Supply, Demand, and Specialized Production

James D. Hamilton
jhamilton@ucsd.edu
University of California at San Diego

March 22, 2021
Revised: April 2, 2022

Abstract

This paper develops a unified model of economic fluctuations and growth characterized by long-run equilibrium unemployment and sustained monopoly power. The level of demand is a key factor in deviations from the steady-state growth path with a Keynesian-type spending multiplier despite the absence of any nominal rigidities. The key friction in the model is the technological requirement that production of certain goods requires a dedicated team of workers that takes time to assemble and train.

*I am grateful to Douglas Laxton and Johannes Wieland for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Introduction.

Many of us are persuaded that fluctuations in demand are a key driver of business cycles. Production of automobiles and construction of new homes appear to fall in a recession not because the items become more difficult to build, but instead because fewer people seem willing to buy them. Evidence supporting this conclusion comes from Mian and Sufi (2014), Michaillat and Saez (2015), and Auerbach, Gorodnichenko, and Murphy (2020), among many others.

A common understanding of the mechanism whereby a decrease in demand leads to lower output is based on a failure of wages and prices to adjust sufficiently quickly. Potential GDP is sometimes defined as the level of output that would be observed if wages and prices were perfectly flexible. This magnitude is often viewed as depending on the labor force, capital stock, and available technology. If wages and prices fall sufficiently quickly in response to a drop in demand, this is supposed to keep output at potential.

But the key feature that makes developed economies productive is specialization of labor, capital, and technology. When this is the case, potential GDP depends not just on the levels of these factors of production but also on the match between specialized factors and the composition of demand. If the demand for a particular product falls below the level that resources were precommitted to be able to produce, producers have limited incentive to lower price and limited ability to shift productive factors to some other specialization. This paper illustrates this in the context of a general equilibrium growth model with perfectly flexible wages and prices. It develops a unified model of growth and fluctuations in which demand and other variables contribute to short-run fluctuations while long-run growth is determined solely by increases in population and productivity. It thus provides an alternative motivation for the consensus interpretation of economic growth and recessions described above without making any appeal to failure of wages and prices to adjust.

The model here focuses on the simple case where labor is the only factor of production. Production of some goods is only possible if a dedicated team of workers is assembled and trained in advance to make that particular good. Developing a new good is costly, but if it is successful, the unit has a monopoly in producing that good, and chooses quantity and price to maximize profits subject to a maximum capacity that the team is capable of producing. If demand falls below capacity, profit maximization calls for lowering both quantity and price. Prices do not fall more than this because it would mean lower profits. Since marginal production costs are zero, there is no market force to bid costs down further. And although the triggering event was a change in relative demand, there is no offsetting gain from higher relative demand for other goods. The reason is that the underutilized specialized workers cannot costlessly shift to producing something else.

The core friction in this model that replaces the nominal rigidities in Keynesian models


is the technological requirement that efficient production of some goods requires specialized resources committed in advance.

A key state variable in this model is $n_{1t}$, which is the fraction of the population without a high-skill, high-paying job. The value of $n_{1t}$ is determined endogenously as individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of trying to develop a new skill, but it is predetermined at date $t$ as a result of the training requirement. A sufficiently large drop in demand for good $j$ may induce producers of good $j$ to disband and try to develop new skills, increasing $n_{1,t+1}$. But $n_{1,t+1}$ is also a factor in the demand for all goods, since unskilled workers have lower income on average than skilled workers. There is thus an effect reminiscent of a Keynesian spending multiplier in this model; lower demand for some goods can have a feedback effect that lowers demand for all goods.

The model is consistent with a number of observed features of business cycles. The first is an asymmetry: a decrease in demand can have a bigger effect on output than an increase of the same magnitude. Empirical evidence of such asymmetry was provided by Weise (1999) and Lo and Piger (2005), with Tobin (1972) and Ball and Mankiw (1994) attributing asymmetry to the mechanics of partial price adjustment. Here the asymmetry arises even with perfectly flexible prices. When demand falls below capacity, the profit-maximizing response is to lower both output and price, whereas an increase in demand above capacity leads only to a price increase. Second, the response of output to a demand shock is often found to be hump-shaped, with the maximum effect observed many months after the initial shock. Empirical support and alternative explanations for this finding were provided by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Hamilton (2008), and Auclert, Rognlie and Straub (2020). In the model here, a hump shape can result when a reduction in demand slows the rate of hiring of new skilled workers. As the number of unskilled increases over time, the demand pressures get amplified, and output will remain below the steady-state level even after the initial shock is completely gone. A third striking observation in the data is that the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable despite a century of economic growth and technological innovations. Martellini and Menzio (2020) noted the challenges in explaining this using standard search and matching models and proposed an alternative explanation. In this model, a stable unemployment rate in the face of long-term economic growth is an equilibrium implication of the fact that the opportunity cost and potential benefits of being unemployed along with the tax base that finances compensation paid to the unemployed all grow with the overall level of productivity.

The paper makes a number of other contributions to the literature. It shows how monopoly power can be sustained in a growing economy even as new goods are introduced and some old goods are discontinued every period. It develops a new characterization of inequality as arising from successful gambles to create new goods. The costs associated with trying to create new goods determine steady-state income differentials and unemployment as well as the speed with which the economy recovers from shocks. The model allows for considerable heterogeneity, yet
both individual and aggregate outcomes can be calculated using only a handful of equations.

There are of course many other papers that have proposed alternative interpretations of how demand shocks could lead to lower output even with perfectly flexible prices. One popular approach interprets aggregate demand shocks as a decrease in desired current consumption relative to future consumption. However, Angeletos (2018) noted that this mechanism would predict recessions to be associated with higher investment and hours worked. An alternative literature emphasizes coordination problems. The models of Cooper and John (1988) and Woodford (1991) are characterized by multiple equilibria, in which demand may or may not be a factor in aggregate fluctuations depending on equilibrium selection. Angeletos and Lian (2020) and Ilut and Sajo (2021) emphasized coordination of expectations in models with a unique equilibrium but in which individual actors are not fully rational. By contrast, the model developed here is characterized by a unique equilibrium in which everyone behaves completely rationally.

There is also a large literature that emphasizes sectoral shocks, costly reallocation, and mismatch. In Alvarez and Shimer (2011) and Şahin et al. (2014), the driving variable is fluctuations in productivity, whereas the focus here is on developing an integrated understanding of how demand shocks can be the fundamental cause of mismatch. Hamilton (1988) showed how sectoral demand shocks can lead to unemployment either from reallocation of labor or from impacted workers waiting for conditions in their sector to improve, but that was in a two-sector model without growth, creation of new goods, or monopoly power.

This paper is most closely related to recent work by Murphy (2017) and Auerbach, Gorodnichenko, and Murphy (2020) who emphasize as I do the role of excess capacity and near-zero marginal production costs. In their models, capacity is exogenous, whereas here, capacity and marginal cost are endogenously determined in a general equilibrium growth model.

2 Demand for goods.

At time $t$ the population consists of a continuum of individuals of measure $N_t$ who each consume a discrete set $j \in \mathcal{J}_t$ of different goods. Goods are nonstorable, and there are no capital or financial markets, so that the budget constraint for individual $i$ is

$$
\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t} P_{jt} q_{ijt} \leq y_{it}
$$

where $P_{jt}$ is the nominal price of good $j$, $q_{ijt}$ is the quantity of good $j$ consumed by individual $i$, and $y_{it}$ the individual's nominal income. The objective of consumer $i$ is to maximize

$$
U_{it} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t} \frac{-\gamma_{ijt}}{2} (\bar{q}_{ijt} - q_{ijt})^2
$$
subject to (1). The first-order conditions for an interior solution are
\[ \gamma_{ijt}(\bar{q}_{ijt} - q_{ijt}) = \lambda_{it} P_{jt} \quad j \in J_t \]  
for \( \lambda_{it} \) the marginal utility of income. Holding \( \lambda_{it} \) constant, these imply a price elasticity of demand given by
\[ \varepsilon_{ijt} = \left. \frac{\partial q_{ijt} \gamma_{ijt}(\bar{q}_{ijt} - q_{ijt})}{\partial P_{jt}} \right|_{q_{ijt}} / q_{ijt} = \frac{\bar{q}_{ijt} - q_{ijt}}{q_{ijt}}. \]  

Quadratic preferences have some important advantages for purposes of this model. As emphasized by Murphy (2017), quadratic preferences imply that the elasticity of demand changes as we move along the demand curve, which is important for understanding how decisions of monopolist producers respond to changing conditions. The price elasticity of consumer \( i \)'s demand is less than one when \( q_{ijt} > \bar{q}_{ijt}/2 \) and greater than one when \( q_{ijt} < \bar{q}_{ijt}/2 \). In the general equilibrium described below, producers choose a level of production and price such that the market-wide elasticity is always greater than or equal to one. Along the steady-state growth path, the market-wide elasticity will turn out to be exactly equal to one.

Another advantage of quadratic utility over isoelastic preferences is that quadratic preferences allow the possibility that producers of \( j \) could be driven out of business if productivity or demand is too low. If the price \( P_{jt} \) becomes too high, a consumer with preferences (2) will choose \( q_{ijt} = 0 \), whereas isoelastic preferences imply that consumers always buy every good in equilibrium, willing to pay \( P_{jt} \to \infty \) as \( q_{ijt} \to 0 \). In the economy described below, some goods are always being discontinued and new goods are being created along the steady-state growth path.

A final advantage of quadratic preferences is that they result in simple closed-form solutions for key magnitudes.

*Expenditure shares.* A useful way to summarize the demand of individual \( i \) is by the fraction of income that consumer \( i \) chooses to spend on good \( j \) at time \( t \). The following proposition gives some results that will prove useful in characterizing the equilibrium fraction of spending devoted to different goods along the steady-state growth path.

**Proposition 1.** Define
\[ \alpha_{ijt} = \gamma_{ijt}(\bar{q}_{ijt}/2)^2. \]  

(a) If prices and income are such that individual \( i \) would choose \( q_{ijt} = \bar{q}_{ijt}/2 \) for all \( j \in J_t \), then the fraction of individual \( i \)'s income that is spent on good \( j \) is proportional to \( \alpha_{ijt} \):
\[ P_{jt}q_{ijt}/y_{it} = \alpha_{ijt}/\sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{ijt}. \]

(b) If there is a set \( \mathcal{M}_t^{(k)} \) of measure \( R_t^{(k)} \) of different individuals at date \( t \) who all share the same preference parameters, that is, if \( \gamma_{ijt} = \gamma_{jkt}^{(k)} \) and \( \bar{q}_{ijt} = \bar{q}_{jkt}^{(k)} \) for all \( i \in \mathcal{M}_t^{(k)} \), and if
prices and incomes are such that members of the group on average choose to consume \( \bar{q}_{jt}^{(k)}/2 \), that is, if
\[
\frac{1}{R_t^{(k)}} \int_{i \in \mathcal{M}_t^{(k)}} q_{ijt} \, di = \frac{\bar{q}_{jt}^{(k)}}{2} \quad \forall j \in J_t,
\]
then the fraction of the group’s income that is spent on good \( j \) is proportional to \( \alpha_{jt}^{(k)} \):
\[
\frac{\int_{i \in \mathcal{M}_t^{(k)}} P_{jt} q_{ijt} \, di}{\int_{i \in \mathcal{M}_t^{(k)}} y_{jt} \, di} = \alpha_{jt}^{(k)} \sum_{j' \in J} \alpha_{j't}^{(k)}.
\]

Market-wide demand curves. Summing across all consumers \( i \) gives the market demand curve \( P_{jt} = A_{jt} - B_{jt} Q_{jt} \). Note we will be following the notational convention of using lowercase letters like \( q_{ijt} \) to refer to magnitudes for individual consumers \( i \) and upper case like \( Q_{jt} \) to refer to total magnitudes for individual goods \( j \). Here \( A_{jt} = \bar{Q}_{jt}/\Lambda_{jt} \), \( B_{jt} = 1/\Lambda_{jt} \), \( \Lambda_{jt} = \int_0^{N_i} (\lambda_{it}/\gamma_{ijt}) \, di \) and
\[
\bar{Q}_{jt} = \int_0^{N_i} \bar{q}_{ijt} \, di.
\]
The marginal revenue for producers of good \( j \) is \( MR_{jt} = A_{jt} - 2 B_{jt} Q_{jt} \). The good-level elasticity has the same properties as the demand curves for individual consumers; the market-wide elasticity is greater than or equal to one provided \( Q_{jt} \leq \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \).

3 Production of specialized goods.

Good \( j = 1 \) can be produced by anyone without any training or coordination with others. By contrast, goods \( j > 1 \) are specialized in the sense that their production requires a dedicated team who work together to produce the good. If any worker were to leave the team, the good could not be produced. Once the workers who form a team are assembled, they enjoy a monopoly in producing good \( j \) and base their production and pricing decisions on that monopoly power. Team \( j \) consists of a measure of \( N_{jt} \) workers and has total production capacity \( X_{jt} N_{jt} \) where productivity per worker \( X_{jt} \) for the team evolves according to an exogenous process. At the time that its production and pricing decisions for period \( t \) are made, unit \( j \) takes \( X_{jt} \) and \( N_{jt} \) as given and chooses \( P_{jt} \) and \( Q_{jt} \) to maximize total profits \( P_{jt} Q_{jt} \) subject to \( P_{jt} = A_{jt} - B_{jt} Q_{jt} \), \( P_{jt} \in [0, A_{jt}] \), and \( Q_{jt} \leq X_{jt} N_{jt} \). The number of specialized goods is sufficiently large that unit \( j \) ignores the effect of its decisions on \( \Lambda_{jt} \) or the price and output of other units. The profit-maximizing strategy is to produce up to the point where marginal revenue equals zero if there is sufficient production capacity and to produce at production capacity if not:
\[
Q_{jt} = \begin{cases} 
\bar{Q}_{jt}/2 & \text{if } X_{jt} N_{jt} \geq \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \quad \text{[demand constrained]} \\
X_{jt} N_{jt} & \text{if } X_{jt} N_{jt} < \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \quad \text{[supply constrained]} 
\end{cases}
\]
(10)
We will describe production of good $j$ as demand constrained in the first instance and supply constrained in the second. See the top panel of Figure 1.

Note that under no circumstances would a monopolist ever choose to produce in the inelastic region of the demand curve. It is always the case for every period $t$ and every specialized good $j$ that $Q_{jt} \leq \bar{Q}_{jt}/2$.

New hiring. In period $t$, unit $j$ takes its total capacity $N_{jt}X_{jt}$ as given. We assume that the hiring decision for $N_{j,t+1}^*$ is based on the goal of maximizing expected profit of the unit. Let $N_{j,t+1}^*$ denote the level of employment that maximizes expected revenue:

$$N_{j,t+1}^*E_t(X_{j,t+1}) = E_t(\bar{Q}_{j,t+1}/2).$$

(11)

Since the team could not be productive if any current member leaves, workers are not laid off even if $N_{j,t+1}^* < N_{jt}$. New workers are hired up to the level $N_{j,t+1}^*$ if $N_{j,t+1}^* > N_{jt}$. The number of positions offered to new members of the team who would begin working in $t + 1$ is thus

$$O_{jt} = \max\{N_{j,t+1}^* - N_{jt}, 0\}.$$

Note that maximizing the profit of the ongoing unit is not the same objective as maximizing the income of continuing workers. We think of an observed firm as a collection of a large number of separate producing units, with the objective of the firm being to maximize total profit subject to the constraint that individuals are available to do the work at the offered terms. If instead we took the objective to be to maximize expected income of existing team members, that would add an additional friction to hiring in the model.

4 Unskilled workers.

We will refer to an individual who is not part of a specialized team at time $t$ as “unskilled.” Unskilled workers can choose between 3 options.

Option 1: seek to join an existing specialized unit. To pursue this option, an individual trains and applies in period $t$ for a position to produce good $j$ beginning in period $t + 1$. With probability $\pi_{jt}$ the individual will be successful. Each individual takes $\pi_{jt}$ as given, though in equilibrium $\pi_{jt}$ will be determined by the number of people applying for the job and the number of openings available. An individual who pursues this option will receive nominal compensation $C_t$ while unemployed, financed through a proportional tax levied on the income of specialized workers during period $t$.

Option 2: seek to create a new good. An individual who is trying to join a team that creates a new good also receives unemployment compensation $C_t$ during period $t$ and has a probability $k_{\pi}$ of being successful. There is also a utility cost $k_{U}$ of making an effort to create a new good. The parameters $k_{\pi}$ and $k_{U}$ are fixed technological parameters that summarize the importance of frictions in creating new goods. If $k_{\pi} \to 1$ and $k_{U} \to 0$, the monopoly power of specialized teams would not be sustained along the steady-state growth path.
Option 3: produce good 1. Good 1 is assumed to be produced in a nonspecialized sector in which anyone could work with no training or coordination with others. If individual i works in sector 1, s/he could produce \( x_{it} \) units of good 1. The productivity parameter \( x_{it} \) is distributed independently across workers and across time. A favorable productivity \( x_{it} \) for individual i at time \( t \) has no implications for that same individual’s productivity at \( t + 1 \). The nominal income of individual i during period \( t \) is given by

\[
y_{it} = \begin{cases} 
  P_t x_{it} & \text{if produces good 1} \\
  C_t & \text{if looks for a job}
\end{cases}
\]

Objective of unskilled workers. Unskilled workers choose between the above three options, seeking to maximize

\[
v_{it} = E_t \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \beta^s \log y_{i,t+s}
\]

where \( E_t \) denotes an expectation conditional on information available at date \( t \) and \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) is a discount rate. We will motivate this objective as an approximation to expected lifetime utility in Section 8.

Let \( Y_{jt} \) be the after-tax nominal income of each individual who is part of specialized team \( j \) at date \( t \),

\[
Y_{jt} = (1 - \tau)P_{jt}Q_{jt}/N_{jt},
\]

for \( \tau \) the tax rate. Let \( V_{jt} \) denote the value of (12) for such an individual:

\[
V_{jt} = \log Y_{jt} + \beta(1 - k_{jt})E_t V_{j,t+1} + \beta k_{jt}E_t V_{1,t+1}.
\]

Here \( k_{jt} \) is the probability that unit \( j \) will discontinue production in \( t + 1 \). If the good is discontinued, next period those individuals will be unskilled. Since productivity \( x_{it} \) is drawn independently over time, the expected lifetime utility in the event that the team is disbanded is \( E_t V_{1,t+1} \), the same for all individuals.

If an unskilled individual successfully creates a new good, the expected lifetime utility is \( E_t V_{t+1}^\sharp \), whose value will be described below. Thus the value of (12) for an unskilled individual at time \( t \) is

\[
v_{it} = \begin{cases} 
  \log(P_t x_{it}) + \beta E_t V_{1,t+1} & \text{if produces good 1} \\
  \log C_t + \beta \pi_{jt}E_t V_{j,t+1} + \beta(1 - \pi_{jt})E_t V_{1,t+1} & \text{if applies to join existing unit } j \\
  \log C_t - k_{U} + \beta k_{\pi}E_t V_{t+1}^\sharp + \beta(1 - k_{\pi})E_t V_{1,t+1} & \text{if tries to create a new good}
\end{cases}
\]

Decisions of unskilled workers. Individual i chooses the most favorable of the options in (14). The optimal decision is characterized by a productivity threshold \( X^*_t \) such that individual i chooses to produce good 1 if \( x_{it} \geq X^*_t \) and looks for something better otherwise.
If some individuals choose to produce good 1 and others try to create new goods, then $X^*_t$ would be the level of productivity at which the marginal unskilled individual is indifferent between working or trying to create a new good:

$$\log(P_{1t}X^*_t) + \beta E_tV_{1,t+1} = \log C_t - k_U + \beta k\pi E_tV^*_t + \beta (1 - k\pi)E_tV_{1,t+1}. \quad (15)$$

Expression (15) can equivalently be written

$$\log(P_{1t}X^*_t) - \log C_t = -k_U + \beta k\pi E_t\tilde{V}^*_t$$

where $\tilde{V}^*_t = V^*_t - V_{1t}$ is the expected lifetime advantage of specializing in a newly created good relative to being nonspecialized. Alternatively, when there is an incentive to try to specialize in continuing good $j$, (14) would require

$$\log(P_{1t}X^*_t) + \beta E_tV_{1,t+1} = \log C_t + \beta \pi_j E_tV_{j,t+1} + \beta (1 - \pi_j)E_tV_{1,t+1}$$

$$\log(P_{1t}X^*_t) - \log C_t = \beta \pi_j E_t\tilde{V}_{j,t+1}$$

for $\tilde{V}_{j,t} = V_{j,t} - V_{1t}$ the lifetime advantage of specializing in $j$. In a typical equilibrium in which some individuals try to create a new good while others seek to join existing unit $j$, both conditions (16) and (18) hold, requiring that in equilibrium $\pi_j$ must satisfy

$$\beta \pi_j E_t\tilde{V}_{j,t+1} = -k_U + \beta k\pi E_t\tilde{V}^*_t. \quad (19)$$

It follows from equations (14), (15), and (17) that the lifetime income of nonspecialized individual $i$ is characterized by

$$v_{it} = \begin{cases} \log(P_{1t}x_{it}) + \beta E_tV_{1,t+1} & \text{if } x_{it} \geq X^*_t \\ \log(P_{1t}X^*_t) + \beta E_tV_{1,t+1} & \text{if } x_{it} < X^*_t \end{cases}. \quad (20)$$

The expression $E_tV_{1,t+1}$ is the expected value for $v_{i,t+1}$ across individuals $i$. Since $x_{it}$ is distributed independently across time, we can find the date $t$ value of $V_{1t}$ by taking the expected value of (20) across all unskilled individuals $i$ at time $t$:

$$V_{1t} = \log(P_{1t}\tilde{X}_{1t}) + \beta E_tV_{1,t+1} \quad (21)$$

$$\log \tilde{X}_{1t} = P(x_{it} \geq X^*_t)E[\log(x_{it})|x_{it} \geq X^*_t] + P(x_{it} < X^*_t)\log X^*_t. \quad (22)$$

Another object of interest is $\tilde{X}_{1t}$, the average output of unskilled individuals:

$$\tilde{X}_{1t} = E(x_{it}|x_{it} \geq X^*_t)P(x_{it} \geq X^*_t). \quad (23)$$
Note that this definition of $\hat{X}_{1t}$ means that if $N_{1t}$ denotes the total number of unskilled individuals (including both those working and those unemployed), the total amount of good 1 that is produced is given by

$$Q_{1t} = N_{1t} \hat{X}_{1t}. \quad (24)$$

**Distribution of productivity across unskilled workers.** Simple closed-form expressions for key magnitudes can be obtained when log of productivity is distributed uniformly across unskilled workers.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose that the log of potential productivity for producing good 1 is distributed independently across individuals as $\log x_{it} \sim U(R_t, S_t)$ and let $\log X_{1t}^{*} \in [R_t, S_t]$ be the threshold level of productivity above which unskilled individuals choose to produce good 1 (that is, $X_{1t}^{*}$ satisfies (16) or (18)). Then:

(a) the fraction of unskilled individuals who are employed is

$$h_{1t} = P(x_{it} \geq X_{1t}^{*}) = \frac{S_t - \log X_{1t}^{*}}{S_t - R_t}, \quad (25)$$

(b) the expected flow-equivalent productivity of unskilled individuals (value of (22)) is

$$\log \tilde{\lambda}_{1t} = \frac{S_t^2 - 2R_t \log X_{1t}^{*} + (\log X_{1t}^{*})^2}{2(S_t - R_t)} \quad (26)$$

which is monotonically increasing in $X_{1t}^{*}$;

(c) the average output of unskilled individuals (expression (23)) is

$$\hat{X}_{1t} = \frac{\exp(S_t) - X_{1t}^{*}}{S_t - R_t}. \quad (27)$$

5 **Entry and exit of specialized goods.**

**Preferences for newly created goods.** The income advantage of a worker specialized in good $j$ at time $t$ is given by the fraction of income that consumers spend on good $j$ divided by the fraction of the population specializing in producing $j$. The fraction of income that consumer $i$ wants to spend on good $j$ in turn depends on the preference parameters $\gamma_{ijt}$ and $\bar{q}_{ijt}$.

We think of the creation of a new good as arising from discovery of latent preference parameters for that good. We assume that there exists a technology for making such discoveries with the feature that the more individuals who join together to create a particular new good, the greater the share of income that consumers want to spend on that good – a bigger team can discover a product that captures a larger market share. We characterize the preferences discovered for a new good $j$ in terms of the share of income that consumers would want to spend on that good along the steady-state growth path. We greatly simplify the analysis by assuming that this share is the same across all consumers.
The steady-state growth path is characterized by an advantage to specialization that just compensates for the costs of trying to develop a specialty. We assume that newly created goods enter with this steady-state advantage, denoted $\omega^0$. Let $q^0_{ijt}$ denote the consumption of good $j$ by individual $i$ along the steady-state growth path. The steady-state growth path turns out to be characterized by $q^0_{ijt} = \bar{q}_{ijt}/2$. From (5) this implies an expenditure share given by $\alpha^0_{ijt} = \gamma^0_{ijt}(q^0_{ijt})^2$, which we assume is the same value $\alpha^0_j$ across consumers and across time. If $J^2_t$ denotes the set of goods that are newly created in period $t$, the assumption that goods that are newly created at date $t$ enter with the steady-state advantage $\omega^0$ is thus represented by

$$\alpha^0_j = \omega^0 n^t_{jt} \text{ for } j \in J^2_t.$$  \hfill (28)

**Discontinued goods.** A good will be discontinued if the expected benefit to workers from retaining that specialization is less than they could anticipate by returning to the pool of unskilled workers:

$$\text{if } E_t V_{jt+1} < E_t V_{1, t+1}, \text{ then } j \in J^b_{2t}. \hfill (29)$$

In Section 9 we will show how condition (29) could arise from a sufficiently severe shock to the demand for good $j$. We assume that shocks like this occur every period, causing a fraction $k_X$ of goods to be discontinued every period along the steady-state growth path. Workers take this risk into account in assessing the potential benefits to specialization in (13) with $k_{jt} = k_X$ for every good $j$ along the steady-state growth path.

**Steady-state growth path.** Along the steady-state growth path, the number of discontinued goods ($J^2_{2t}$) equals the number of newly created goods each period ($J^2_{2t}$) and the number of workers who successfully create new goods just balances population growth and the number induced to give up their previous specialization. The steady-state growth path is characterized by a constant fraction over time of the population without skills: $n_{1t} = n^0_{1t}$.

Note that expression (28) does not restrict the number of goods or the relative expenditure shares of different specialized goods. Suppose for example that there are $k_J$ new goods created each period and that the fraction of new-goods workers who produce good $j$ is represented by $a_{\ell_j}$ with $a_1 + \cdots + a_{k_J} = 1$,

$$n_{jt} = a_{\ell_j} n^t_t \text{ for } j \in J^2_{2t} \text{ and } \ell_j \in \{1, \ldots, k_J\} \hfill (30)$$

where $n^t_t$ is the fraction of the population that produce goods that were first created in period $t$. Then from (28), $\alpha^0_j = \omega^0 a_{\ell_j} n^t_t$ for $j \in J^2_{2t}$. With $k_J$ goods newly created at $t$ and $k_X J_{2t}$ goods discontinued (where $J_{2t}$ is the number of specialized goods of all type produced at $t$), the number of goods produced along the steady-state growth path is given by the constant $J_2 = k_J/k_X$. 


6 Steady-state growth with constant productivity.

In this section we consider an economy in which population grows at rate \( n \) and productivity is constant. Thus in this section the bounds on the productivity of unskilled workers \( R_t \) and \( S_t \) are constants \( R \) and \( S \) over time. The log of productivity of workers producing goods that are newly created at time \( t \) is drawn from a time-invariant distribution \( \log X_{jt} \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \) for \( j \in J_{2t} \) and the productivity of workers producing good \( j \) remains fixed as long as good \( j \) remains in production.

We assume that a constant fraction \( k_X \) of existing specialized goods is discontinued each period. Setting \( k_{jt} = k_X \) in (13) and subtracting (21) from the result gives

\[
\tilde{V}_{jt} = \log \tilde{Y}_{jt} + \beta (1 - k_X) E_t \tilde{V}_{t+1}
\]

for \( \tilde{V}_{jt} = V_{jt} - V_{1t} \) and \( \tilde{Y}_{jt} = Y_t/(P_{1t} \tilde{X}_{1t}) \). We conjecture a steady-state growth path along which the share of spending on good 1 is constant at \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \tilde{Y}_{jt} \) is the same for all specialized goods and constant over time: \( \tilde{Y}_{jt} = \tilde{Y}^0 \). This would mean from (31) that the lifetime advantage of any specialization is constant: \( \tilde{V}_{jt} = \tilde{V}^0 \). We suppose that new goods enter with this same advantage. The steady-state growth path is also characterized by a constant fraction of the population that is unskilled \( (n_{1t} = n^0) \) and a constant fraction of the unemployed who are trying to acquire a skill \( (h_{1t} = h^0) \). From (25)-(27) the latter would mean that \( X^*_{1t}, \tilde{X}_{1t}, \) and \( \hat{X}_{1t} \) are constants. Also along the steady-state growth path, each good always has exactly the capacity to produce the profit-maximizing output,

\[
Q_{jt} = N_{jt} X_{jt} = \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \quad j \in J_{2t},
\]

adding new workers as the population grows to guarantee this. A fraction \( h_{0t} \) of the unemployed try to create new goods and the remaining \( 1 - h_{0t} \) apply for new openings with continuing goods, with \( h_{0t} = h^0 \) and the probability \( \pi_t = \pi^0 \) of a successful application both constant over time. In this section we prove the existence and uniqueness of such a steady-state growth path and sketch the forces that would cause an economy to converge to this path.

Advantage from specialization. A constant share of spending on good 1 would mean

\[
\frac{\sum_{j \in J_{2t}} P_{jt} Q_{jt}}{P_{1t} Q_{1t}} = \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{\alpha_1}.
\]

Let \( Y_{st} \) denote the average after-tax income per person of skilled workers. From (33) and (24) this is

\[
Y_{st} = \frac{(1 - \tau) \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} P_{jt} Q_{jt}}{(1 - n_{1t}) N_t} = \left[ \frac{(1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha_1)}{\alpha_1} \right] \left[ \frac{P_{1t} N_{1t} \tilde{X}_{1t}}{(1 - n_{1t}) N_t} \right].
\]
Let \( \tilde{Y}_t \) be the ratio of \( Y_{st} \) to \( P_{1t} \tilde{X}_{1t} \), the flow-equivalent income of unskilled in (22):

\[
\tilde{Y}_t = \frac{Y_{st}}{P_{1t} \tilde{X}_{1t}} = \frac{(1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha_1)n_{1t}}{\alpha_1(1 - n_{1t})} \frac{\tilde{X}_1(X^{*}_{1t})}{\tilde{X}_1(X^{*}_{1t})}
\]

(34)

where in light of (27) and (26) we have written \( \tilde{X}_{1t} \) and \( \tilde{X}_{1t} \) as functions of \( X^{*}_{1t} \). Note that if \( n_{1t} \) and \( X^{*}_{1t} \) are constant, then \( \tilde{Y}_t \) is constant. Substituting (34) into (31), the steady-state advantage to specialization is

\[
\tilde{V}(n^{0}_{1}, X^{*}_{1}) = \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - k_X)} \right] \left\{ \log \left[ \frac{(1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha_1)n^{0}_{1}}{\alpha_1(1 - n^{0}_{1})} \right] + \log \tilde{X}_1(X^{*0}_1) - \log \tilde{X}_1(X^{*0}_1) \right\}
\]

(35)

**Creation of new goods.** The numerator on the left side of (33) is the tax base, and from (24), the denominator is \( P_{1t}N_{1t}\tilde{X}_{1t} \). With a total of \((1 - h_{1t})N_{1t}\) individuals collecting unemployment compensation, the compensation per individual is

\[
C_t = \frac{\tau \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} P_{jt}Q_{jt} (1 - h_{1t})N_{1t}}{P_{1t} \tilde{X}_{1t}} = \left[ \frac{\tau(1 - \alpha_1)}{\alpha_1(1 - h_{1t})} \right] P_{1t} \tilde{X}_{1t}.
\]

(36)

Let \( h_{Yt} \) denote the log difference between the income that the marginal unskilled individual could earn from producing good 1 and the income collected from unemployment compensation:

\[
h_{Yt} = \log(P_{1t}X^{*}_{1t}) - \log C_t.
\]

(37)

From expression (36) this is

\[
h_{Yt} = - \log \left[ \frac{\tau(1 - \alpha_1)}{\alpha_1} \right] + \log(1 - h_{1t}) + \log X^{*0}_{1t} - \log \tilde{X}_{1t} = h_{Y}(X^{*}_{1t}).
\]

(38)

We can write the equilibrium condition for creation of new goods (16) as

\[
h_{Yt} = -k_U + k_\pi \beta \tilde{V}_t.
\]

The steady-state solution is

\[
- \log \left[ \frac{\tau(1 - \alpha_1)}{\alpha_1} \right] + \log(1 - h_{1}(X^{*0}_{1})) + \log X^{*0}_{1} - \log \tilde{X}_1(X^{*0}_1) = -k_U + k_\pi \beta \tilde{V}(n^{0}_{1}, X^{*0}_{1}).
\]

(39)

**New hiring.** If each continuing good adds workers at the rate of population growth, along the steady-state growth path the total number of new openings is

\[
O_t = (1 - k_X)(e^n - 1)(1 - n_{1t})N_t.
\]

(40)
Since each continuing good offers the same lifetime advantage, the probability of successfully applying for one of these positions is the same across all continuing goods. With \((1 - h_{1t})(1 - h_{0t})n_{1t}\) individuals applying for these positions, the probability of success is

\[
\pi_t = \frac{(1 - k_X)(e^n - 1)(1 - n_{1t})}{(1 - h_{1t})(1 - h_{0t})n_{1t}} = \pi(n_{1t}, X_{1^*}, h_{0t}).
\] (41)

Individuals are indifferent between applying for existing jobs and trying to create new goods when (19) holds:

\[
-k_U + k_\pi \beta \tilde{V}(n_1^0, X_1^*) = \pi(n_1^0, X_1^*, h_0^0)\beta \tilde{V}(n_1^0, X_1^*).
\] (42)

**Changes in the number of skilled workers.** Note that \((1 - h_{1t})h_{0t}k_\pi n_{1t}N_t\) individuals will join newly created units in \(t + 1\) which would be added to the \((1 - k_X)(1 - n_{1t})e^n N_t\) workers at continuing units. The total number of unskilled at \(t + 1\), which could be written as \(n_{1,t+1}e^n N_t\), would then consist of the total population at \(t + 1\) \((e^n N_t)\) minus the total number of skilled individuals:

\[
n_{1,t+1}e^n N_t = e^n N_t - (1 - h_{1t})h_{0t}k_\pi n_{1t}N_t - (1 - k_X)(1 - n_{1t})e^n N_t
\]

\[
n_{1,t+1} = n_{1t} + k_X(1 - n_{1t}) - e^n h_{0t}(1 - h_{1t})k_\pi n_{1t}.
\] (43)

Thus the fraction of unskilled workers will be constant if

\[
k_X(1 - n_1^0) = e^{-n} h_0^0 k_\pi (1 - h_1(X_1^*)) n_1^0.
\] (44)

The conditions for steady-state growth are characterized by the three equations (44), (42) and (39) in the three unknowns \(X_1^*, n_1^0, h_0^0\).

**Proposition 3.** If \(k_\pi, k_X, \alpha_1, \beta, \tau\) are all \(\in (0, 1)\) and \(n \) and \(k_U\) are both positive, there exists a unique value of \((X_1^*, n_1^0, h_0^0)\) for which (44), (42) and (39) simultaneously hold. **At this solution**, \(log X_1^* \in (R, S)\), \(h_Y(X_1^*) > 0\), \(\tilde{V}(n_1^0, X_1^*) > 0\), and \(0 < \pi(n_1^0, X_1^*, h_0^0) < 1\).

The fact that \(\tilde{V}\) is positive means that individuals would prefer to be skilled if they could acquire skills at no cost. The barriers to becoming specialized (a probability \(k_\pi\) less than one of being able to join an existing enterprise and a cost \(k_U\) of trying to create a new one) require as compensation that \(\tilde{V}\) be positive in equilibrium. The value of \(\omega^0\) is given by \((1 - \alpha_1)/(1 - n_1^0)\).

Letting \(n_j^0\) denote the value of \(n_{jt}\) when good \(j\) was first introduced \((n_j^0 = n_{jt} \text{ for } j \in J^*_t)\), expression (28) becomes

\[
\alpha_j^0 = n_j^0 \frac{(1 - \alpha_1)}{(1 - n_1^0)}.
\] (45)

**Converging to the steady state.** Figure 2 plots \(\pi_t \beta \tilde{V}_{t+1}\) and \(-k_u + k_\pi \beta \tilde{V}_{t+1}\) as functions of \(\tilde{V}_{t+1}\). The point at which unskilled individuals are indifferent between applying for an existing
job and trying to create a new good is the point at which the two lines cross. If the advantage to specialization is a large value like $\tilde{V}_t^{[1]}$, then $\tau_t$ must be a large value like $\pi_t^{[1]}$ shown in the figure. For a given level of job openings $O_j$, this means from (41) that $(1-h_{0t})$ is small and the fraction of unemployed seeking to create new products $h_{0t}$ is bigger. Thus a large value of $\tilde{V}_{t+1}$ encourages more people to try to create new goods, which from (43) means that $n_{1,t+1}$ will be lower because more people will develop new skills. From (35), a lower value of $n_1$ will bring $\tilde{V}$ down. The steady state is characterized by a value $\tilde{V}^0$ for which $n_{1,t+1} = n_{1t} = n_1^0$.

7 Steady-state growth with growing productivity.

Here we generalize to an economy in which productivity grows at the rate $g$. Proposition 4 establishes that if the threshold $X_{1t}^*$ grows at the same rate $g$ as overall productivity and if the fraction of the population without skills is constant, then the unemployment rate, the income advantage to specialization, and the flow value of searching for work are all constant.

**Proposition 4.** Let $h_{1t}, \tilde{X}_{1t}, \check{X}_{1t}, C_t, h_Yt$, and $\check{Y}_t$ be given by (25)-(27), (36), (37) and (34). If $R_{t+1} = R_t + g$, $S_{t+1} = S_t + g$, and $\log X_{1,t+1} = \log X_{1t} + g$, then $h_{1,t+1} = h_{1t}$, $\log \check{X}_{1,t+1} = \log \check{X}_{1t} + g$, $\log \check{X}_{1,t+1} = \log \check{X}_{1t} + g$, $\log C_{t+1} = \log C_t + g$, and $h_Y_{t+1} = h_Yt$. If also $n_{1,t+1} = n_{1t}$, then $\check{Y}_{t+1} = \check{Y}_t$.

**Quadratic preferences in a growing economy.** We assume for a growing economy that creation of a new good by $n_j^0N_t$ people at date $t$ arises from the discovery of a good on which individuals will want to consume a constant fraction $\alpha_j^0 = \omega n_j^0$ of their growing income along the steady-state growth path. A useful way to think about this is to relate our assumption of quadratic preferences to a specification in which individual $i$ has a logarithmic utility function:

$$U_{it}^\dagger = \sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{ijt} \log q_{ijt}. \quad (46)$$

Let $q_{ijt}^0$ denote the consumption of good $j$ by individual $i$ at date $t$ along the steady-state growth path. A second-order approximation to (46) around the steady-state growth path gives

$$U_{it}^\dagger \simeq \sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{ijt} \left[ \log q_{ijt}^0 + \frac{1}{q_{ijt}^0}(q_{ijt} - q_{ijt}^0) - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{q_{ijt}^0}{q_{ijt}^0} \right)^2(q_{ijt} - q_{ijt}^0)^2 \right]$$

$$= \sum_{j \in J_t} \left[ \delta_{ijt} - \frac{\gamma_{ijt}}{2}(q_{ijt} - q_{ijt}^0)^2 \right]$$

$$\check{q}_{ijt} = 2q_{ijt}^0 \quad (47)$$

$$\gamma_{ijt} = \frac{\alpha_{ijt}}{(q_{ijt}^0)^2}. \quad (48)$$

See the top panel of Figure 3. Note that if consumption on the steady-state growth path were
\(q^0_{ijt} = \bar{q}_{ijt}/2\), expression (48) would just be another way to write expression (5).

A typical approach in macroeconomics is to assume that an expression like (46) is the true utility function and (2) an approximation in which the approximating parameters \(\bar{q}_{ijt}\) and \(\gamma_{ijt}\) are functions of the true preference parameter \(\alpha_{jt}\) and the steady-state consumption \(q^0_{ijt}\). Under that interpretation, the expenditure share would be exactly equal to \(\alpha_{jt}\) and the elasticity would be exactly equal to one for all \(t\). By contrast, here we are proposing to view (2) as the true preferences and (46) as an approximation. Under this interpretation, in the neighborhood of the steady state, the expenditure share is approximately \(\alpha_{jt}\) and the elasticity is approximately one. This second interpretation allows us to incorporate the benefits of using quadratic preferences noted in Section 2 while also taking advantage of some of the attractive steady-state growth features of logarithmic preferences.

Note that maximization of (46) subject to the budget constraint (1) has the solution \(P_{jt}q_{ijt} = \alpha_{jt}y_{jt}\). Substituting this into (46) gives the indirect utility function,

\[
\sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{jt} \log \left( \frac{\alpha_{jt}y_{jt}}{P_{jt}} \right) = \log y_{jt} + \sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{jt} \log \alpha_{jt} - \sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{jt} \log P_{jt},
\]

which provides a motivation for (12).

**Assumptions behind the steady-state growth path with productivity growth.** Population grows at a fixed rate \(n\) starting from a value \(N_{t_0}\) at an initial date \(t_0\). Log productivity at date \(t_0\) is distributed \(\log x_{it_0} \sim U(R_{t_0}, S_{t_0})\) across individuals \(i\) for unskilled workers and \(\log X_{jt_0} \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)\) across goods \(j\) for skilled workers producing good \(j\). There are \(k_J\) types of specialized goods at date \(t_0\) as in (30). Each period a fraction \(k_X\) of each type of good is discontinued and one new good of each type is created. The log of the productivity of newly created goods at date \(t\) is drawn from the distribution \(\log X_{jt} \sim N(\mu + gt, \sigma^2)\) for \(j \in J_{2t}\) and \(t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots\) with \(\log X_{jt,t+1} = \log X_{jt,t} + g\) for as long as specialized good \(j\) is produced. Likewise \(\log x_{it} \sim U(R_t, S_t)\) with \(R_{t+1} = R_t + g\) and \(S_{t+1} = S_t + g\) for \(t = t_0, t_0 + 1, \ldots\) Each consumer wants to spend a fraction \(\alpha^0_j\) of their income along the steady-state growth path on good \(j\) as long as the good remains produced and the desired share of spending on good 1 is constant at \(\alpha_1\) along the steady-state growth path.

**Proposition 5.** Let \((X^*_1, n^*_1, b^*_1)\) be the unique solution to (44), (42) and (39) for \(R = R_{t_0}\) and \(S = S_{t_0}\). If at initial date \(t_0\) there are \(1/k_X\) specialized goods of each type \(\alpha_k\) (so that the initial total number of goods is \(J_{2t_0} = k_J/k_X\)), the initial share of unskilled workers is \(n_{1t_0} = n^*_1\), and the initial share of the population specialized in good \(j\) satisfies

\[
n_{jt_0} = \frac{\alpha^0_j (1 - n^*_1)}{1 - \alpha_1} \quad j \in J_{2t_0},
\]

then for all \(t \geq t_0:\)

(a) the fraction of the population that is unskilled, the threshold at which unskilled choose
unemployment, the fraction of the unskilled who are employed, and fraction of the unskilled who try to create new goods are constant over time,

\[ n_{1t} = n_1^0 \quad X_{1t}^* = X_1^{0*} \quad h_{1t} = h_1^0 \quad h_{0t} = h_0^0; \]

(b) the number of specialized goods in production is constant: \( J_2t = k_j/kX \);

(c) the consumption of good \( j \) by every skilled worker at time \( t \) is given by

\[ q_{sjt}^0 = \frac{(1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \tau)}{1 - n_1^0} n_j^0 X_{jt} \quad j \in \mathcal{J}; \quad (50) \]

where \( X_{1t} \) is defined to be \( \dot{X}_{1t} \);

(d) the average consumption of good \( j \) by unskilled workers at time \( t \) is given by

\[ q_{njt}^0 = \left[ \frac{\alpha_1}{n_1^0} + \frac{\tau(1 - \alpha_1)}{n_1^0} \right] n_j^0 X_{jt} \quad j \in \mathcal{J}; \quad (51) \]

(e) the share of the population that produces good \( j \) remains constant as long as the good remains in production: \( n_{jt} = n_j^0 \) for \( j \in \mathcal{J} \) and the quantity of any good grows at rate \( n + g \) for as long as it is produced:

\[ \log Q_{jt,t+1} = n + g + \log Q_{jt} \quad j \in \{1\} \cup \mathcal{J}_2^{2,t+1}; \]

(f) the relative price of good \( j \) at time \( t \) is given by

\[ p_{jt} = \frac{P_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = \frac{\alpha_j n_j^0 \dot{X}_{1t}}{\alpha_1 n_1^0 X_{jt}} \quad (52) \]

which is constant over time as long as the good continues to be produced;

(g) the total demand parameter for good \( j \) is given by

\[ \frac{\bar{Q}_{jt}^0}{2} = [n_1^0 q_{njt}^0 + (1 - n_1^0) q_{sjt}] N_t \quad j \in \mathcal{J}; \]

(h) at any date \( t \), all skilled workers earn the same income as each other and the log difference between their income and that of the average unskilled is a constant over time.

8 Adjustment dynamics.

In this section we analyze the path by which an economy that is not in steady state converges over time to the steady-state growth path. We begin by parameterizing departures from steady state.

Shocks to demand and supply. In Section 8 we assumed that if a fraction \( n_j^0 \) of the popula-
ation successfully creates a new good \( j \), they discover a good for which the preference parameters for individual \( i \) at date \( t \) are given by \( \bar{q}_{ijt} = 2q_{ijt}^0 \) and \( \gamma_{ijt} = \alpha_j^0/(q_{ijt}^0)^2 \) where \( q_{ijt}^0 \) is the consumption of good \( j \) by individual \( i \) along the steady-state growth path and \( \alpha_j^0 = n_j^0(1 - \alpha_1)/(1 - n_1^0) \). We now generalize this to study an economy in which the preference parameters for individual \( i \) at date \( t \) are given by \( \bar{q}_{ijt} = \chi_{jt}2q_{ijt}^0 \) and \( \gamma_{ijt} = \xi_{jt}\alpha_{jt}/(q_{ijt}^0)^2 \). Here \( \chi_{jt} > 1 \) would represent the possibility that consumers value good \( j \) more than normal at date \( t \) while \( \chi_{jt} < 1 \) would represent lower than normal demand. Since the market-wide demand parameter \( \bar{Q}_{jt} \) is given by \( \int_0^N \bar{q}_{ijt}di \), an increase in \( \chi_{jt} \) shifts the demand for good \( j \) up. The magnitude \( \xi_{jt} \) is a different demand shock that makes the demand curve steeper, allowing producers to raise the price without inducing any change in the profit-maximizing level of output (see the bottom panel of Figure 1). Without loss of generality\(^1 \) we assume that \( \chi_{1t} = \xi_{1t} = 1 \).

To understand the role of \( \alpha_{jt} \), recall from Proposition 1 that if all specialized goods were producing at the unconstrained profit-maximizing level (\( \bar{Q}_{jt} = \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \) for all \( j \in J_{2t} \)) and if \( \sum_{j \in J_{t}} \alpha_{jt} = 1 \), then \( \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} \alpha_{jt} \) would measure the share of spending on specialized goods. Although each producer has a monopoly in their particular good, if \( \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} \alpha_{jt} \) is constant at \( 1 - \alpha_1 \) for all \( t \), specialists are always competing with each other for a fixed share \( (1 - \alpha_1) \) of consumers’ budgets. We adopt a simple characterization in which the share of good \( j \) out of the total share of specialized goods is determined by the share of producers of that good relative to all specialists:

\[
\alpha_{jt} = \frac{n_{jt}}{(1 - n_{1t})(1 - \alpha_1)} \quad \text{for} \ j \in J_{2t}.
\]  

(53)

Note (53) ensures that \( \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} \alpha_{jt} = 1 - \alpha_1 \) for all \( t \) and simplifies to the earlier specification \( \alpha_{jt} = \alpha_j^0 \) in (45) if the economy is on the steady-state growth path at date \( t \). Expression (53) implies that if off the steady-state growth path more people than usual become new specialists, they take some of the short-run expenditure share away from existing specialized goods. Again note that the specification of \( \alpha_{jt} \) has no effect on quantity \( Q_{jt} \) that producers of good \( j \) choose to produce, but does influence the price they charge for the good and thus the income that producers receive off the steady-state growth path.

Finally, we specify the productivity of producers of good \( j \) as \( X_{jt} = \zeta_{jt}X_{jt}^0 \) where \( X_{jt}^0 \) is the productivity associated with the steady-state growth path. Here \( \zeta_{jt} > 1 \) captures a favorable productivity shock at date \( t \) and \( \zeta_{jt} < 1 \) represents lower than normal productivity.

We now describe the equations of motion for an economy that begins at date \( t_0 \) in which the initial values of \( n_{jt_0} \) and \( n_{1t_0} \) may not be at the steady-state values \( n_j^0 \) and \( n_1^0 \) and the values of \( \chi_{jt}, \xi_{jt}, \) and \( \zeta_{jt} \) may not equal unity for a finite number of initial periods \( t_0, t_0 + 1, \ldots, t_0 + D \).

**Proposition 6.** At any point off the steady-state growth path:

\(^1\)A lower demand for good 1 could equivalently be expressed as \( \xi_{jt} > 1 \forall j \in J_{2t} \).
(a) 
\[ \frac{Q_{jt}}{2} = \chi_{jt}H_t n_j^0 X_j^0 N_t = \chi_{jt}H_t Q_{jt}^0 \quad \text{for } j \in J_t \]  
(54)

\[ H_t = 1 + \lambda_H (n_{1t} - n_1^0) \]  
(55)

\[ \lambda_H = \frac{\alpha_1 + \tau(1 - \alpha_1) - n_1^0}{n_1^0(1 - n_1^0)} \]  
(56)

with \( \lambda_H < 0 \) for typical parameter values;

(b) the quantity of good \( j \) that is produced at date \( t \) is

\[ Q_{jt} = \begin{cases} 
   n_{1t} N_t \hat{X}_1t & \text{for } j = 1 \\
   \min\{\bar{Q}_{jt}/2, n_{jt} \zeta_{jt} X_j^0\} & \text{for } j \in J_2t 
\end{cases} \]  
(57)

(c) the relative price of good \( j \) at date \( t \) is

\[ p_{jt} = \frac{P_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = \left( \frac{P_j^0}{P_1^0} \right)^{\alpha_j} \left( \frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_{j^0}} \right) \xi_{jt} \left[ \frac{\bar{Q}_{jt} - Q_{jt}}{Q_{1t} - Q_{11}} \right] \quad \text{for } j \in J_2t \]  
(58)

which in the special case when \( Q_{jt} = \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \) becomes

\[ p_{jt} = \frac{P_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = \xi_{jt} \left( \frac{P_j^0}{P_1^0} \right)^{\alpha_j} \left( \frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_{j^0}} \right) \left[ \frac{\chi_{jt}H_t n_1^0 \hat{X}_1t}{2H_t n_1^0 \hat{X}_1t - n_1 \hat{X}_1t} \right] \]  
(59)

(d) the share parameter for good \( j \) is characterized by

\[ \alpha_{jt} = \frac{n_{jt}(1 - n_1^0)}{n_j^0(1 - n_1^0)} \alpha_j^0 \quad \text{for } j \in J_2t; \]  
(60)

(e) if good \( j \) continues into \( t + 1 \), the number of individuals specializing in \( j \) at \( t + 1 \) is

\[ N_{j,t+1} = \max \left\{ \frac{\bar{Q}_{jt+1}}{2X_{j,t+1}}, N_{jt} \right\} \quad \text{for } j \in J_2^{2,t+1}, \]  
(61)

the overall fraction of continuing specialists is

\[ n_{t+1}^2 = \sum_{j \in J_2^{2,t+1}} N_{j,t+1}/N_{t+1}, \]

and if \( N_{j,t+1} = Q_{jt+1}/(2X_{jt+1}) \) then

\[ \frac{N_{j,t+1}}{N_{jt+1}} = \frac{\chi_{jt+1} H_{t+1}}{\zeta_{jt+1}}; \]  
(62)

(f) after-tax income per individual specialized in good \( j \) \((Y_{jt} = (1 - \tau)P_{jt}Q_{jt}/N_{jt})\) is char-
acterized by
\[
\frac{Y_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = \frac{Y^0_{jt}(1-n^0_1)Q^0_{jt}(Q_{jt} - Q^0_{jt})Q^0_{1t}}{(1-n^1_1)(Q^0_{jt})^2(Q_{jt} - Q^0_{jt})} \quad \text{for } j \in J_2t
\] (63)

which if \( Q_{jt} = \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \) simplifies to
\[
\frac{Y_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = \frac{Y^0_{jt}(1-n^0_1)(\chi_{jt}H_t)^2}{(1-n^1_1)(2H_tQ^0_{jt} - n^1_{1t}\bar{X}_{1t};N_t)}
\] (64)

and which along the steady-state growth path is the same for all skilled workers:
\[
Y^0_t = \frac{(1-\tau)(1-\alpha_1)n^0_1\bar{X}_{1t};}{\alpha_1(1-n^0_1)};
\] (65)

(g) compensation per unemployed individual is
\[
C^t = \frac{\tau \sum_{j \in J_2t} n_{jt}Y_{jt}}{n^1_1(1-h^1_1)(1-\tau)};
\] (66)

(h) the lifetime advantage of being skilled in good \( j \) relative to being unskilled is
\[
\tilde{V}_{jt} = \log Y_{jt} - \log(P_{1t}\bar{X}_{1t}) + \beta(1-k_X)\tilde{V}_{j,t+1} \quad \text{for } j \in J_2t
\] (67)

with good \( j \) endogenously discontinued after period \( t \) (\( j \in J^*_t \)) if \( \tilde{V}_{j,t+1} < 0 \); (i) if some individuals spend period \( t \) trying to create a new good, then
\[
\log(P_{1t}X^*_{1t}) - \log C^t = -k_U + k_\pi \beta \tilde{V}_{j,t+1} \quad \text{for } j \in J^w_{2,t+1};
\] (68)

(j) if a positive fraction \( h_{jt} \) of unemployed workers seek to specialize in continuing good \( j \), the fraction \( \pi_{jt} \) who are successful is characterized by
\[
\pi_{jt} = \frac{N_{jt+1} - N_{jt}}{(1-h^1_1)h_{jt}n^1_{1t}N_t}
\]
\[
\log(P_{1t}X^*_{1t}) - \log C^t = \pi_{jt} \beta \tilde{V}_{j,t+1}
\] (69)

for \( j \in J^w_{2,t+1} \) and \( h_{0t} = 1 - \sum_{j \in J^w_{2,t+1}} h_{jt} \) the fraction seeking to create new goods; (k) the fraction of the population in \( t+1 \) producing newly created goods is
\[
n^\beta_{t+1} = e^{-n}(1-h^1_1)h_{0t}n^1_{1t}k_\pi
\] (70)

and the fraction of the population that is unskilled is given by
\[
n^w_{1,t+1} = 1 - n^\beta_{t+1} - n^\beta_{t+1}.
\] (71)
(1) Define real GDP to be the ratio of current production evaluated at steady-state prices to steady-state production evaluated at steady-state prices:

\[ Q_t = \frac{\sum_{j \in J_t} P^0_{jt} Q_{jt}}{\sum_{j \in J_t} P^0_{jt} Q^0_{jt}}. \]  

(72)

This can equivalently be written as

\[ Q_t = \sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha^0_j (Q_{jt}/Q^0_{jt}) = \left( \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n^0_1} \right) \sum_{j \in J_t} \left( \frac{Q_{jt}}{N_t X^0_{jt}} \right) + \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{n^0_1} \right) \left( \frac{\hat{X}_{1t}}{X^0_{1t}} \right) n_{1t}. \]  

(73)

In the special case when all goods are demand constrained and \( \chi_{jt} = \zeta_{jt} = 1 \) \( \forall j \), this becomes

\[ Q_t = \frac{H_{1t}(1 - \alpha_1)}{1 - n^0_1} \sum_{j \in J_t} n^0_j + \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{n^0_1} \right) \left( \frac{\hat{X}_{1t}}{X^0_{1t}} \right) n_{1t}. \]  

(74)

The role of demand in determining real output. Recall from Proposition 5e that the long-run growth rate of real output is determined solely by growth in population and productivity. By contrast, Proposition 6 identifies demand as potentially important in the short run. Whereas Keynesian models attribute this difference between short and long run to the time necessary for wages and prices to adjust to economic conditions, here it arises solely from the time required for productive resources to be reallocated. For example, if the current number of specialists in good \( j \) is higher than warranted by long-run demand \( (n_{jt0} > n^0_j) \), long-run equilibrium is eventually restored either by limiting new hires in \( j \) until population growth returns the share to \( n^0_j \) or, if the rewards from waiting for a return to profitability are insufficient, discontinuing production of \( j \) altogether. In the latter case, some of the individuals will eventually develop a new specialty, but doing so takes time. If the excess supply results instead from a temporary drop in demand \( (\chi_{jt} < 1 \text{ for } t = t_0, t_0 + 1, ..., t_0 + D) \), the result would again be a temporary drop in output with specialized factors of production underutilized as they wait for demand conditions to improve, or again possibly a permanent discontinuation of the good’s production if demand is expected to remain depressed for a sufficiently long period. Shortfalls in demand can have effects that are long lasting as a result of the technological costs of developing new specialties, but will not have permanent effects because eventually specialties will adapt to long-run incentives.

Result 6a establishes that the overall number of skilled individuals \( n_{1t} \) is itself a factor entering demand for specialized goods. An increase in \( n_{1t} \) results in lower total demand provided that \( \alpha_1 + \tau (1 - \alpha_1) < n^0_1 \). In interpreting this inequality, note that \( \alpha_1 \) is the steady-state fraction of income that goes to unskilled individuals as a result of production of good 1 and \( \tau (1 - \alpha_1) \) is the fraction collected as unemployment compensation. If the sum of these is less than than \( n^0_1 \), the fraction of the population that is unskilled, then the average after-tax
income of an unskilled individual along the steady-state path is less than that of someone who is skilled. This is all that is needed to conclude that \( \lambda_H < 0 \). This condition is almost guaranteed by Proposition 3, which established that \( \tilde{V}^0 > 0 \), meaning that the log after-tax income of skilled workers exceeds the expected log income of unskilled along the steady-state growth path. However, because of Jensen’s Inequality, this is not quite enough to conclude that expected skilled after-tax income also exceeds the expected income of the unskilled, which is the condition required by \( \alpha_i + \tau(1 - \alpha_i) < n_i^0 \). For most parameter values, Jensen’s Inequality is not big enough to reverse the typical outcome. Online Appendix D provides sufficient conditions under which \( \lambda_H \) is necessarily negative. When \( \lambda_H < 0 \), \( \tilde{Q}_{jt} \) is lower when the fraction of unskilled individuals is higher.

**Short-run determinants of real GDP.** Note that we calculated real GDP in (72) as the ratio of current to steady-state output evaluated at steady-state prices. Thus \( Q_t > 1 \) means a value of real GDP higher than steady state and \( Q_t < 1 \) means a value lower than steady state. As an example, consider the special case when there are no demand or productivity shocks (\( \chi_{jt} = \zeta_{jt} = 1 \)), all goods have capacity to produce the profit-maximizing output (\( Q_{jt} = \tilde{Q}_{jt}/2 \)), and the population share of each specialty is the steady-state value (\( n_{jt} = n_{jt}^0 \)). In this case (74) becomes

\[
Q_t = H_t \left( \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n_1^0} \right) (1 - n_{1t}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{n_1^0} \right) \left( \frac{\tilde{X}_{1t}}{\tilde{X}_{1t}^0} \right) n_{1t}
\]

(75)

Note that \((1 - \alpha_1)/(1 - n_1^0)\), is greater than 1 and \((\alpha_1/n_1^0)\) is less than 1. Thus when \( H_t = (\tilde{X}_{1t}/\tilde{X}_{1t}^0) = 1 \),

\[
\frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial n_{1t}} = \frac{\alpha_1}{n_1^0} - \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n_1^0} < 0.
\]

Thus even if \( H_t \) and \( (\tilde{X}_{1t}/\tilde{X}_{1t}^0) \) were unity, a higher fraction of unskilled workers would mean lower GDP because fewer of the goods that consumers value are being produced. When \( n_{1t} > n_1^0 \), both \( (\tilde{X}_{1t}/\tilde{X}_{1t}^0) < 1 \) because when more individuals are unskilled, a higher fraction of them look for jobs, and also \( H_t < 1 \) due to lower demand. Both these are additional factors pushing real GDP below 1 when \( n_{1t} > n_1^0 \). A higher number of unskilled lowers real GDP.

**Linearized adjustment dynamics.** We can get some additional understanding by linearizing the results in Proposition 6. Let \( w_t \) denote the deviation of the variable \( w_t \) or its log from the value on the steady-state growth path. Online Appendix B shows that if \( j \) is a continuing specialized good that is demand constrained in period \( t \) (that is, if \( j \in J_{2t}, t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots, \) and \( \tilde{Q}_{jt}/2 < n_{jt}N_jX_{jt} \)), then the deviations from steady state of output, employment, and

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{w}_t &= \log w_t - \log w_0^j \quad \text{for } w_t = Q_{jt}, X_{jt}, \chi_{jt}, \zeta_{jt}, \dot{w}_t = w_t - w_0^j \quad \text{for } w_t = n_{jt}, \text{ and } \dot{p}_j &= \log(P_{jt}/P_{1t}) - \log(P_{jt}^0/P_{1t}^0).
\end{align*}
\]

\[[2]\text{If } n_{1t} > n_1^0, \text{ then } X_{1t} > X_{1t}^0 \text{ and } \tilde{X}_{1t} < \tilde{X}_{1t}^0.\]

\[[3]\text{Specifically, } w_t^j = \log w_t - \log w_0^j \text{ for } w_t = Q_{jt}, X_{jt}, \chi_{jt}, \zeta_{jt}, \dot{w}_t = w_t - w_0^j \text{ for } w_t = n_{jt}, \text{ and } \dot{p}_j = \log(P_{jt}/P_{1t}) - \log(P_{jt}^0/P_{1t}^0).\]
relative price are characterized by

$$Q_{jt}^\dagger = \chi_{jt}^\dagger + \lambda_H n_{1t}^\dagger$$ (76)

$$n_{jt}^\dagger = n_{jt,t-1}^\dagger - n$$ (77)

$$p_{jt}^\dagger = \xi_{jt}^\dagger + \chi_{jt}^\dagger + \lambda_H n_{1t}^\dagger + \frac{1}{n_{jt}^\dagger(1-n_{jt}^\dagger)} n_{1t}^\dagger + \frac{n_{jt}^\dagger}{n_{jt}^\dagger} + \lambda_5 X_{1t}^\ast.$$ (78)

An increase in demand that shifts the demand curve up ($\chi_{jt}^\dagger > 0$) leads to an increase in production and relative price of good $j$, whereas an increase in demand that rotates the demand curve up ($\xi_{jt}^\dagger > 0$) leads to an increase in price with no change in quantity. This confirms as a general-equilibrium dynamic result the partial-equilibrium static intuition in the bottom panel of Figure 1. If the good is demand constrained, productivity shocks $\zeta_{jt}^\dagger$ have no effects on either quantity or price, and no new workers will be hired in $t$, causing employment as a share of the population to fall at the rate of population growth in (77).

In addition, aggregate economic conditions also influence output, with a positive value of $n_{1t}^\dagger$ leading to lower production of each good $j$ when $\lambda_H < 0$. Aggregate conditions (operating through both $n_{1t}^\dagger$ and $X_{1t}^\ast$) have more complicated general implications for relative prices. The effect of $n_{1t}^\dagger > 0$ operating through $\lambda_H$ would be a factor shifting the demand curve for specialized goods down which by itself would lower prices. But there is also a terms-of-trade effect that would lead to a higher relative price of good $j$ if more of good 1 is being produced. The latter could arise either because there are more people without skills likely to be producing good 1 ($n_{1t}^\dagger > 0$) or if a higher fraction of the unskilled produce good 1 (which would show up as $X_{1t}^\ast < 0$ operating through the coefficient $\lambda_5 < 0$).

Calibration. Our baseline numerical examples use the parameter values in Table 2. We assume that a period corresponds to one quarter, with $n$ implying an annual population growth rate of 1% and $\beta$ an annual discount rate of 2%. Note that taxes in this model are used solely to finance unemployment compensation, motivating a relatively low value ($\tau = 0.02$) for the marginal tax rate. Productivity for all workers grows at some fixed rate $g$ (which does not affect any of the numbers reported in the table), and the log difference between the most productive and least productive unskilled individual ($S_t - R_t$) is constant at 1 for all $t$. There are huge gross flows out of and into employment in a typical month in the U.S. Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006, Table 1) found that 10% of workers lose or quit their jobs each quarter, and the estimates in Ahn and Hamilton (2022) imply that 12% of employed individuals will be unemployed or out of the labor force 3 months later. Our value of $k_X = 0.02$ assumes that involuntary separations account for less than 1/5 of these observed gross flows. When the probability of successfully creating a new good is $k_{10} = 0.25$, the baseline

---

4At this rate, steady-state unemployment compensation is equal to about one-quarter of the average wage of unskilled workers: $(P_{1t}^0 \times X_{1t}^0)/h_{1t}^0$; $[k_{10}^0 \times (2-\alpha_1)]/[\alpha_1(1-h_{1t}^0)] = 0.23.$
parameters imply a steady-state unemployment rate of \( u^0 = 5.1\% \). Skilled workers receive 60% of the pretax income of the economy but only account for 55.6% of the population, implying a value for \( \omega = 1.0784 \). The discounted lifetime advantage of being skilled is \( \tilde{V}^0 = 4.80 \), which translates into a per-period flow advantage of \( [1 - \beta(1 - k_X)]\tilde{V}^0 = 0.12 \), or 12% higher after-tax incomes for skilled workers.

Adjustment dynamics in the absence of new shocks. Adjustment dynamics are straightforward in the case when \( Q_{j,t+s} = Q_{j,t+s}/2 \) and \( \chi_{j,t+s} = \xi_{j,t+s} = \zeta_{j,t+s} = 1 \) for all \( s \geq 0 \). In this case equation (64) implies that all specialized workers earn the same income as each other from date \( t \) onward

\[
y_t = \frac{y^0(1 - n^0_1)H^2q_1^0}{(1 - n_{1t})\left\{2Hq_1^0 - n_{1t}\bar{X}_{1t}\right\}}.
\] (79)

Here we’ve introduced the notation \( y_t = Y_{jt}/P_{1t} \) to represent the common real income of any specialized worker in the absence of shocks and \( q_1^0 = Q_{1t}/N_t \) for the per capita output of good 1 along the steady-state growth path. We also simplify the notation to the case with zero productivity growth, since \( g > 0 \) results in a system of equations with identical implications to those presented in this subsection. For example, \( y^0 \) in (79) corresponds to \( Y^0_t / (1 + g)^t \) in the notation that was used in equation (65). With \( y_t \) the same for all specialized workers, unemployment compensation in (66) becomes

\[
c_t = \frac{\tau(1 - n_{1t})y_t}{n_{1t}(1 - n_{1t})(1 - \tau)}
\] (80)

for \( c_t = C_t / P_{1t} \). Common incomes also mean that (67) becomes a single value function \( \tilde{V}_t \) for all specialties,

\[
\tilde{V}_t = \log(y_t) - \log \bar{X}_{1t} + \beta(1 - k_X)\tilde{V}_{t+1}
\] (81)

and (68) becomes

\[
x^*_t - \log c_t = -k_U + \beta k_x \tilde{V}_{t+1}
\] (82)

for \( x^*_t = \log X^*_1 \). The fraction of the population that is unskilled evolves as in (71):

\[
n_{1,t+1} = 1 - n^2_{1,t+1} - n^2_{t+1}.
\] (83)

We assume that new goods enter with \( n_{jt} = n^0_j \) when \( j \in J^2_t \). However, economic conditions after they enter may cause \( n_{jt} \) for \( j \in J^2_t \) to differ from \( n^0_j \). For example, depressed demand could discourage hiring of new workers, in which case \( n_{jt+s} \) would fall below the value \( n_{jt} = n^0_j \) when the good was first introduced. For some of the examples in the next section, it is helpful to keep track of the state variable \( \tilde{n}_t \) which is defined as the sum of the steady-state employment shares \( n^0_j \) of all specialized goods that are produced at \( t \):

\[
\tilde{n}_t = \sum_{j \in J^2_t} n^0_j.
\]

A fraction \( (1 - k_X) \) of goods in \( t \) survive to \( t + 1 \), and the value of \( n^0_j \) for these goods at \( t + 1 \) is by definition
the same as in $t$. In addition, for newly produced goods the steady-state population share is the value when they were first introduced: $n_j^0 = n_{jt}$ for $j \in J_{2t}^*$. Thus the equation of motion for $\bar{n}_t$ is

$$\bar{n}_{t+1} = (1 - k_X)\bar{n}_t + n^*_{t+1}. \quad (84)$$

The fraction of the population that is newly specialized is given by

$$n^*_{t+1} = e^{-n}(1 - h_{1t})h_{0t}n_{1t}k_\pi. \quad (85)$$

A fraction $(1 - k_X)$ of the specialized goods in $t$ survive to $t + 1$, and the profit-maximizing employment share for those that survive is $n^*_{jt+1} = H_{t+1}n^0_j$. Provided $n^*_{jt+1} \geq n_{jt} \forall j \in J_{2t}$, this means

$$n^*_{t+1} = H_{t+1}(1 - k_X)\bar{n}_t. \quad (86)$$

Since continuing specialities offer a common income, equilibrium requires in (69) a common probability of successful application $\pi_t$:

$$x^*_{1t} - \log c_t = \beta\pi_t \tilde{V}_{t+1}. \quad (87)$$

The value of $\pi_t$ can be calculated as the ratio of total openings to total applicants:

$$\pi_t = \frac{n^*_{t+1}e^n - (1 - k_X)(1 - n_{1t})}{(1 - h_{1t})(1 - h_{0t})n_{1t}}. \quad (88)$$

In addition we have the definitions

$$H_t = 1 + \lambda_H(n_{1t} - n^0_1) \quad (89)$$

$$h_{1t} = \frac{S - x^*_{1t}}{S - R} \quad (90)$$

$$\log \tilde{X}_{1t} = \frac{S^2 - 2Rx^*_{1t} + (x^*_{1t})^2}{2(S - R)} \quad (91)$$

$$\hat{X}_{1t} = \frac{\exp(S) - \exp(x^*_{1t})}{S - R}. \quad (92)$$

Equations (79)-(92) are a system of 14 nonlinear dynamic equations in the 14 variables $y_t, c_t, \tilde{V}_t, x^*_{1t}, n_{1t}, \bar{n}_t, n^*_{t+1}, n^*_{t+1}, \pi_t, h_{0t}, H_t, h_{1t}, \tilde{X}_t, \hat{X}_t$ in which $n_{1t}$ and $\bar{n}_t$ are predetermined state variables, $\tilde{V}_t$ is a forward-looking state variable, and the other variables can be solved out to arrive at a nonlinear system in the three state variables. Steady-state magnitudes that appear as coefficients in the nonlinear system (for example, $y^0, n^0_1$, and $q^0_1$ in (79)) can be obtained by finding the steady-state solution from Proposition 3. For any specified initial $n_{1t_0}$ and $\bar{n}_{t_0}$, the system can be solved using the perfect foresight solver in Dynare (Adjemian et
and the terminal conditions $n_{1,t+s} \to n_{1}^{0}$, $\bar{n}_{t+s} \to n_{1}^{0}$, and $\bar{V}_{t+s} \to V^{0}$. Shocks to $\chi_{jt}$, $\xi_{jt}$, $\zeta_{jt}$ can be modeled as described in the next two sections. For more details see online Appendix C.

9 Demand shocks.

In this section we consider an economy in which all predetermined variables at $t_0$ are equal to their steady-state values, meaning $n_{jt} = n_{j}^{0}$ $\forall j \in J_{t_0}$, $n_{1t} = n_{1}^{0}$, and $\bar{n}_{t_0} = 1 - n_{1}^{0}$. In this section there are no shocks to productivity ($\zeta_{jt} = 1$ $\forall j,t$).

In our first two examples, $\chi_{jt} = \chi \neq 1$ for a fraction $\kappa$ of the specialized goods that were produced at $t_0$ with $\chi_{jt} = 1$ for the remaining goods and for all $t > t_0$. Note from (64) that nonimpacted goods (those with $\chi_{jt} = 1$) will all offer the same income as each other, which we denote $y_t$, while income for impacted goods (those with $\chi_{jt} = \chi$) is

$$y_t^{\chi} = \chi^2 y_t. \quad (93)$$

If $n_{i}^{\chi}$ and $n_{i}^{c}$ denote the fraction of the population specializing in impacted and nonimpacted goods, unemployment compensation from (66) is given by

$$c_t = \frac{\tau(n_{i}^{c}y_t + n_{i}^{\chi}y_t^{\chi})}{n_{1t}(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)}. \quad (94)$$

9.1 A transient drop in demand.

Let $\kappa$ denote the fraction of specialized goods that were in production at $t_0$ for which $\chi_{jt_0} = \chi$. In our first example, 10% of specialized goods experience a 10% drop in demand ($\kappa = 0.1, \chi = 0.9$). Since specialized goods account for 60% of steady-state GDP, this corresponds to a demand shock equal to 0.6% of GDP in $t_0$. For this example, lower demand lasts for only one period ($\chi_{jt} = 1$ for $t > t_0$).

To determine variables for dates $t > t_0$, note that beginning in $t = t_0 + 1$, $\chi_{jt} = \xi_{jt} = \zeta_{jt} = 1$ $\forall j$. The profit-maximizing level of production for every specialized good will be $\bar{Q}_{jt}/2 = H_{jt}Q_{jt}^{0}$ and all teams will add new workers each period to be able to produce this amount. No one has any incentive to give up their specialty in $t_0$, since $\bar{V}_{t+1}$ remains quite positive. Thus the economy for $t > t_0$ is described by equations (79)-(92) with the particular path determined by the values of the state variables $n_{1,t_0+1}$ and $\bar{n}_{t_0+1}$ that are endogenously determined at date $t_0$.

To determine variables at date $t_0$, note that $n_{1t_0} = n_{1}^{0}$, so from (55), $H_{t_0} = 1$. Thus from (54) and (57), impacted goods will produce $\chi Q_{jt_0}^{0}$ in $t_0$ while nonimpacted specialized goods produce the steady-state quantities ($Q_{jt_0} = Q_{jt_0}^{0}$ if $\chi_{jt_0} = 1$). Note that the latter have neither the incentive nor the capacity to produce more than this. The total number of people available to produce good 1 is determined by $n_{1t_0} = n_{1}^{0}$, so whether production of good 1 is above or
below $Q_{t_0}^0$ is determined by the productivity threshold $x_{1t}^*$ above which the unskilled produce good 1. Incentives at $t = t_0$ for trying to create a good that will begin production in $t_0 + 1$ are still described by (82). The one variable entering this determination of $x_{1t}^*$ that differs from the steady-state magnitude is unemployment compensation at $t_0$. This is given by (94), which can be written

$$c_t = \frac{\tau(1 - n_{1t})y_t}{n_{1t}(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)} s_{3t}$$

$$s_{3t} = \begin{cases} 1 + \kappa(\chi^2 - 1) & t = t_0 \\ 1 & t > t_0 \end{cases}$$

Thus the adjustment path for this example is represented by the system (79)-(92) with (80) replaced by (95). This can again be solved using Dynare with $s_{3t}$ treated as an exogenous shock.

From this solution any other magnitudes of interest can be calculated. For example, for all specialized goods, $n_{jt} = n_j^0$ for $t = t_0$ and $n_{jt} = H_t n_j^0$ for $t > t_0$. This allows us to calculate the relative price of any individual good $p_{jt} = P_{jt}/P_{1t}$ from (59):

$$p_{jt} = \begin{cases} \left( \chi_{j0} n_j^0 \tilde{x}_{1t_0}^0 \right) & t = t_0 \\ \left( \frac{H_t n_j^0 \tilde{x}_{1t}^0}{2H_t n_j^0 \tilde{x}_{1t_0}^0 - n_{1t} X_{1t_0}} \right) & t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, ... \end{cases}$$

Since $Q_{jt}/(N_t X_{jt}^0) = \chi_j H_t$, real GDP for this example is found from (73) to be

$$Q_t = \begin{cases} (1 - \alpha_1)[1 + \kappa(\chi - 1)] + \alpha_1 \tilde{x}_{1t_0}^0 X_{1t_0} & t = t_0 \\ (1 - \alpha_1)[1 + \kappa(\chi - 1)] + \alpha_1 \tilde{x}_{1t}^0 n_{1t} + \alpha_1 \tilde{x}_{1t}^0 n_{1t} & t > t_0 \end{cases}$$

The solid green line in Figure 4 plots the path over time of a few selected variables for this example. Real GDP (panel E) falls 0.55% below the steady-state growth path in $t_0$ but almost completely recovers by $t_0 + 1$. The reason that real GDP does not not fall quite by the full 0.6% expected is because of a modest general-equilibrium feedback. The lower income of the impacted specialized workers in period $t_0$ results in a decrease in the tax base from which unemployment compensation gets funded. The slight decrease in unemployment compensation induces some unskilled individuals in $t_0$ to produce good 1 rather than train for a specialty (panel C). The increase in production of good 1 slightly offsets the lost production of some specialized goods, explaining why GDP falls by only 0.55% rather than 0.6%.

The drop in demand for impacted goods leads to an increase in the relative price of all other goods. But this increase in relative prices results in little or no increase in production of those goods because the productive resources that become underutilized in the sectors with lower demand cannot be costlessly reallocated to produce in other sectors. Since the drop in demand only lasts one period, there is very little reallocation over time either. To a first
approximation, a transient drop in demand results in a transient drop in real GDP from which the economy almost immediately recovers.

### 9.2 A transient increase in demand.

Consider next the case in which there is a transitory 10% increase in demand ($\chi = 1.1$) affecting 10% of the specialized goods. Since these goods would have been at capacity with $\chi = 1$, their response at $t_0$ is to increase price with no change in production. The time paths in this case are plotted in dashed blue in Figure 4. In this case tax receipts (in units of good 1) go up, providing more generous unemployment compensation that leads to a slight reduction of good 1. The result is that real GDP actually falls very slightly in response to an increase in demand for goods that are already capacity constrained. To summarize: a reduction in demand will reduce real GDP, but an increase in demand need not increase real GDP.

### 9.3 A large persistent but isolated drop in demand.

Next consider the case of a 40% drop in demand that affects only 2.5% of specialized goods ($\chi = 0.6$, $\kappa = 0.025$). Note that the total size of the shock to demand is the same as in Example 9.1 (with $\kappa(\chi - 1) = -0.01$ in both cases) but in Example 9.3 the drop in demand is concentrated on a small subset of goods. If the low demand only lasted for a single period, the results would be identical to those in Example 9.1. Here however we consider a shock that lasts for $D = 8$ periods. We take the shock to be isolated in the sense that new goods created beginning in $t_0 + 1$ all enjoy the steady-state demand level $\chi_{jt} = 1$. From (64) the period $t$ log income for workers specializing in the impacted good would differ from that of other specialized workers by $\log \chi^2$ for each $t = t_0, ..., t_0 + D - 1$. From (67) this means that the lifetime advantage as of date $t$ of having a specialty in the impacted good is

$$\tilde{V}_t^j = \tilde{V}_t + \beta_{t_0+D-t}^X \log \chi^2$$

$$\beta_{t_0+D-t}^X = \left\{ \begin{array} {l l}
\sum_{s=0}^{t_0+D-t-1} [\beta (1 - k\chi)]^s & t = t_0, ..., t_0 + D - 1 \\
0 & t \geq t_0 + D
\end{array} \right.$$  

If the drop in demand is big enough and lasts long enough, it could turn out that $\tilde{V}_{t_0+1} < 0$ which would mean $E_{t_0} V_{j,t_0+1}$ for impacted goods is less than $E_{t_0} V_{t_0+1}$. In this case individuals who had specialized in the impacted goods would be better off abandoning their specialty and returning to the pool of the unskilled and the possibility of developing a new specialty. This turns out to be the case for the size of the shock in this numerical example. All impacted goods produce $\chi Q_{j\kappa}^{t_0}$ in period $t_0$ and are then discontinued.

The effects of discontinued goods can be represented as shocks to the equations that determine $n_{t+1}^j$ and $\bar{n}_{t+1}$ by generalizing (86) and (84) to

$$n_{t+1}^j = H_{t+1}(1 - k\chi)s_t \bar{n}_t$$
\[ \tilde{n}_{t+1} = (1 - k_X)\tilde{n}_t s_{1t} + n_{t+1}^s. \]

For Example 9.3, \( s_{1t} = s_{7t} = (1 - \kappa) \) for \( t = t_0 \) and equal to unity afterwards. Finally, the probability in (88) of successfully obtaining a job with a continuing specialty is modified to reflect the fact that discontinued goods will not be hiring in \( t_0 + 1 \):

\[ \pi_t = \frac{n_{t+1}^s e^n - (1 - k_X)(1 - n_{1t})s_{6t}}{(1 - h_{1t})(1 - h_{0t})n_{1t}} \]

with \( s_{6t} = (1 - \kappa) \) for \( t = t_0 \) and equal to unity afterwards.

The time paths for variables in this example are shown as solid black lines in Figure 4. The fact that there are fewer specialists in \( t_0 + 1 \) raises the value of \( \tilde{V}_{t_0 + 1} \) (panel B), and this partially offsets the effect of \( \chi \) on \( \tilde{V}_{t_0 + 1}^\chi \) in equation (96). However, for this numerical example it is the case that all impacted specialists still want to return to the pool of unskilled despite the higher value of \( \tilde{V}_{t_0 + 1} \) (see panel D). With the higher anticipated rewards to specialization, more unskilled than usual start trying to develop a specialty in \( t_0 \) (panel C). This results in a lower level of production of good 1 in \( t_0 \) that contributes to the GDP loss resulting from lower production of specialized goods (panel E).

Demand for all new and surviving goods is back to normal beginning in \( t_0 + 1 \). But GDP is not back to steady state because of the surplus of unskilled individuals. Why doesn’t the economy return to steady state immediately? The distribution of productivity of unskilled workers \( x_{it} \) results in a continuum of opportunity costs across unskilled workers who might consider trying to develop a skill. At any point in time, some unskilled individuals find it worth their while to search for something better and others do not. More than the usual number will be searching as long as \( n_{1t} > n_0 \), and this will eventually return the economy to \( n_{1t} = n_0 \). But the effects of a demand shock can persist long after the shock is gone if it takes time for the overall population to develop new skills.

This example offers one possible interpretation of why goods are always being discontinued along the steady-state growth path. Suppose that along the steady-state growth path, each period \( t \) a fraction \( k_X \) of specialized producers learn that demand for their particular product is going to experience a decrease of the magnitude considered in this example beginning in \( t + 1 \). Producers of those goods would have an incentive to abandon their specialty after producing in \( t \), and choose to return to the pool of unskilled workers. Thus a shock of the kind considered in Example 9.3 could be viewed as occurring all the time in this model. Everyone takes into account the possibility that the good could be discontinued at any time (and eventually will be discontinued for certain) through the parameter \( k_X \) that enters every decision.

\[ ^5 \text{For a more modest shock } \chi, \text{ it could be the case that if all impacted goods were to drop out, the value of } \tilde{V}_{t_0 + 1} \text{ would be sufficiently big that an impacted specialist would want to remain in, whereas if they all remained in then } \tilde{V}_{t_0 + 1} \text{ would be sufficiently small that everyone would want to drop out. In this case the equilibrium would be characterized by a fraction } \kappa_{\chi} \text{ of impacted goods being discontinued such that } \tilde{V}_{t_0 + 1}^\chi \text{ exactly equals zero, i.e., those who remain are just indifferent between staying or leaving.} \]
9.3 could be viewed as exploring what happens when these regular demand shocks affect a larger fraction of goods than usual and catch the producers of these goods by surprise in $t_0$.

9.4 The role of technological frictions.

How long it takes to return to steady state depends on how hard it is to create new goods. Here we illustrate this with an example that is identical to Example 9.3 except that now the probability of successfully creating a new specialized good is $k_\pi = 0.60$ rather than $0.25$ in our baseline parameterization. With lower technological frictions to developing new goods, there is a lower equilibrium unemployment rate ($u^0 = 2.4\%$ versus $5.1\%$ for the baseline parameters) and a lower equilibrium advantage to being skilled ($\bar{V}^0 = 0.7$ versus $4.8$ for the baseline case). If this economy were subjected to the same shock as in Example 9.3, all impacted specialists would again choose to return to the pool of the unskilled. Indeed, they would have chosen to do so with a much smaller or less persistent shock, since a new skill is much more easily obtained when $k_\pi = 0.6$. This is reflected in the very negative value for the red plot of $\bar{V}_t^\chi$ in panel D of Figure 4. Although the surge in unskilled workers in $t_0 + 1$ is the same as in Example 9.3, the economy recovers more quickly. This example illustrates that technological frictions are the key determinant of what we have described as a Keynesian-type multiplier effect.

9.5 A persistent drop in demand for new and existing goods.

The assumption in Examples 9.3 and 9.4 was that newly created goods were immune from the lower demand that hit existing goods. In those examples, a surge in new good creation was a key factor that helped the economy recover. In reality, starting a new business may be harder than usual when the economy is weak. To study this possibility, we now consider a demand shock that affects not just goods that were produced at $t_0$ but also any new goods that are introduced during the period when demand remains weak. Just as in Example 9.1, we suppose that $10\%$ of existing goods at $t_0$ experience a $10\%$ drop in demand ($\kappa = 0.1$, $\chi = 0.9$), but now we assume that low demand persists for $D = 5$ periods. For these numerical values, it turns out that impacted skilled workers would want to retain their specialty and wait until demand recovers. But impacted goods are demand constrained and do no additional hiring until demand recovers. For the first $D - 1$ periods the condition for new good creation (82) becomes

$$x_{1t} - \log c_t = -k_U + \beta k_\pi \bar{V}_{t+1} + \beta \bar{V}_{t_0+D-t-1} \log \chi^2$$

for $\beta X_j$ given by (97). Some unskilled workers will still choose this option, though fewer do so than would in steady state because of the lower return to trying to develop a skill.

Let $J_2^\chi$ denote the set of goods produced at $t$ for which $\chi_{jt} = \chi$. This set consists of those goods that survive to $t$ that either experienced $\chi_{jt_0} = \chi$ in $t_0$ or were newly created between $t_0 + 1$ and $t_0 + D - 1$. For this example we keep track of the fraction of the population
with impacted specialties, which evolves during the period of depressed demand according to
\[ n_{t+1}^\chi = e^{-n_t}(1-k_X)n_t^\chi + n_{t+1}^\tau, \]
and the sum of \( n_j^0 \) for all impacted goods, \( \bar{n}_t^\chi = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_2} n_j^0 \). The latter evolves according to \( \bar{n}_t^\chi + 1 = (1-k_X)n_t^\chi + n_{t+1}^\tau \) since new goods enter with \( n_j^0 = n_{jt} \) for \( t \in \mathcal{J}_2 \) and continuing goods retain \( n_j^0 \) as long as they continue to be produced. We also have \( \bar{n}_t^\tau = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_1} n_j^0 \) whose value is given by \( \bar{n}_t^\tau = (1-k_X)^{t-t_0}(1-\kappa)(1-n_0^j) \). These changes can again be represented by a series of shocks for periods \( t_0, \ldots, t_0+D-1 \) after which the system dynamics revert to (79)-(92). For details see online Appendix C.

The cyan curves in Figure 4 show the adjustment dynamics for this example. The lower rewards to acquiring a skill (panel D) and the reduced hiring opportunities from continuing goods result in a larger fraction of the unskilled deciding to produce good 1 (panel C). This higher production of good 1 helps offset much of the initial loss in GDP in \( t_0 \) that resulted from less production of impacted specialized goods. But since fewer of the unskilled are developing skills, we see in panel A an increase over time in the fraction of the population that are unskilled. This continues to drag GDP down as long as the period of weak hiring persists, and by period \( t_0 + 4 \) GDP is 1% below trend. Demand conditions are fully recovered beginning in \( t_0 + 5 \), but the economy only gradually returns to steady state for the same reasons as in Example 9.3. This provides an illustration of the possible hump-shaped response to a demand shock mentioned in the introduction. In this example, the normal inflow of people who are looking for better jobs confronts a slower than normal rate of new hiring. The effects of this on the number of unskilled workers and the value of GDP build over time.

### 9.6 Shocks to \( \xi_{jt} \).

Up to this point we have been discussing shocks to the preference parameter \( \chi_{jt} \), which results in a vertical shift of the demand curve for good \( j \) and changes the profit-maximizing level of output \( \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \) (see Figure 1). Consider now a shock to the parameter \( \xi_{jt} \), which changes the vertical intercept of the demand curve but leaves the horizontal intercept and the profit-maximizing level of output unchanged. From equation (57), this has no direct effect on output regardless of whether the good is demand- or supply-constrained. It results instead in an increase in the relative price of good \( j \) and in the relative income of producers of good \( j \). The changes in income will result in a change in tax receipts and unemployment compensation which would have general-equilibrium effects on \( h_{it} \) and \( n_{it} \), but these would be secondary contributions of the size noted in Example 9.1.

It is possible that if a drop in \( \xi_{jt} \) is large enough and lasts long enough, the drop in income for producers of the good would be sufficiently large to persuade them to discontinue production, but we do not explore this possibility here.

Although shocks to \( \xi_{jt} \) are less interesting for purposes of the questions studied here than are shocks to \( \chi_{jt} \), it would be important to include them in any empirical applications. The three shocks \( \chi_{jt}, \xi_{jt}, \zeta_{jt} \) could be viewed as the fundamental drivers (along with aggregate
factors represented here by \( n_{1t} \) and \( x_{1t}^* \) of the three variables \( Q_{jt}, p_{jt}, N_{jt} \). If we think of observed output for a given sector or firm \( k \) as resulting from a collection of \( J_t^k \) separate production activities (e.g., \( N_t^k = \sum_{j \in J_t^k} N_{jt} \)), some fraction of which could be demand-constrained and others supply-constrained, the three observed magnitudes \( Q_t^k, p_t^k, N_t^k \) could be interpreted as driven by a mixture of three unobserved shocks \( \chi_t^k, \xi_t^k, \zeta_t^k \).

10 Productivity shocks.

In this section we consider an economy that begins period \( t_0 \) with all predetermined variables equal to their steady-state values and \( \chi_{jt} = \xi_{jt} = 1 \) \( \forall j, t \). We study the consequences if the productivity parameter \( \zeta_{jt} = \zeta = 1 \) for a fraction \( \kappa \) of the specialized goods in production in date \( t_0 \).

10.1 A transient drop in productivity.

Consider first a 10% drop in productivity that affects 10% of the specialized goods at \( t_0 \) (\( \zeta = 0.9, \kappa = 0.1 \)) with productivity returning to normal in \( t_0 + 1 \). Since \( n_{1t_0} = n_t^0 \) and \( H_{t_0} = 1 \), from (57) nonimpacted goods will produce \( Q_{jt_0}^0 \) while impacted goods will produce \( \zeta Q_{jt_0}^0 \). Moreover, \( Q_{jt_0}^0 - Q_{jt_0}^0 = (2 - \zeta)Q_{jt_0}^0 = 1.1Q_{jt_0}^0 \) for \( j \in J_{2t_0}^k \) so from (58) impacted goods raise their price by 10% relative to nonimpacted goods. With a 10% drop in production and a 10% increase in price, the effect on relative income is nearly a wash; \( Q_{jt_0}(Q_{jt_0}^0 - Q_{jt_0}^0) = \zeta (2 - \zeta) (Q_{jt_0}^0)^2 \) so from (63) \( y \zeta^2 = \zeta (2 - \zeta) y_t \). For \( \zeta = 0.9, \zeta (2 - \zeta) = 0.99 \), implying a 1% drop in the relative income of impacted workers. Thus the general equilibrium effects operating through unemployment compensation \( c_{t_0} \) are even more modest here than in Example 9.1. We would see nearly a 0.6% drop in real GDP at \( t_0 \) followed by an almost complete recovery in \( t_0 + 1 \), with the time paths of variables in Example 10.1 almost the same as the solid green lines in panels A-C and E-F of Figure 4.

The effects of supply and demand shocks could look quite similar to each other in the data. Note moreover that we could not use measured productivity to distinguish between the 10% demand shock in Example 9.1 and the 10% productivity shock in Example 10.1. In both cases, output falls by 10% with no change in labor input, so measured productivity of impacted goods falls by 10% in both examples. The one way we could distinguish between demand and supply shocks is in observations of relative prices. In Example 9.1 the drop in production is accompanied by a decrease in the relative price, whereas in Example 10.1 we would see an increase in the relative price.

10.2 A transient increase in productivity.

Consider next the case in which a fraction \( \kappa = 0.1 \) of the goods in production at \( t_0 \) experience a 10% increase in productivity (\( \zeta = 1.1 \)), with conditions again returning to normal beginning in \( t_0 + 1 \). Although more goods could be produced in \( t_0 \), no one has an incentive to do so, since
$Q_{j0}/2$ is still the profit-maximizing level of production. There is no incentive to change prices, and no incentive to make any changes for the future since conditions at $t_0 + 1$ will be back to steady state. If businesses already have the capacity to produce at the revenue-maximizing level of output, a purely transient increase in productivity has no effect on the output or price of any good at any date.

### 10.3 A persistent decrease in productivity.

We saw in Example 9.3 that if a drop in demand is sufficiently severe and long lasting it could induce workers to abandon their specialty. How big a drop in productivity would be necessary to produce the same result? A demand shock lowers income by a factor of $\chi^2$ whereas the factor for a productivity shock is $\zeta(2 - \zeta)$. For $\chi = \zeta = 0.9$, $\chi^2 = 0.81$ and $\zeta(2 - \zeta) = 0.99$. A 10% drop in demand would have a significant effect on income, whereas the effect on income of a 10% drop in productivity would be negligible. In Example 9.3 we saw that a 40% drop in demand ($\chi = 0.6$) that persisted for two years would be sufficient to persuade workers to try to develop a new skill. To get a comparable income effect from a productivity shock would require an 80% drop in productivity that persists for two years.\(^6\) Thus in this model both demand and supply shocks could contribute to short-run economic fluctuations, but it would require quantitatively bigger productivity shocks to produce some of the propagation mechanisms to which we have called attention.

Consumer preferences change all the time. But events that lead to significant drops in productivity are harder to identify as the cause of historical economic downturns. The popularity of macroeconomic models in which productivity shocks are a primary driver of short-run economic fluctuations is based not on anything observed in the data but instead on a lack of satisfactory models with which we could understand how demand shocks could be the main cause of business cycles. This is why I wrote this paper.

### 11 Discussion.

In order to focus as clearly as possible on the role of specialization in determining the level of economic activity, this paper abstracted from many details that play a key role in economic fluctuations. Here labor was the only input, with specialization taking the form of training and assembling a dedicated team of workers. Specialized capital is an even more important commitment for most businesses (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998 and 2001). Production moreover typically depends on inputs purchased from other firms that themselves specialize to be able to provide those goods or services, amplifying the forces studied here through network connections (Baqae, 2018 and Baqae and Farhi, 2019). This paper completely ignored financial frictions, even though they appear to be a key factor in many economic downturns. And although nominal frictions played no role in this model, they could well be an additional factor in

\(^6\)For $\chi = 0.6$ and $\zeta = 0.2$, $\chi^2 = \zeta(2 - \zeta) = 0.36$. 
amplifying economic downturns, just as they are known to amplify the effects of productivity shocks in existing models that incorporate costs of reallocating resources across sectors (e.g., Guerrieri et al., 2020).

By focusing on just a single source of specialization and a single technological friction, the hope was to shed light on the interaction between specialization and demand as a fundamental short-run determinant of the level of GDP.

References.


Table 1. Ranges and derivatives of key variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value at</th>
<th>Value at</th>
<th>Sign of</th>
<th>Steady-state derivative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Z_t$</td>
<td>$\log X_t^* = R_t$</td>
<td>$\log X_t^* = S_t$</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>$\partial Z_t / \partial \log X_t^* &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>$\log(1 - h_{1t})$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>$\log X_{1t}$</td>
<td>$\frac{S_t + R_t}{2}$</td>
<td>$\frac{S_t + R_t}{S_t - R_t}$</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>$X_{1t}$</td>
<td>$\frac{\exp(S_t) - \exp(R_t)}{S_t - R_t}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>$h_{1t}$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>$V_1$</td>
<td>finite</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Parameter values used in baseline calculations.

**Exogenous parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parameter</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_1$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_U$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_\pi$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_X$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_{t0}$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_{t0}$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Derived parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parameter</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_2$</td>
<td>8.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_3$</td>
<td>0.1154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_5$</td>
<td>-0.7032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_H$</td>
<td>-0.1281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Steady-state values of endogenous variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$n_1^*$</td>
<td>0.4436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\log X_{1t}^*$</td>
<td>1.1154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 - h_1^*$</td>
<td>0.1154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u^*$</td>
<td>0.0512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^*$</td>
<td>0.2082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega^*$</td>
<td>1.0784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{V}^*$</td>
<td>4.8032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Market demand curves.

Notes to Figure 1. Top panel: market demand and marginal revenue. Bottom panel: effects of shifts in $\xi_{jt}$ and $\chi_{jt}$.

Figure 2. Benefit of creating new good versus specializing in existing good.

Notes to Figure 2. Horizontal axis: advantage of specialization ($\bar{V}_{t+1}$). Vertical axis: benefit to trying to create new good (solid black) and of specializing in existing good for two different values of $\pi_t$ (dashed red and dotted blue).
Figure 3. Individual utility and demand curves.

Notes to Figure 3. Top panel: logarithmic preferences and quadratic approximation. Bottom panel: demand curve associated with quadratic preferences.
Figure 4. Effects of demand shocks.

Notes to Figure 4. Horizontal axis: time ($t_0 = 1$). Vertical axis: deviation of variable from value on the steady-state growth path for Panels A-C and E; levels in Panels D and F. Panel A: fraction of population without a high-skilled, high-paying job ($n_{1t} - n_0$). Panel B: lifetime advantage of specializing in goods that do not experience demand shock ($\bar{v}_t - \bar{v}_0$). Panel C: fraction of unskilled workers who are unemployed ($-h_{1t} + h_0$). Panel D: lifetime advantage of specializing in goods that experience demand shock ($\bar{v}_{1t}^X$). Panel E: log of real GDP ($logQ_t$). A value of -0.01 on the vertical axis represents a value of real GDP that is 1% below the value on the steady-state growth path. Panel F: relative price that would maximize profits for goods that experience demand shocks ($p^X_{1t}$) with steady-state relative price normalized at 1. Solid green (Example 9.1): 10% of specialized goods experience 10% drop in demand that only lasts for period $t_0$. Dashed blue (Example 9.2): 10% of specialized goods experience 10% increase in demand that only lasts for period $t_0$. Solid black (Example 9.3): 2.5% of specialized goods experience 40% drop in demand that would last for 8 periods if goods remained in production. Dotted red (Example 9.4): same as Example 9.3 except that creating a new good is easier ($k_\pi = 0.6$). Solid cyan (Example 9.5): 10% of specialized goods and all newly created goods experience a 10% drop in demand that lasts for 5 periods.
Figure A1. Value of specialization solved in terms of $h_{0t}$ and $X^*_t(h_{0t})$.

Notes to Figure A1. Each value of $h_{0t}$ implies a steady-state fraction of unskilled labor and thus particular values of $X^*_t(h_{0t})$ and $\bar{V}(h_{0t}, X^*_t(h_{0t}))$. Each point on the horizontal axis corresponds to a particular value of $h_{0t}$ and its implied $X^*_t(h_{0t})$ and $\bar{V}(h_{0t}, X^*_t(h_{0t}))$ with that value of $\bar{V}$ plotted on the horizontal axis. Thus $h_{0t}$ is decreasing and $X^*_t$ increasing as we move to the right along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis plots the value of trying to create a new good (in black) or seeking to specialize in an existing good (in dashed red) as a function of that $\bar{V}(h_{0t}, X^*_t(h_{0t}))$. The two panels correspond to different parameter configurations depending on whether $\bar{V}(1, X^*_t(1))$ is positive (top panel) or nonpositive (bottom panel).
Appendix A. Proofs of propositions

Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) If \( q_{ijt} = \bar{q}_{ijt}/2 \), equation (3) becomes

\[
\gamma_{ijt} \bar{q}_{ijt}/2 = \lambda_{it} P_{jt}.
\]  
(A1)

Multiplying both sides of (A1) by \( \bar{q}_{ijt}/2 = q_{ijt} \) gives

\[
\alpha_{ijt} = \lambda_{it} P_{jt} q_{ijt}.
\]  
(A2)

Summing (A2) over \( j \) and using \( \sum_{j \in J_t} P_{jt} q_{ijt} = y_{it} \) gives

\[
\sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{ijt} = \lambda_{it} y_{it}.
\]  
(A3)

Dividing (A2) by (A3) gives (6).

(b) For all \( i \in M_t^{(k)} \) we have from (3) that

\[
\gamma_{jt}^{(k)} (\bar{q}_{jt}^{(k)} - q_{jt}) = \lambda_{it}^{(k)} P_{jt}.
\]  
Integrating over \( i \in M_t^{(k)} \), dividing by \( R_t^{(k)} \), and using (7) gives

\[
\gamma_{jt}^{(k)} (\bar{q}_{jt}^{(k)}/2) = P_{jt} \lambda_{it}^{(k)}
\]  
(A4)

for \( \lambda_{it}^{(k)} = (1/R_t^{(k)}) \int_{i \in M_t^{(k)}} \lambda_{it} di \). Multiplying (A4) by (7) gives

\[
\alpha_{jt}^{(k)} = \frac{\lambda_{it}^{(k)} P_{jt} \int_{i \in M_t^{(k)}} q_{ijt} di}{R_t^{(k)}}.
\]  
(A5)

Summing over \( j \) gives

\[
\sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_{jt}^{(k)} = \frac{\lambda_{it}^{(k)} R_t^{(k)} \int_{i \in M_t^{(k)}} y_{it} di}{R_t^{(k)}}.
\]  
(A6)

Dividing (A5) by (A6) gives (8).

Proof of Proposition 2.
Let \( z \sim U(R, S) \): \( f(z) = (S - R)^{-1} \) for \( z \in [R, S] \). Then:

(a) \[
P(z \geq z^*) = \int_{z^*}^{S} \frac{1}{S - R} dz = \frac{z}{S - R} \bigg|_{z^*}^{S} = \frac{S - z^*}{S - R};
\]
(b) 
\[
\tilde{z} = E(z|z \geq z^*)P(z \geq z^*) + z^*P(z < z^*) \\
= \int_{z^*}^{\infty} \frac{z}{S - R} \, dz + z^* \int_{R}^{\infty} \frac{1}{S - R} \, dz = \frac{1}{2} \frac{z^2}{S - R} + \frac{z^*}{S - R} \frac{z^*}{\tilde{R}} \\
= \frac{S^2 - z^*^2}{2(S - R)} + \frac{z^*(z^* - R)}{S - R} = \frac{S^2 - 2Rz^* + z^*^2}{2(S - R)} \\
\frac{d\tilde{z}}{dz^*} = \frac{2z^* - 2R}{2(S - R)} > 0 \quad \forall z^* > R;
\]

(c) 
\[
\int_{z^*}^{S} \frac{\exp(z)}{S - R} \, dz = \left. \frac{\exp(z)}{S - R} \right|_{z^*}^{S} = \frac{\exp(S) - \exp(z^*)}{S - R}.
\]

**Proof of Proposition 3.**

Write expression (44) as 
\[
\frac{1 - n_{1t}}{n_{1t}} = \frac{k_\pi}{k_X e^n} (1 - h_{1t}) h_{0t}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A7)

and substitute this result into (35):

\[
\bar{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*) = \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - k_X)} \right\} \left\{ \log \left[ \frac{(1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha_1)}{\alpha_1} \right] \\
- \log \left[ \frac{k_\pi}{k_X e^n} \right] - \log(1 - h_{1t}) - \log h_{0t} + \log \hat{X}_{1t} - \log \bar{X}_{1t} \right\}.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A8)

Condition (39) can be written

\[
h_{Y_1}(X_{1t}^*) = -k_U + k_\pi \beta \bar{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*)
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

where \(h_{Y_1}(X_{1t}^*)\) denotes the function of \(X_{1t}^*\) given in (38).

From rows (2) and (5) of Table 1, as \(X_{1t}^*\) increases from \(R_t\) to \(S_t\), the left side of (A9) monotonically increases from \(-\infty\) to \(\infty\). For fixed \(h_{0t} > 0\), the right side monotonically decreases from \(\infty\) to \(-\infty\). Thus given any \(h_{0t} \in (0, 1)\), there exists a unique \(\log X_{1t}^* \in (R_t, S_t)\) at which condition (A9) holds, that is, for which conditions (44) and (39) simultaneously hold. Denote this solution \(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})\).

From (A8), a larger value of \(h_{0t}\) lowers the right side of (A9) and is thus associated with a lower value of \(X_{1t}^*\): \(\partial X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})/\partial h_{0t} < 0\). As \(h_{0t} \to 0\), \(-\log h_{0t} \to \infty\) and \(\log(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}))\) is driven to \(S_t\). Since \(h_{Y_1}(X_{1t}^*)\) in (38) is monotonically increasing in \(X_{1t}^*\) and since \(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})\) is monotonically decreasing in \(h_{0t}\), it follows that \(h_{Y_1}(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}))\) is a monotonically decreasing function of \(h_{0t}\). By the definition of \(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})\), we know that

\[
h_{Y_1}(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})) = -k_U + k_\pi \beta \bar{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}))
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A10)
holds for all $h_{0t}$. Monotonicity of the left side of (A10) as a function of $h_{0t}$ implies that the right side is also a monotonically decreasing function of $h_{0t}$.

Next consider the incentives for applying for a position with continuing enterprises. Substituting (A7) into (41),

$$
\pi_t(h_{0t}) = \max \left\{ \frac{(1 - k_X)(1 - e^{-t})k_\pi}{k_X} \frac{h_{0t}}{(1 - h_{0t})}, 1 \right\},
$$

allowing us to write (42) as

$$
-k_U + \beta k_\pi \tilde{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})) = \beta \pi_t(h_{0t})\tilde{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*(h_{0t})).
$$

(A12)

Recalling that $\tilde{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}))$ is a monotonically decreasing function of $h_{0t}$, consider two cases. Suppose first that $\tilde{V}(h_{0t}, X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}))$ is positive at its lowest point ($h_{0t} = 1$). Note from (A11) that $\pi_t = 1$ at this point. With $\tilde{V}$ positive and $\pi_t = 1 > k_\pi$, the right side of (A12) must be larger than the left side at the lowest possible value for $\tilde{V}$, namely $\tilde{V}(1, X_{1t}^*(1))$. As $h_{0t}$ decreases below 1, $\tilde{V}$ monotonically increases and $\pi_t$ monotonically decreases, the latter eventually reaching 0 as $h_{0t} \to 0$. Thus there exists a unique value $h_{0t}^0 \in (0, 1)$ at which (A12) holds; see the top panel of Figure A1. Call this value $\bar{h}_{0t}$. This value implies a unique $X_{1t}^*(\bar{h}_{0t})$, a unique $n_{1t}(\bar{h}_{0t})$ and thus a unique $n_{1t}(\bar{h}_{0t})$ from (A7). By construction $(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}^0, n_{1t}(h_{0t}^0), h_{0t}^0))$ satisfy (43), (42) and (44).

Alternatively, suppose that $\tilde{V}(1, X_{1t}^*(1))$ is negative (see the bottom panel of Figure A1). Since $\tilde{V}$ is monotonically decreasing in $h_{0t}$ and goes to $\infty$ as $h_{0t} \to 0$, there exists a unique $\bar{h}_{0t} \in (0, 1)$ at which $\tilde{V}(\bar{h}_{0t}, X_{1t}^*(\bar{h}_{0t})) = 0$. At this point the right side of (A12) is zero and the left side is negative. As $h_{0t}$ decreases below $\bar{h}_{0t}$, the value of $\tilde{V}$ increases without bound while the magnitude $\pi_t(h_{0t})$ eventually goes to 0. Thus there again exists a unique $h_{0t}^0$ for which condition (A12) holds and for which $(X_{1t}^*(h_{0t}^0, n_{1t}(h_{0t}^0), h_{0t}^0)$ simultaneously satisfies (44), (42) and (39).

**Proof of Proposition 4.**

$$
\begin{align*}
\bar{h}_{1t+1} &= \frac{S_{t+1} - \log X_{1t+1}^*}{S_{t+1} - R_{t+1}} = \frac{S_t + g - (\log X_{1t}^* + g)}{(S_t + g) - (R_t + g)} = \frac{S_t - \log X_{1t}^*}{S_t - R_t} = h_{1t} \\
\log \bar{X}_{1t+1} &= \frac{(S_t + g)^2 - 2(R_t + g)(\log X_{1t}^* + g) + (\log X_{1t}^* + g)^2}{2[(S_t + g) - (R_t + g)]} \\
&= \frac{S_t^2 - 2S_t \log X_{1t}^* + (\log X_{1t}^*)^2}{2(S_t - R_t)} + \frac{2S_t g + g^2 - 2g \log X_{1t}^* - 2gR_t - 2g^2 + 2g \log X_{1t}^* + g^2}{2(S_t - R_t)} \\
&= \log \bar{X}_{1t} + g \frac{2S_t - 2R_t}{2(S_t - R_t)} = \log \bar{X}_{1t} + g
\end{align*}
$$
\[ \dot{X}_{1t+1} = \frac{\exp(S_t + g) - X^*_1 \exp(g)}{(S_t + g) - (R_t + g)} = \exp(g) \left[ \frac{\exp(S_t) - X^*_1}{S_t - R_t} \right] = \exp(g) \dot{X}_{1t}. \]

The other results follow immediately.

**Proof of Proposition 5.**

(a) Let \((X^*_{1t0}, n^0_1, h^0_0)\) be the unique solution to (39), (42) and (44) for date \(t_0\). Then \((e^g X^*_{1t0}, n^0_1, h^0_0)\) solve these three equations for date \(t_0 + 1\), as can be verified as follows. From Proposition 4, \(X^*_{1t0+1} = e^g X^*_{1t0}\) would imply \(h_{1,t0+1} = h^0_1, \log \dot{X}_{1t0+1} = g + \log \dot{X}_{1t0}\) and \(\log \dot{X}_{1,t0+1} = g + \log \dot{X}_{1t0}\) establishing from (38) that \(h_{Y,t0+1} = h_{Yt0}\) and from (35) that \(\tilde{V}_{t0+1} = \tilde{V}_{t0}\). Hence (39), (42) and (44) are all satisfied at date \(t_0 + 1\), confirming that \((e^g X^*_{1t0}, n^0_1, h^0_0)\) is the solution. By induction, \((e^g(t-t_0) X^*_{1t0}, n^0_1, h^0_0)\) is the solution for all \(t\).

(b) Of the \(J_{2t0} = k_J/k_X\) goods at initial date \(t_0\), \(k_X J_{2t0} = k_J\) will no longer be produced beginning in \(t_0 + 1\). And since \(h_{0t0} > 0, k_J\) new goods (one of each type) will begin being produced in \(t_0 + 1\). Thus \(J_{2,t0+1} = J_{2t0}\) and by induction \(J_{2t}\) is constant for all \(t\).

(c) Along the steady-state growth path, a fraction \((1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \tau)\) of total income \(\dot{Y}_t\) is earned by skilled workers and the remaining \([\alpha_1 + \tau(1 - \alpha_1)]\dot{Y}_t\) is received by unskilled. Each of these groups on average spends a fraction \(\alpha_{jt}\) of their income on good \(j\). Since \(n_{jt} N_t X_{jt}\) units of good \(j\) get produced, \((1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \tau)n_{jt} N_t X_{jt}\) units of good \(j\) are consumed by the skilled and the remaining \([\alpha_1 + \tau(1 - \alpha_1)]n_{jt} N_t X_{jt}\) by unskilled. Dividing the first expression by the total number of skilled workers \((1 - n_{1t}) N_t\) gives result (c). Result (h) below verifies that this is in fact the same number for all skilled workers.

(d) Dividing unskilled total spending on \(j\), \([\alpha_1 + \tau(1 - \alpha_1)]n_{jt} N_t X_{jt}\), by the total number of unskilled \(n^0_1 N_t\) gives result (d). Since productivities \(x_{jt}\) are drawn independently over time, this is the average unskilled spending and is the level of consumption \(q^0_{n_{jt}}\) along the steady-state growth path.

(e) With \(n_{jt} = n^0_1\), consumption of good \(j\) per individual in (50)-(51) grows at rate \(g\) so that total consumption \(Q_{jt}\) grows at \(g + n\) and equals total production in (32).

(f) The ratio of nominal spending on good \(j\) to that for good \(1\) is \((P_{jt} Q_{jt})/(P_{1t} Q_{1t}) = \alpha_j/\alpha_1\). Since \(Q_{jt} = n^0_1 N_t X_{jt}, P_{jt}/P_{1t} = (\alpha_j n_{1t} \dot{X}_{1t})/(\alpha_1 n^0_1 X_{jt})\). Since \(\dot{X}_{1t}\) and \(X_{jt}\) both grow at rate \(g\), the ratio \(\dot{X}_{1t}/X_{jt}\) is constant over time.

(g) This follows from applying results (c) and (d) to expression (9).

(h) Total spending on good \(j\) is \(P_{jt} Q_{jt} = \alpha_j Y_t\), so the after-tax income per person producing good \(j\) is

\[ \frac{(1 - \tau)P_{jt} Q_{jt}}{n_{jt} N_t} = \frac{\alpha_j Y_t (1 - \tau)}{n_{jt} N_t}. \]

Equation (49) establishes that at date \(t_0\) this magnitude is

\[ \frac{(1 - \tau)P_{jt0} Q_{jt0}}{n_{jt0} N_{t0}} = \frac{Y_{t0}(1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha_1)}{(1 - n^0_1) N_{t0}} \]
which is the same for all \( j \in J_{2t_0} \). Thus the stated initial conditions imply that all skilled workers earn the same income at date \( t_0 \). The income for a worker producing good \( j \) at date \( t \) is \( P_{jt}X_{jt} \), which from result (f) is \( e^{\sigma(t-t_0)} \) times the income that individual received at date \( t_0 \), the same constant factor for each \( j \).

For goods that are produced for the first time in period \( t \), substituting condition (45) into (A13) gives

\[
\frac{(1 - \tau)P_{jt}Q_{jt}}{n_{jt}N_t} = \frac{(1 - \alpha_1)Y_t(1 - \tau)}{(1 - n_0^0)N_t} \quad j \in J_{2t_0}^2,
\]

which is the same for each \( j \in J_{2t_0}^2 \) and the same as the income received by those producing continuing specialized goods.

**Proof of Proposition 6.**

(a) Note that

\[
\bar{q}_{ijt} = \begin{cases} 
2\chi_{jt}q_{ijt}^0 & \text{for } i \in M_{st} \\
2\chi_{jt}q_{njt}^0 & \text{for } i \in M_{nt} 
\end{cases}
\]  

(A14)

where \( M_{st} \) and \( M_{nt} \) denote the sets of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. From (A14), (9), and Proposition 5c-e:

\[
\hat{Q}_{jt} = 2\chi_{jt}[n_{1t}\bigg]n_{njt}^0 + (1 - n_{1t})q_{kjt}^0]N_t = 2\chi_{jt}H_tn_j^0X_{jt}^0N_t
\]

(A15)

\[
H_t = \frac{n_{1t}[\alpha_1 + \tau(1 - \alpha_1)]}{n_1^0} + \frac{(1 - n_{1t})(1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \tau)}{1 - n_0^0} = 1 + \lambda_H(n_{1t} - n_0^0).
\]

(b) This simply restates (24) and (10).

(c) For \( \gamma_{ijt} = \xi_{ijt}\alpha_{ijt}/(q_{ijt}^0)^2 \) and \( \bar{q}_{ijt} = 2\chi_{jt}q_{ijt}^0 \) consumer \( i \)’s first-order condition (3) is

\[
\frac{\xi_{ijt}\alpha_{ijt}}{(q_{ijt})^2}(2\chi_{jt}q_{ijt}^0 - q_{ijt}) = \lambda_{it}P_{jt}.
\]

(A16)

From (50)-(52),

\[
\frac{q_{ijt}^0}{q_{i1t}^0} = \frac{n_j^0X_{jt}^0}{n_1^0X_{jt}^0} = \frac{\alpha_j^0P_{jt}^0}{\alpha_1^0P_{jt}^0},
\]

allowing (A16) to be written

\[
\xi_{jt}\alpha_{jt}(2\chi_{jt}q_{ijt}^0 - q_{ijt}) = \lambda_{it}P_{jt} \left( \frac{\alpha_j^0P_{jt}^0}{\alpha_1^0P_{jt}^0} \right)^2 (q_{i1t}^0)^2.
\]

(A17)

From (A14), \( \int_0^{N_t} 2\chi_{jt}q_{ijt}^0di = \bar{Q}_{jt} \). Thus integrating (A17) over \( i \) gives

\[
\xi_{jt}\alpha_{jt}(\bar{Q}_{jt} - Q_{jt}) = \Lambda_{it}P_{jt} \left( \frac{\alpha_j^0P_{jt}^0}{\alpha_1^0P_{jt}^0} \right)^2
\]

(A18)
for \( \Lambda_t = \int_0^{N_t} \lambda_t(q_{1t}^0)^2 dt \). Dividing (A18) by its value for \( j = 1 \),

\[
\frac{\xi_j \alpha_j (Q_{jt} - Q_{jt})}{\alpha_1 (Q_{1t} - Q_{1t})} = \left( \frac{\alpha_j^0 P_{1t}^0}{\alpha_1 P_{1t}^0} \right)^2 \left( \frac{P_{jt}}{P_{1t}} \right).
\]

Rearranging gives (58).

If we substitute (60), \( Q_{jt} = Q_{jt}/2 \), and (54) into (58) we get

\[
\frac{P_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = \xi_j \left( \frac{P_{jt}^0}{P_{1t}^0} \right)^2 \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_j^0} \right) \left( \frac{n_{jt}(1 - n_{jt}^0)}{n_j^0(1 - n_{1t})} \right) \left( \frac{\chi_j H n_j^0 X_{jt}^0 N_t}{2 H n_j^0 X_{jt}^0 N_t - n_{jt} X_{jt}N_t} \right) \]

\[
= \xi_j \left( \frac{P_{jt}^0}{P_{1t}^0} \right)^2 \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_j^0} \right) \left( \frac{n_{jt} X_{jt}^0}{n_j^0 X_{jt}^0} \right) \left( \frac{n_{jt}(1 - n_{jt}^0)}{n_j^0(1 - n_{1t})} \right) \left( \frac{\chi_j H n_j^0 \hat{X}_{jt}}{2 H n_j^0 X_{jt}^0 N_t - n_{jt} X_{jt}N_t} \right) \]

\[
= \xi_j \left( \frac{P_{jt}^0}{P_{1t}^0} \right) \left( \frac{n_{jt}(1 - n_{jt}^0)}{n_j^0(1 - n_{1t})} \right) \left( \frac{\chi_j H n_j^0 \hat{X}_{jt}}{2 H n_j^0 X_{jt}^0 - n_{jt} X_{jt}N_t} \right).
\]

The last equality followed from (52) and establishes (59).

(d) This is obtained by taking the ratio of (53) to (45).

(e) Expression (62) follows from (54):

\[
\frac{\bar{Q}_{jt+1}/2}{X_{jt+1}} = \frac{\chi_{jt+1} H_{jt+1} n_j^0 X_{jt+1}^0 N_{jt+1}}{X_{jt+1}} = \chi_{jt+1} H_{jt+1} \left( \frac{X_{jt+1}^0}{X_{jt+1}} \right) N_{jt+1}.
\]

(f) From (58) and (60),

\[
Y_{jt} = (1 - \tau) P_{1t} \left( \frac{P_{jt}^0}{P_{1t}^0} \right)^2 \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_j^0} \right) \left( \frac{n_{jt}(1 - n_{jt}^0)}{n_j^0(1 - n_{1t})} \right) \xi_j \left[ \frac{Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}}{Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}} \right] \frac{Q_{jt}}{n_{jt} N_t}.
\]  

(A19)

From (52) we know

\[
\frac{P_{jt}^0}{P_{1t}^0} = \frac{\alpha_j^0 n_j^0 X_{jt}^0}{\alpha_1 n_j^0 X_{jt}^0} = \frac{\alpha_j^0 Q_{jt}^0}{\alpha_1 Q_{jt}^0}
\]

allowing (A19) to be written

\[
Y_{jt} = (1 - \tau) Q_{jt}^0 P_{jt}^0 \left( \frac{1 - n_{jt}^0}{1 - n_{jt}^0} \right) \xi_j \left[ \frac{Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}}{Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}} \right] \frac{Q_{jt}}{n_{jt} N_t}.
\]

(A20)

Using (45) we can also conclude from (A20) that \( P_{jt}^0/P_{1t}^0 = [(1 - \alpha_1) n_j^0 \hat{X}_{jt}^0]/(\alpha_1(1 - n_j^0) X_{jt}^0) \).

Substituting this into (A21) and rearranging,

\[
Y_{jt} = (1 - \tau) \alpha_j^0 (1 - n_{jt}^0) n_{jt}^0 \left( \frac{1 - n_{jt}^0}{1 - n_{jt}^0} \right) \xi_j (Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}/Q_{jt}^0) \frac{Q_{jt}^0}{Q_{jt}^0 n_j^0 X_{jt}^0} \frac{Q_{jt}}{n_j^0 N_t} \frac{\hat{X}_{jt}^0}{X_{jt}^0}.
\]

(A22)
Note that if \( Q_{jt} = \bar{Q}_{jt}/2 \),

\[
Q_{jt}(\bar{Q}_{jt} - Q_{jt}) = (\bar{Q}_{jt}/2)^2 = (\chi_{jt} H_t n_j^0 X_{jt}^0 N_t)^2 = (\chi_{jt} H_t Q_{jt}^0)^2.
\]  
(A23)

Also

\[
\bar{Q}_{1t} - Q_{1t}^0 = 2H_t Q_{1t}^0 - n_{1t} \hat{X}_{1t} N_t.
\]  
(A24)

Substituting (A23) and (A24) into (A22) results in

\[
\frac{Y_{jt}}{P_{1t}} = (1 - \tau) (1 - \alpha_1) n_j^0 \frac{1 - n_j^0}{1 - n_{1t}} \xi_{jt} \left( \frac{\chi_{jt} H_t}{2H_t Q_{1t}^0 - n_{1t} \hat{X}_{1t} N_t} \right).
\]  
(A25)

Along the steady-state growth path, \( n_{1t} = n_{1t}^0 \), and \( \xi_{jt} = \chi_{jt} = H_t = 1 \). Thus from (A25) the steady-state real income of skilled workers is given by (65). Substituting (65) into (A22) and (A25) gives (63) and (64).

Results (g)-(k) restate expressions from elsewhere in the paper.

(l) Notice from \( \alpha_j^0 = \sum_{j \in J_t} P_{jt}^0 Q_{jt}^0 / \sum_{j \in J_t} P_{jt}^0 Q_{jt}^0 \) that

\[
Q_t = \frac{\sum_{j \in J_t} P_{jt}^0 Q_{jt}^0 (Q_{jt}/Q_{jt}^0)}{\sum_{j \in J_t} P_{jt}^0 Q_{jt}^0} = \sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_j^0 (Q_{jt}/Q_{jt}^0).
\]

Recall also that for \( j \in J_{2t}, Q_{jt}^0 = n_j^0 N_t X_{jt}^0 \). Using this along with (45) and (24) we conclude that

\[
\sum_{j \in J_t} \alpha_j^0 (Q_{jt}/Q_{jt}^0) = \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} \left( \alpha_j^0 \frac{Q_{jt}}{n_j^0 X_{jt}^0} + \alpha_1 \frac{Q_{1t}}{Q_{1t}^0} \right)
\]

\[= \left( \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n_j^0} \right) \sum_{j \in J_{2t}} \left( \frac{Q_{jt}}{n_j^0 X_{jt}^0} \right) + \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{n_{1t}} \right) \left( \frac{Q_{1t}}{X_{1t}^0} \right) n_{1t}.
\]

Note that if \( \chi_{jt} = \zeta_{jt} = 1 \) and \( Q_{jt} = Q_{jt}/2 \), then \( Q_{jt} = H_t n_j^0 N_t X_{jt}^0 \) so \( Q_{jt}/(N_t X_{jt}^0) = H_t n_j^0 \) and (73) becomes (74).
Appendix B. Linearized adjustment dynamics (online)

Define \( w_t^\dagger = \log w_t - \log w_t^0 \) for \( w_t = Q_{jt}, Q_{jt}, X_{it}, Y_{jt}, C_t, X_{jt}, Q_t, \chi_{jt}, \xi_{jt}, \zeta_{jt} \) (recalling that \( \log Q_t^0 = \log \chi_{jt}^0 = \log \xi_{jt}^0 = \log \zeta_{jt}^0 = 0 \)); \( w_t^\dagger = w_t - w^0 \) for \( w_t = \alpha_{jt}, n_{jt}, h_{0t}, \tilde{V}_{jt} \); \( P_{jt}^\dagger = \log(P_{jt}/P_{it}) - \log(P_{jt}/P_{it}^0) \); \( \tilde{V}_{jt}^\dagger = \log Y_{jt} - \log Y_{jt}^0 - [\log(P_{jt}X_{it}) - \log(P_{jt}^0X_{it}^0)] \); \( \lambda_2, \lambda_3, \lambda_5 \) are the derivatives in Table 1 and \( \lambda_H \) the derivative in Proposition 6a.

Linearized version of Proposition 6.

Evaluating derivatives of Proposition 6 along the steady-state growth path and taking deviations from steady state results in

\[
\begin{align*}
Q_{jt}^\dagger &= \chi_{jt}^\dagger + \lambda_H n_{jt}^\dagger \quad j \in J_t \quad (B1) \\
Q_{it}^\dagger &= \frac{1}{n_{jt}^0} n_{jt}^\dagger + \lambda_5 X_{it}^\dagger \quad (B2) \\
Q_{jt}^\dagger &= \begin{cases} 
\chi_{jt}^\dagger + \lambda_H n_{jt}^\dagger & \text{if } j \in J_{2t} \text{ and } \tilde{Q}_{jt}/2 \leq n_{jt}N_tX_{jt} \\
\frac{n_{jt}^\dagger}{n_{jt}^0} + \zeta_{jt}^\dagger & \text{if } j \in J_{2t} \text{ and } \tilde{Q}_{jt}/2 > n_{jt}N_tX_{jt} 
\end{cases} \quad (B3) \\
P_{jt}^\dagger &= \frac{\alpha_{jt}^\dagger}{\alpha_{jt}^0} + \xi_{jt}^\dagger + 2\chi_{jt}^\dagger - Q_{jt}^\dagger + \frac{n_{jt}^\dagger}{n_{jt}^0} + \lambda_5 X_{it}^\dagger \quad j \in J_{2t} \quad (B4) \\
\frac{\alpha_{jt}^\dagger}{\alpha_{jt}^0} &= \frac{n_{jt}^\dagger}{n_{jt}^0} + \frac{1}{1 - n_{jt}^\dagger} \quad j \in J_{2t} \quad (B5) \\
n_{jt,1,1}^\dagger &= \begin{cases} 
n_j^0 \chi_{jt,1,1}^\dagger + n_j^0 \lambda_H n_{jt,1}^\dagger - n_j^0 \zeta_{jt,1}^\dagger & \text{if } j \in J_{2t}^2 \text{ and } \tilde{Q}_{jt,1}/2 \geq X_{jt,1}N_jt \\
n_{jt}^\dagger - n & \text{if } j \in J_{2t}^2 \text{ and } \tilde{Q}_{jt,1}/2 < X_{jt,1}N_jt 
\end{cases} \quad (B6) \\
Y_{jt}^\dagger &= \zeta_{jt}^\dagger + \frac{1}{n_{jt}^0(1 - n_{jt}^0)} n_{jt}^\dagger + 2\chi_{jt}^\dagger + \lambda_5 X_{it}^\dagger \quad j \in J_{2t} \quad (B7) \\
\tilde{V}_{jt}^\dagger &= Y_{jt}^\dagger - \lambda_3 X_{it}^\dagger + \beta(1 - k_X)\tilde{V}_{jt,1}^\dagger \quad j \in J_{2t} \quad (B8) \\
\end{align*}
\]

To derive result \( (B4) \) we used the fact that for all \( j \in J_t, Q_{jt}^0 = 2Q_{jt}^0 \) establishing

\[
\log(\tilde{Q}_{jt} - Q_{jt}) \approx \log Q_{jt}^0 + \frac{1}{Q_{jt}^0} [(\tilde{Q}_{jt} - \tilde{Q}_{jt}^0) - (Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}^0)] \\
= \log Q_{jt}^0 + \frac{2}{Q_{jt}} (\tilde{Q}_{jt} - \tilde{Q}_{jt}^0) - \frac{Q_{jt} - Q_{jt}^0}{Q_{jt}} \\
= \log Q_{jt}^0 + 2Q_{jt}^\dagger - Q_{jt}^\dagger \quad (B9)
\]

\[
P_{jt}^\dagger = \frac{\alpha_{jt}^\dagger}{\alpha_{jt}^0} + \xi_{jt}^\dagger + 2\tilde{Q}_{jt}^\dagger - Q_{jt}^\dagger - 2Q_{jt}^\dagger + Q_{jt}^\dagger.
\]

Result \( (B4) \) then follows from \( (B1) \) and \( (B2) \). Similarly to derive \( (B7) \) we used \( (B9) \) along
with
\[ Y_{jt}^\dagger = \xi_{jt}^\dagger + \frac{1}{1 - n_{1t}} n_{1t}^\dagger + Q_{jt}^\dagger + 2\bar{Q}_{jt}^\dagger - Q_{jt}^\dagger - 2\bar{Q}_{1t}^\dagger + Q_{1t}^\dagger. \]

For \( \tilde{Y}_{jt} = \log Y_{jt} - \log(P_{1t}\tilde{X}_{1t}) \) and \( \tilde{Y}_{jt}^\dagger = Y_{jt}^\dagger - \tilde{X}_{jt}^\dagger = Y_{jt}^\dagger - \lambda_3 X_{1t}^{*\dagger} \) it follows from (B7) that
\[ \tilde{Y}_{jt}^\dagger = \xi_{jt}^\dagger + 2\lambda_{jt}^\dagger + \frac{1}{n_{1t}^0(1 - n_{1t}^0)} n_{1t}^\dagger + (\lambda_5 - \lambda_3) X_{1t}^{*\dagger} \quad j \in J_{2t}. \] (B10)
Appendix C. Details of dynamic solution (online)

Baseline model and Examples 9.1-9.4.

Here we write the system in the form of 10 dynamic equations in the 10 endogenous variables

\[ z_t = (n_{1t}, \bar{V}_t, \bar{n}_t, y_t, c_t, x_{1t}^*, \pi_t, h_{0t}, n_{t+1}^0, n_{t+1}^\sharp) \]

with four exogenous shocks \( s_{1t}, s_{3t}, s_{6t}, s_{7t} \). In addition we will use the following symbols to simplify some of the expressions, to be substituted in when coded:

\[ H_t = 1 + \lambda_H (n_{1t} - n_1^0) \]

\[ h_{1t} = \frac{S - x_{1t}^*}{S - R} \]

The system can be written as follows:

\[ n_{1,t+1} = 1 - n_{t+1}^\sharp - n_{t+1}^\sharp \tag{C1} \]

\[ \bar{V}_t = \log y_t - \left[ \frac{S^2 - 2Rx_{1t}^* + (x_{1t}^*)^2}{2(S - R)} \right] + \beta(1 - k_X)\bar{V}_{t+1} \tag{C2} \]

\[ \bar{n}_{t+1} = (1 - k_X)\bar{n}_t s_{1t} + n_{t+1}^\sharp \tag{C3} \]

In the baseline model and Examples 9.1-9.2, \( s_{1t} = 1 \) for all \( t \). For Examples 9.3-9.4, since a fraction \( \kappa \) of the specialists drop out after \( t_0 \), the value of \( \bar{n}_{t_0+1} \) is characterized by

\[ \bar{n}_{t_0+1} = (1 - k_X)(1 - \kappa)\bar{n}_{t_0} + n_{t_0+1}^\sharp \]

which is implemented by setting

\[ s_{1t} = \begin{cases} 
1 - \kappa & t = t_0 \\
1 & t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots 
\end{cases} \]

\[ y_t = \frac{y^0(1 - n_{1t}^0)H_t q_1^0}{(1 - n_{1t})(2H_t q_1^0 - n_{1t} \left[ \frac{\exp(S) - \exp(x_{1t}^*)}{S - R} \right])} \tag{C4} \]

\[ c_t = \frac{\tau(1 - n_{1t})y_t}{n_{1t}(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)} s_{3t} \tag{C5} \]

For the baseline model, \( s_{3t} = 1 \) for all \( t \). In Examples 9.1-9.4, a fraction \( \kappa \) of the goods are
impacted at $t_0$ and none are impacted afterwards, so

$$s_{3t} = \begin{cases} 
1 + \kappa (\chi^2 - 1) & t = t_0 \\
1 & t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots
\end{cases}$$

(C6)

$$x^*_{1t} - \log c_t = -k_U + \beta \kappa \bar{V}_{t+1}$$

(C7)

$$\pi_t = \frac{n^\sharp_{t+1} e^n - (1 - k_X)(1 - n_{1t})s_{6t}}{(1 - h_{1t})(1 - h_{0t})n_{1t}}.$$

(C8)

For the baseline model and Examples 9.1-9.2, $s_{6t} = 1$. For Examples 9.3-9.4, a fraction $\kappa$ discontinue after period $t_0$, as represented by

$$s_{6t} = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \kappa) & t = t_0 \\
1 & t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots
\end{cases}$$

(C9)

$$n^\sharp_{t+1} = e^{-n}h_{1t}h_{0t}n_{1t}k_\pi$$

(C10)

For the baseline model and Examples 9.1-9.2, $s_{7t} = 1$ for all $t$. For Examples 9.3-9.4,

$$s_{7t} = \begin{cases} 
1 - \kappa & t = t_0 \\
1 & t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots
\end{cases}$$

Predetermined variables at date $t_0$ are $n_{1t_0} = n^0_1$, $\bar{n}_{t_0} = 1 - n^0_1$, $n^\sharp_{t_0}$, and $n^\bar{c}_{t_0}$. Initial values of $n^\sharp_{t_0}$ and $n^\bar{c}_{t_0}$ do not appear anywhere in the system. A solution is a sequence $\{z_t\}_{t=t_0}$ for very large $T$ satisfying $n_{1t_0} = n^0_1$, $\bar{n}_{t_0} = 1 - n^0_1$ and $n_{1T} \simeq n^0_1$, $\bar{V}_T \simeq \bar{V}^0$, $\bar{n}_T \simeq 1 - n^0_1$, $y_T \simeq y^0$, $c_T \simeq c^0$, $x^*_{1T} \simeq x^{a0}_1$, $\pi_T \simeq \pi^0$, $h_{0T} \simeq h^0_0$, $n_{1T+1}^\sharp \simeq n^{\bar{c}0}_0$, $n_{1T+1}^\sharp \simeq n^{\bar{c}0}_0$.

**Example 9.5.**

In this example we need to keep track of the fraction of the population specializing in impacted and nonimpacted goods ($n^\chi_t$ and $n^\ell_t$, respectively) and what the fractions would be if each good employed its steady-state level $n^0_j$ ($\bar{n}^\chi_t = \sum_{j \in J^\chi} n^0_j$ and $\bar{n}^\ell_t = \sum_{j \in J^\ell} n^0_j$). The value of $\bar{n}^\ell_t$ evolves independently of all other variables, since goods in $J^\ell_t$ started out with $n_{jt_0} = n^0_j$ and a fraction $k_X$ of these disappear each period,

$$\bar{n}^\ell_{t+1} = (1 - k_X)\bar{n}^\ell_t \ t = t_0, \ldots, t_0 + D - 2$$

starting from $\bar{n}^\ell_{t_0} = (1 - \kappa)(1 - n^0_1)$. The other three magnitudes ($n^\chi_t$, $n^\ell_t$, $\bar{n}^\chi_t$) influence and respond to other variables during the initial periods as described below. We can adapt the structure used for Examples 9.1-9.4 to this case by reinterpreting the meaning of $n^\sharp_t$ and $\bar{n}_t$ over
the initial periods and by adding an eleventh state variable to the system, \( n_t^\chi \), which denotes the fraction of the population producing demand-impacted goods at \( t \). Notice \( n_{t0}^\chi = \kappa (1 - n_t^0) \) and \( n_{t0+D}^\chi = 0 \).

During the impacted period, the variable \( n_t^\chi \) will represent the fraction of workers producing nonimpacted goods. Thus specialized workers during the impacted phase consist of nonimpacted workers \( n_t^\n \) plus impacted workers \( n_t^\chi \). After the impacted period, \( n_t^\chi \) will revert to its original interpretation as number of continuing workers. Thus

\[
n_{1,t+1} = \begin{cases} 1 - n_{t+1}^\n - n_{t+1}^\chi & \text{for } t = t_0, t_0 + 1, ..., t_0 + D - 2 \\ 1 - n_{t+1}^\n - n_{t+1}^\chi & \text{for } t = t_0 + D - 1, t_0 + D, ... \end{cases}.
\]

Note that when \( t = t_0 + D - 1 \), it will be the case that \( n_{1,t+1} = n_{1,t0+D} \) for which there are no impacted workers. This can be written in terms of shocks as

\[
n_{1,t+1} = 1 - n_{t+1}^\n - s_{8t} n_{t+1}^\chi - (1 - s_{8t}) n_{t+1}^\chi.
\]  

Equations (C2)-(D5) for Example 9.5 are the same as in Examples 9.1-9.4:

\[
\tilde{V}_t = \log y_t - \left[ \frac{S^2 - 2Rx_t^* + (x_t^*)^2}{2(S - R)} \right] + \beta(1 - k_X)\tilde{V}_{t+1} \tag{C12}
\]

\[
\bar{n}_{t+1} = (1 - k_X)\bar{n}_t + n_{t+1}^\chi \tag{C13}
\]

\[
y_t = \frac{y^0(1 - n_t^0)H_t^0q_1^0}{(1 - n_t)(2H_tq_1^0 - n_t\left[\frac{\exp(S) - \exp(x_t^*)}{S - R}\right])} \tag{C14}
\]

though (C13) will not be referenced by the other equations during the impacted period. If \( n_t^\n \) denotes the number of nonimpacted workers, the general expression for unemployment compensation is

\[
c_t = \frac{\tau y_t(n_t^\n + n_t^\chi \chi^2)}{n_t(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)} \\
= \begin{cases} \frac{\tau y_t(n_t^\n + \kappa \chi^2)(1 - h_{1t})}{1 - h_{1t}} & \text{for } t = t_0 \\ \frac{\tau y_t(n_t^\n + \kappa \chi^2)}{n_t(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)} & \text{for } t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, ..., t_0 + D - 1 \\ \frac{\tau y_t(n_t^\n + \kappa \chi^2)}{n_t(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)} & \text{for } t = t_0 + D, t_0 + D + 1, ... \end{cases}
\]

This can be written in terms of shocks as

\[
c_t = s_{9t} \frac{\tau y_t s_{10,t}(n_t^\n + n_t^\chi \chi^2) + (1 - s_{10,t})(1 - n_t)}{n_t(1 - h_{1t})(1 - \tau)} \tag{C15}
\]
The demand shock affects all newly created goods during the impacted period, so (C6) becomes

\[ x_{1t}^* - \log c_t = -k_U + \beta k_{\pi} \tilde{V}_{t+1} + s_{5t} \quad \text{(C16)} \]

\[ s_{5t} = \begin{cases} 
\sum_{s=1}^{t_0-D-1} [\beta(1-k_X)]^s \log \chi^2 & t = t_0, t_0 + 1, \ldots, t_0 + D - 2 \\
0 & t = t_0 + D - 1, t_0 + D, \ldots 
\end{cases} \]

Expression (C7) continues as before

\[ x_{1t}^* - \log c_t = \beta \pi_t \tilde{V}_{t+1} \quad \text{(C17)} \]

where \( \pi_t \) is now characterized by

\[ \pi_t = \begin{cases} 
\frac{n^s_{t+1} e^{n_t - (1-k_X)(1-k)(1-n_0^s)}}{(1-h_{1t})(1-h_{0t})n_{1t}} & t = t_0 \\
\frac{n^s_{t+1} e^{n_t - (1-k_X)n_0^s}}{(1-h_{1t})(1-h_{0t})n_{1t}} & t = t_0 + 1, t_0 + 2, \ldots, t_0 + D - 2 \\
\frac{n^s_{t+1} e^{n_t - (1-k_X)(1-n_0^s)}}{(1-h_{1t})(1-h_{0t})n_{1t}} & t = t_0 + D - 1, t_0 + D, \ldots 
\end{cases} \]

In the shock notation,

\[ \pi_t = \frac{n^s_{t+1} e^{n_t - (1-k_X)(1-k)(1-n_0^s)}}{(1-h_{1t})(1-h_{0t})n_{1t}} + (1-s_{9t})(1-s_{9t})s_{8t}n^s_{t} + (1-s_{9t})(1-s_{8t})(1-n_{1t}) \]

\quad \text{(C18)}

Expression (C9) remains unchanged:

\[ n^s_{t+1} = e^{-n_{1t}h_{0t}n_{1t}k_{\pi}}. \quad \text{(C19)} \]

The hiring decisions of continuing goods are characterized by

\[ n^s_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
H_{t+1}(1-k_X)\tilde{n}_t & \text{for } t = t_0, t_0 + 1, \ldots, t_0 + D - 2 \\
H_{t+1}(1-k_X)\tilde{n}_t & \text{for } t = t_0 + D - 1, t_0 + D, \ldots 
\end{cases} \]

with \( \tilde{n}_t = (1-k_X)^{t-t_0}(1-k)(1-n_0^s) \), or

\[ n^s_{t+1} = H_{t+1}(1-k_X)[s_{8t}s_{11,t} + (1-s_{8t})\tilde{n}_t] \quad \text{(C20)} \]

for \( s_{11,t} = \tilde{n}_t^r \). Since impacted goods do no hiring and new goods enter as impacted, the number
of impacted workers over \( t = t_0, t_0 + 1, ..., t_0 + D - 2 \) evolves according to

\[
n_{t+1}^x = e^{-n}(1 - k_X)n_t^x + n_t^{x+1}
\]

starting from \( n_{t_0}^x = \kappa(1 - n_{t_0}^0) \). Thus

\[
n_{t+1}^x = s_8t[n_{t+1}^x + s_9te^{-n}(1 - k_X)\kappa(1 - n_{t_1}^0) + (1 - s_9)e^{-n}(1 - k_X)n_t^x]. \tag{C21}
\]

**Real GDP.**

Real GDP for Examples 9.1-9.5. If \( \mathcal{J}_t^x \) denote the set of demand-impacted goods and \( \mathcal{J}_t^c \) non-impacted specialized goods,

\[
\frac{Q_{jt}}{N_tX_{jt}^0} = \begin{cases} 
\chi H_t n_{jt}^0 & \text{for } j \in \mathcal{J}_t^x \\
H_t n_{jt}^0 & \text{for } j \in \mathcal{J}_t^c
\end{cases}
\]

and (73) becomes

\[
\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t} \frac{Q_{jt}}{N_t X_{jt}^0} = H_t \left[ \chi \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t^x} n_{jt}^0 + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t^c} n_{jt}^0 \right] = H_t [\chi \bar{n}_t^x + \bar{n}_t^c].
\]

\[
Q_t = \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n_1^0} H_t [\chi \bar{n}_t^x + \bar{n}_t^c] + \frac{\alpha_1 \hat{X}_t}{n_1^0 \hat{X}_t^0} n_{1t}.
\tag{C22}
\]

For Examples 9.1-9.4, this means

\[
Q_t = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \kappa) + \kappa \chi & \text{for } t = t_0 \\
\chi \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t^x} n_{jt}^0 + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t^c} n_{jt}^0 & \text{for } t > t_0
\end{cases}
\tag{C23}
\]

For Example 9.5 we have

\[
Q_t = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \kappa) + \kappa \chi & \text{for } t = t_0 \\
\chi \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t^x} n_{jt}^0 + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t^c} n_{jt}^0 & \text{for } t = t_0 + 1, ..., t_0 + D - 1 \\
\frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n_1^0} H_t [\chi \bar{n}_t^x + \bar{n}_t^c] + \frac{\alpha_1 \hat{X}_t}{n_1^0 \hat{X}_t^0} n_{1t} & \text{for } t = t_0 + D, t_0 + D + 1, ...
\end{cases}
\]

Real GDP for Examples 10.1-10.3. In this case (54) states

\[
Q_{jt_0} = \begin{cases} 
\zeta n_{jt_0} N_0 X_{jt_0}^0 & \text{for supply-impacted goods} \\
n_{jt_0} N_0 X_{jt_0}^0 & \text{for nonimpacted goods}
\end{cases}
\]

C-5
for which (73) becomes

\[ Q_{t_0} = \frac{1 - \alpha_1}{1 - n_1^0}[(1 - \kappa) + \kappa \zeta](1 - n_{1t_0}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{n_1^0} \right) \left( \frac{\dot{X}_{1t_0}}{X_{1t_0}^0} \right) n_{1t_0} \]

\[ = (1 - \alpha_1)[(1 - \kappa) + \kappa \zeta] + \alpha_1 \left( \frac{\dot{X}_{1t_0}}{X_{1t_0}^0} \right). \]

Note this is identical to (C23) with \( \chi \) replaced by \( \zeta \).
Appendix D. Bounds on Jensen’s Inequality (online)

Proposition D1. Let

\[
\delta_t = \log \left[ \frac{\exp(S_t) - \exp(R_t)}{S_t - R_t} \right] - \left[ \frac{S_t + R_t}{2} \right] \tag{D1}
\]

where \(\delta_t = \delta\) is constant along the steady-state growth path. If

\[
\frac{[1 - \beta(1 - k_X)]k_U}{\beta k_\pi} > \delta,
\]

then

\[
\alpha_1 + \tau (1 - \alpha_1) < n_1^0. \tag{D3}
\]

Proof of Proposition D1.

We first show that \(\delta_t = \delta\) is constant along the steady-state growth path:

\[
\delta_{t+1} = \log \left[ \frac{\exp(S_{t+1} + g) - \exp(R_{t+1} + g)}{S_{t+1} + g - (R_{t+1} + g)} \right] - \left[ \frac{S_{t+1} + R_{t+1} + g}{2} \right]
\]

\[
= g + \log \left[ \frac{\exp(S_t) - \exp(R_t)}{S_t - R_t} \right] - \left[ \frac{S_t + R_t}{2} \right] - \frac{2g}{2}
\]

\[
= \delta_t.
\]

Let \(I_t^0 = \sum_{j \in J_t} P_{jt}^0 Q_{jt}^0 / P_{1t}^0\) denote steady-state real national income. The skilled receive a total share \((1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \tau)\) and the unskilled \(\alpha_1 + \tau (1 - \alpha_1)\), and thus per capita receive

\[
Y_t^0 = \frac{(1 - \alpha_1)(1 - \tau) I_t^0}{1 - n_1^0}
\]

\[
\bar{Y}_{1t}^0 = \frac{\alpha_1 + \tau (1 - \alpha_1)}{n_1^0} I_t^0
\]

\[
Y_t^0 - \bar{Y}_{1t}^0 = \frac{n_1^0 - [\alpha_1 + \tau (1 - \alpha_1)]}{n_1^0 (1 - n_1^0)} I_t^0
\]

so (D3) holds whenever \(Y_t^0 > \bar{Y}_{1t}^0\). Note that \(\bar{Y}_{1t}^0\) could alternatively be calculated as

\[
\bar{Y}_{1t}^0 = \int_{\log X_{1t}^*}^{S_t} \frac{\exp(z)dz}{S_t - R_t} + \frac{C_{t}^{0} P_{1t}^{0} \int_{R_t}^{\log X_{1t}^*} \frac{dz}{S_t - R_t}}{S_t - R_t}.
\]

Expression (37) and Proposition 3 established that

\[
h_Y^0 = \log X_{1t}^* - \log(C_t^0 / P_{1t}^0) > 0
\]
so
\[
\tilde{Y}^0_{1t} < \int_{\log X^*_{1t}}^{S_t} \frac{\exp(z)dz}{S_t - R_t} + X^*_{1t} \int_{R_t}^{\log X^*_{1t}} \frac{dz}{S_t - R_t} = \tilde{Y}^0_{1t}. \tag{D4}
\]

Thus if \( Y^0_t > \tilde{Y}^0_{1t} \), then also \( Y^0_t > \bar{Y}^0_{1t} \). Thus the proof will be complete if we can show that \((D2)\) implies that \( Y^0_t > \bar{Y}^0_{1t} \).

From \((39)\) and \((31)\),
\[
h_Y^0 = -k_U + k_\pi \left[ \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta(1 - k_X)} \right] \log \tilde{Y}^0 \tag{D5}
\]
where from \((34)\), \( \log \tilde{Y}^0 = \log Y^0_t - \log \tilde{X}^0_{1t} \). Since \( h_Y^0 > 0 \), \((D5)\) implies
\[
\log \tilde{Y}^0 > \frac{[1 - \beta(1 - k_X)]k_U}{\beta k_\pi}.
\]

Condition \((D2)\) then establishes that \( \log \tilde{Y}^0 > \delta \) meaning \( \log Y^0_t > \log \tilde{X}^0_{1t} + \delta \). Thus we will have succeeded in showing that \( \log Y^0_t > \log \tilde{Y}^0_{1t} \) if we show that \( \log \tilde{Y}^0_{1t} < \log \tilde{X}^0_{1t} + \delta \). From \((D4)\) and \((22)\), this means establishing
\[
\log \left[ \int_{\log X^*_{1t}}^{S_t} \frac{\exp(z)dz}{S_t - R_t} + X^*_{1t} \int_{R_t}^{\log X^*_{1t}} \frac{dz}{S_t - R_t} \right] < \int_{\log X^*_{1t}}^{S_t} \frac{zdz}{S_t - R_t} + \log X^*_{1t} \int_{R_t}^{\log X^*_{1t}} \frac{dz}{S_t - R_t} + \delta. \tag{D6}
\]

For \( z^* = \log X^*_{1t} \) define the functions
\[
k(z^*) = \int^{S} \frac{\exp(z)dz}{S - R} + \exp(z^*) \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R} \]
\[
Q(z^*) = \log[k(z^*)] - \int_{z^*}^{S} \frac{zdz}{S - R} - z^* \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R}
\]
whose derivatives are
\[
\frac{dk(z^*)}{dz^*} = -\frac{\exp(z^*)}{S - R} + \frac{\exp(z^*)}{S - R} + \exp(z^*) \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R} = \exp(z^*) \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R}
\]
\[
\frac{dQ(z^*)}{dz^*} = \exp(z^*) \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R} + \frac{z^*}{S - R} - \frac{z^*}{S - R} - \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R} = \left[ \int_{R}^{z^*} \frac{dz}{S - R} \right] \left[ \frac{\exp(z^*)}{k(z^*)} - 1 \right].
\]

Since \( k(z^*) \geq \exp(z^*) \), this derivative is negative, meaning this function reaches its maximum
at the lowest possible value of $z^*$, namely $z^* = R$,

$$Q(z^*) \leq Q(R) = \log \left[ \int_R^S \frac{\exp(z)dz}{S - R} \right] - \int_R^S \frac{zdz}{S - R} = \log \left[ \frac{\exp(S) - \exp(R)}{S - R} \right] - \left[ \frac{S + R}{2} \right] = \delta,$$

which is $\log E(x_{it}) - E[\log x_{it}]$ when $\log x_{it} \sim U(R, S)$. From the definition of $Q(\log X_{1t}^{*0})$, this means

$$\log \left[ \int_{\log X_{1t}^{*0}}^S \frac{\exp(z)dz}{S - R} + \exp(\log X_{1t}^{*0}) \int_R^{\log X_{1t}^{*0}} \frac{dz}{S - R} \right] - \int_{\log X_{1t}^{*0}}^S \frac{zdz}{S - R} - \log X_{1t}^{*0} \int_R^{\log X_{1t}^{*0}} \frac{dz}{S - R} < \delta$$

establishing (D6).

Note that (D2) is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to guarantee (D3). Typically (D3) also holds even when (D2) does not.