

## **Course Outline and Syllabus: First-Year M. Phil Lectures on Experimental Economics Vincent P. Crawford, University of Oxford**

(Additional course materials are at <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/FirstYearMPhil.html>, linked to the Department's course page and to my Oxford page at [http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/staff/vincent\\_crawford/](http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/staff/vincent_crawford/)).

### **Motivation and overview of experimental methods**

Alvin Roth, chapter 1, "Introduction to Experimental Economics," in Kagel and Roth (eds.), *The Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton, 1995: 3-23.

Colin Camerer, *Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction*, Princeton, 2003: 34-42 (Appendix 1.2, Experimental Design) and (optional) pp. 1-25; manuscript at [http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Camerer\\_Ch1intro.pdf](http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Camerer_Ch1intro.pdf)

Section 3, Experimental Designs in Vincent Crawford, "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction," Chapter 7 in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, Editors, *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress*, Vol. I, Cambridge 1997; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawfordThExp97.pdf>.

Charles Plott, "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," *Journal of Economic Literature* 20 (1982), 1485-1527; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2724830>

Vernon Smith, "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," *American Economic Review* 72 (1982), 923-955; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812014>

Alvin Roth, "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics," *Economic Journal* 101 (1991), 107-114; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2233845>;  
<http://www.economics.harvard.edu/%7Earoeth/alroth.html>

### **Competition in partial-equilibrium markets**

Alvin Roth, chapter 1, "Introduction to Experimental Economics," in Kagel and Roth (eds.), *The Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton, 1995: pp. 49-60.

Edward Chamberlin, "An Experimental Imperfect Market," *Journal of Political Economy* 56 (1948), 95-108; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826387>

Vernon Smith, "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," *Journal of Political Economy* 70 (1962), 111-137; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1861810>

Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder, "Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets," *Econometrica* 56 (1988), 1085-1118;  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911360>

### **Discrimination in labor markets**

Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," *American Economic Review* 94 (2004), 991-1013; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592802>

### **Measuring trust**

Edward Glaeser, David Laibson, Jose Scheinkman, Christine Soutter, "Measuring Trust," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (2000), 811-846; [www.jstor.org/stable/2586897](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586897)

### **Unstructured bargaining**

Alvin Roth, chapter 1, "Introduction to Experimental Economics," in Kagel and Roth (eds.), *The Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton, 1995: pp. 40-49.

Section 5.3, Experimental Designs in Vincent Crawford, "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of

- Strategic Interaction," Chapter 7 in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, Editors, *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress*, Vol. I, Cambridge 1997; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawfordThExp97.pdf>.
- Colin Camerer, *Behavioral Game Theory*: Chapter 4.1 (pp. 151-161), Unstructured Bargaining
- Alvin Roth, "Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory," Chapter 2 (pp. 14-41) in Roth (ed.), *Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View*, Cambridge, 1987
- Alvin Roth and J. Keith Murnighan, "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," *Econometrica* 50 (1982), 1123-1142; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911866>
- Alvin Roth and Francoise Schoumaker, "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," *American Economic Review* 73 (1983), 362-37; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1808119>
- Alvin Roth, "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining," Chapter 12 in Roth, (ed.), *Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining*, Cambridge, 1985
- Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Oxford 1960 or Harvard 1980, Chapter 3, "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War"; Appendix C
- Diego Moreno and John Wooders, "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," *Games and Economic Behavior* 24 (1998), 47-76; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0624>

### **Equilibrium selection via adaptive learning**

- Alvin Roth, chapter 1, "Introduction to Experimental Economics," in Kagel and Roth (eds.), *The Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton, 1995: pp. 35-40.
- Vincent Crawford, "Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games," in Ugo Pagano and Antonio Nicita, editors, *The Evolution of Economic Diversity*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 133-163; UCSD Discussion Paper 97-19; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/ucsd9719.pdf>
- Vincent Crawford, "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," *Econometrica* 63 (1995), 103-143; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951699> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Crawford95EMT.pdf>
- Vincent Crawford and Bruno Broseta, "What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play," *American Economic Review* 88 (March 1998), 198-225; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/116825> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawBro98AER.pdf>

### **Strategic communication of private information**

- Joseph Wang, Michael Spezio, and Colin Camerer, "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation To Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games," *American Economic Review* 101 (2011), 984-1007; <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.984> or [http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/pinocchio\\_final.pdf](http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/pinocchio_final.pdf)
- Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission," *Econometrica* 50 (1982), 1431-1451; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913390>
- Vincent Crawford, "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," *American Economic Review* 93 (2003), 133-149; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132165> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawAER03.pdf>