Hours: Historical series 1939–2008

1939:1–1947:2: I interpolate Kendrick’s (1961) annual civilian nonfarm, farm, and military hours series using monthly and quarterly series published in various issues of the Statistical Abstract. An advantage of Kendrick’s civilian series is that it includes hours worked by “emergency workers” as part of the WPA, etc. Various issues of the Statistical Abstract (available online through census.gov) report quarterly or monthly data on employed persons and average weekly hours of employed persons for farm and nonfarm civilians from 1941:3 through 1945. These are based on the household survey. In 1946, ranges of hours were reported, so that average weekly hours could be constructed. Thus, total hours series for (nonemergency) farm and nonfarm civilians were constructed from these numbers from 1941:3–1946:4. The numbers of employed farm and nonfarm civilians from the household survey were reported from 1940:2 on, but average hours were not reported. For 1939:1 to 1940:1, the only available series was the establishment-based civilian nonfarm employment (available from bls.com). As there was no significant seasonality in the average weekly hours series for civilian nonfarm workers, I used the employment series to extend the civilian nonfarm worker total hours back to 1939:1. There was, however, significant seasonality in the average weekly hours for farm workers. I estimated seasonal hours factors for farm workers using data from 1941:3–1947:3 and then applied those to the employment numbers to create total hours back to 1939:1.

1947:3–2008:4: Because the earlier series were based on household data and because the match with Kendrick’s series was better, I spliced the earlier data CPS household series from 1947 on. The seasonally unadjusted CPS monthly data were collected by Cociuba, Prescott, and Ueberfeldt (2009). I then seasonally adjusted the entire series using the Census’ X12 program, allowing for outliers due to roving Easters and Labor Days. However, because there was a noticeable permanent change in the seasonality of hours from 1946 through 1948, the X12 program led to a few anomalous quarters, 1947:3, 1948:2, and 1948:4. I smoothed these quarters by averaging with the surrounding quarters.
The military hours series was available quarterly from unpublished BLS data from 1948 on. For 1939 to 1947, I performed a simple interpolation of Kendrick's annual military hours series and spliced it to the BLS series. Note the hours estimated by the BLS, and hence my series, are about 6 percent higher than Kendrick's estimates of military hours. Siu (2008) argues that Kendrick underestimates military hours.

As noted above, the initial baseline regressions use the establishment-based hours series rather than the household series for comparability with the rest of the literature.

**E. Tax Series**

Barro and Redlick (2010) provide an update for the Barro and Sahasakul (1983) average marginal tax rate series from 1912 through 2006. I had previously updated Alexander and Seater's (2009) series through 2007 using their programs. I assumed that the Barro–Redlick series changed by the same percent in 2007 as my update of the Alexander–Seater (2009) series and (for want of more information) was constant through 2008. The annual tax series are converted to quarterly assuming that the tax rate in each quarter of the year was equal to the annual rate for that year.

**F. Survey of Professional Forecasters Series**

The forecasts of federal spending from 1981:3 on are available online from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve. GDP deflator forecasts were also available online. Thomas Stark kindly provided the forecasts of defense spending from 1968:4 to 1981:2. I use the mean estimates.

**APPENDIX II**

This appendix investigates how much uncertainty is introduced by the fact that the narrative method I use to construct news shocks involves many judgement calls and hence produces a series with measurement error. To investigate the effects of measurement error, I simulated the following process:

\[
\text{Noisy }\text{news}_t = (1 - \mu_t)\text{news}_t + \rho_t \mu_t \text{news}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_t) \mu_t \text{news}_{t+1} + \phi_t \text{news}_t \quad \text{with} \quad \mu_t \sim U(0, 0.2), \quad \rho_t \sim B(0.5), \quad \phi_t \sim U(0.9, 1.1).
\]
In this equation, "news" is my news series, which is the present discounted value of expected changes in government spending divided by lagged nominal GDP. Measurement error is added in two ways. First, I allow up to 20 percent of the value to be mistimed by a quarter, so that $\mu$ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.2. $\rho$ takes the value of 0 with 50 percent probability and 1 with 50 percent probability, so that there is equal probability of mistiming by leading a quarter and lagging a quarter. Second, I allow the value of news to be over-estimated or under-estimated by up to 20 percent, so that $\phi$ is uniformly distributed over the interval 0.8 to 1.2. All three random variables are independent.

I then estimate the VAR from 1939:1 to 2008:4 for the six variable system with nondurable consumption as the sixth variable. Figure A.1 shows the 95 percent confidence bands for government spending, GDP and nondurable consumption from 500 replications. The error bands are very tight. I also calculated the implied elasticity based on comparing the maximum output response to the maximum government spending response. The multiplier was estimated to be 0.215 with a standard error of 0.0071. Thus, adding the noise to the news variable adds very little uncertainty to estimates of the multiplier.

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