Course Outline and Syllabus: First-Year M. Phil Lectures on
Experimental Economics
Vincent P. Crawford,
(Additional course materials are at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/FirstYearMPhil.html, linked to the Department’s course page and to my Oxford page at http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/staff/vincent_crawford/.
Motivation and overview of experimental methods
Alvin Roth, chapter 1,
“Introduction to Experimental Economics,” in Kagel and Roth (eds.), The
Handbook of Experimental Economics,
Colin
Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction,
42 (Appendix 1.2, Experimental Design) and (optional) pp. 1-25; manuscript at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Camerer_Ch1intro.pdf
Section 3, Experimental Designs in Vincent Crawford, "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of
Strategic
Interaction," Chapter 7 in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, Editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics:
Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. I,
Charles Plott, “Industrial
Organization Theory and Experimental Economics,” Journal of Economic
Literature 20 (1982), 1485-1527; http://www.jstor.org/stable/2724830
Review 72 (1982), 923-955; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812014
Alvin Roth, "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics," Economic Journal 101 (1991),
107-114; http://www.jstor.org/stable/2233845; http://www.economics.harvard.edu/%7Earoth/alroth.html
Competition in partial-equilibrium markets
Alvin
Roth, chapter 1, “Introduction to Experimental Economics,” in Kagel and Roth
(eds.), The
Handbook of Experimental
Economics,
Edward Chamberlin, "An Experimental Imperfect Market," Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948),
95-108; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826387
Economy 70 (1962), 111-137; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1861810
Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder, “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information
in Laboratory Security Markets," Econometrica 56 (1988), 1085-1118;
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911360
Discrimination in labor markets
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," American Economic Review 94 (2004), 991-1013; http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592802
Measuring trust
Edward Glaeser, David Laibson, Jose Scheinkman, Christine Soutter, "Measuring Trust," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 115 (2000), 811-846; www.jstor.org/stable/2586897
Unstructured bargaining
Alvin
Roth, chapter 1, “Introduction to Experimental Economics,” in Kagel and Roth
(eds.), The
Handbook
of Experimental Economics,
Section 5.3, Experimental Designs in Vincent Crawford, "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of
Strategic
Interaction," Chapter 7 in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, Editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics:
Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. I,
Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Chapter 4.1 (pp. 151-161), Unstructured Bargaining
Alvin Roth, "Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory," Chapter 2 (pp. 14-41) in Roth (ed.),
Laboratory Experimentation in
Economics: Six Points of View,
Alvin Roth and J. Keith Murnighan, "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study,"
Econometrica 50 (1982), 1123-1142; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911866
Alvin Roth and Francoise Schoumaker, "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An
Experimental Study," American Economic Review 73 (1983), 362-37; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1808119
Alvin
Roth, "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining," Chapter 12 in
Roth, (ed.), Game-Theoretic
Models of Bargaining,
Thomas Schelling, The
Strategy of Conflict,
Communication, and Limited War”; Appendix C
Diego Moreno and John Wooders, "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in
Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 47-76; http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0624
Equilibrium selection via adaptive learning
Alvin
Roth, chapter 1, “Introduction to Experimental Economics,” in Kagel and Roth
(eds.), The
Handbook
of Experimental Economics,
Vincent Crawford, "Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental
Coordination Games," in Ugo
Pagano and Antonio Nicita, editors, The
Evolution of Economic Diversity, London and New York: Routledge, 2001,
133-163; UCSD Discussion Paper 97-19; http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/ucsd9719.pdf
Vincent Crawford, "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica 63 (1995), 103-143;
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951699 or http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Crawford95EMT.pdf)
Vincent Crawford and Bruno Broseta, "What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing Effect
of Auctioning the Right to Play," American Economic Review 88 (March 1998), 198-225; http://www.jstor.org/stable/116825 or http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawBro98AER.pdf
Strategic communication of
private information
Joseph Wang, Michael Spezio, and Colin Camerer, "Pinocchio’s Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil
Dilation To Understand Truth-telling
and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games," American
Economic Review 101 (2011), 984–1007; http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.984 or
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/pinocchio_final.pdf
Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica 50 (1982), 1431-
1451; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913390
Vincent Crawford, "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational
Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review 93 (2003), 133-149; http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132165 or http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawAER03.pdf