THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
Department of Economics
Fall 2003
James
Andreoni
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~andreoni/Econ741/home.html
READING
LIST
0. Introduction
Laffont, Introduction
Mueller, Public Choice, Chapter 10
Samuelson, Paul A., “Social Indifference Curves,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1956, 1--22.
Harsanyi, John C. “Cardinal Welfare Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” Journal of Political Economy, 1955, 309--321.
1. Public Goods
1.1 Neoclassical Theory
* Samuelson, Paul A., “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1954, 387-389.
Samuelson, Paul A., “Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1955, 350--356.
** Samuelson, Paul A., “Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation,” in Margolis and Guitton, eds., Public Economics, Macmillian, 1969, 492--517.
* Lindahl, E., “Just Taxation --- A Positive Solution,” in Musgrave and Peacock, ed., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Macmillian, 1958, 168--176.
Foley, Duncan, “Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods,” Econometrica, 1970, 38, pp. 66--72.
Laffont, Chapter 2.1 -- 2.4, 2.7
Arrow, Kenneth, “The Organization of Market Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocations,” in Haveman and Margolis, eds., Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, Markham, 1970.
1.2 Privately Provided Public Goods
Arrow, Kenneth, “Optimal and Voluntary Income Distribution,” in Steven Rosenfielde, ed., Economic Welfare and the Economies of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor Abram Bergson, 1981.
Becker, G., “A Theory of Social Interactions,” Journal of Political Economy, 1974.
Warr, Peter, “Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity,” Journal of Public Economics, 1982.
** Bergstrom, Theodore, Laurence Blume and Hal Varian, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 1986, v 29, 25--49.
Bernheim, B. D., “On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods,” American Economic Review, 1986.
** Andreoni, James, “Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, February 1988, v 35, 57--73.
* Andreoni, James, “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence,” Journal of Political Economy, December, 1989, 1447--1458.
Andreoni, James, “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,” Economic Journal, 100, 1990.
* Andreoni, James and Ted Bergstrom, “Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?,” Public Choice, v. 88, 1996, 295-308.
* Varian, Hal R., “Sequential Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 53, 165--86.
* Bliss, C. and Barry Nalebuff, “Dragon Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good,” Journal of Public Economics, 27, 1984, 772--87.
* Bilodeau, Marc and Al Slivinski, “Toilet Cleaning and Department Chairing: Volunteering a Public Service,” Journal of Public Economics, February 1996, 299--308.
1.3 Fund-raising
Bilodeau, Marc and Al Slivinski, “Rival Charities,” Journal of Public Economics, March 1997, 449—467.
Harbaugh, William, “What Do Donations Buy?,” Journal of Public Economics, 67, 1998, 269--84.
* Andreoni, J. “Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising.” Journal of Political Economy, 106, no. 6, 1998, 1186--1213.
Vesterlund, Lise D., “The Information Value of Sequential Fundraising,” Journal of Public Economics, March 2003, 87(3-4), 627-658.
Romano, Richard and Huseyim Yildirim, “Why Charities Announce Donations: A Positive Perspective.” Journal of Public Economics, v 81, 2001, 423-448.
* Andreoni, J. “Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-raising,” working paper, 2002.
1.4 Experimental Studies
Ledyard, John O., “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research” in J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth, eds., Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, 1995.
Marwell, G. and Ruth Ames, “Economists Free Ride --- Does Anyone Else?" Journal of Public Economics, 1981, 295--310.
Isaac, Mark and James Walker, “Group Size Hypothesis of Public Goods Provision: Experimental Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988.
Andreoni, James, “Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, December 1988.
Andreoni, James, “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding Out Hypothesis,” American Economic Review, December 1993.
** Andreoni, James, “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,” American Economic Review, September 1995, 85, 891--904.
* Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jeffrey E. Prisbey, “Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?,” American Economic Review, v. 87(5), 829--846.
* Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt, and Susan K. Laury, “Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior,” Journal of Public Economics, February 2002, 83(2), 255-276.
Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, “Altruism, Reputation and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics, v. 61, 1997,March 1996, 409--427.
Andreoni, James and John H. Miller, “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism.” Econometric, 2002.
Andreoni, James, and Lise Vesterlund, “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001.
* Andreoni, James and Ragan Petrie, “"Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse Into Fund-Raising." July 2002. Forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics, 2003.
1.5 Econometric Studies
** Randolph, William, “Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions,'' Journal of Political Economy, August 1995, 103, 709--738.
** Payne, A. Abigail, , “Does the Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? New Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms,” Journal of Public Economics, v.69 (3), 1998, 323--345.
* Ribar, David C. and Mark O. Wilhelm, “Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, April 2002, 110(2), 425-458.
* Andreoni, J. and A. Abigail Payne, “Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fundraising?” American Economic Review, June 2003, 93(3), 792-812.
Kingma, Bruce, “An Accurate Measure of the Crowd-out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions,” Journal of Political Economy, October 1989.
Straub, John “Fundraising and Crowd-out of Charitable Contributions: New Evidence from Contributions to Public Radio,” Texas A&M Working Paper, April 2003.
Auten, Gerald E., Holger Sieg, and Charlet T. Clotfelter, “Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: Analysis of Panel Data,” American Economic Review, March 2002, 92(1), 371-382
Berry, Steven T. and Joel Waldfogel, “Public Radio in the United States: Does it Correct Market Failure or Cannibalize Commercial Stations?,” Journal of Public Economics, v.71, February 1999, 189—211.
2. Externalities
Laffont, Chapter 1.
Coase, R., “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, 1--44.
Dixit, Avinash and Mancur Olson, “Does Voluntary Participation Undermine the Coase Theorem?” Journal of Public Economics, June 2000, 309-336.
** Ebrill, L. and Steve Slutsky, “Time, Congestion and Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 1982, 307--335.
Harden, Garret, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 1968, December.
* Greenwood, Jeremy and R. Preston McAfee, “Externalities and Assymetric Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1991, 103--122.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Ruud A. de Mooij, “Environmental Levies and Distonrtionary Taxation,” American Economic Review, September 1994, 1085--1089.
Fullerton, Don, “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation: Comment,” American Economic Review, March 1997, 245--251.
** Fullerton, Don, and Gilbert Metcalf, “Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-existing Distortions,” Journal of Public Economics, v 80, 2001, 249—67.
* Metcalf, Gilbert E., “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, February 2003, 87(2), 313-322.
* Andreoni, James, and Arik Levinson, “The Simple Analytics of the Envrironmental Kuznets Curve,” Journal of Public Economics, v 80, 2001, 269-286.
3. Collective Choice and Majority Voting
Laffont, Chapters 2.5, 2.6, 4, “Collective Choice Theory.”
* Mueller, Public Choice, Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Persson, Torston and Guido Tabellini, “Political Economy and Public Finance,” in Auerbach and Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, 2001.
Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff, “The 64% Majority Rule,” Econometrica, July 1988.
Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff “Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem,” Econometrica, January 1991.
* Levin, Jonathan and Barry Nalebuff, “An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1995, 3--26.
Young, Peyton, “Optimal Voting Rules,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1995, 51--64.
Osbourne, Martin and Al Slivinski, “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1996, 65--96.
** Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate, “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1997, 85--114.
* Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico, “The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives,” American Economic Review, March 2001, 91(1), 225-240.
4. Preference Revelation and Implementation
* Varian, Hal R., Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, Sections 23.8 and 23.9 on the Groves/Clarke tax.
Mueller, Public Choice II, Chapter 8.
** Laffont, Chapter 5, “Incomplete Information in Public Economics.”
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991, Chapter 7, “Baysian Games and Mechanism Design.”
Groves T. and J. Ledyard, “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem,” Econometrica, 45, 1977, 783--810.
Chen, Yan and Charles Plott, “The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design,” Journal of Public Economics, v.59(3), 1997, 335-364.
Chen, Yan and Fang-Fang Tang, “Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Political Economy, June 1998, v. 106 (3), 633--662.
Bagnoli, Mark and Bart Lipman, “Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions,” Review of Economic Studies, Oct 1989.
Abreu, Dilip and Arunana Sen, “Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, July 1991, 997--1072.
Sefton, M. and A. Yavas, “Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, v. 16(2), 280--302.
Chung, Kim-Sau and Jeffrey C. Ely, “Implementation with Near-Complete Information,” Econometrica, May 2003, 71(3), 857-872.
* Varian, Hal R., “A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods When Agents are Well Informed,” American Economic Review, December 1994, 84, 1278-1293.
Andreoni, James and Hal R. Varian, “Preplay Contracting in Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, September/October, 1999.
** Admati, Anat amd M. Perry, “Joint Projects Without Commitment,” Review of Economic Studies, v. 58, 1991, 259--76.
** Marx, Leslie and Steve Matthews, “Dynamic Voluntary Contributions to a Public Project,” Review of Economic Studies, v 62(2), 2000, 327-58.
Ledyard, John O. and Thomas R. Palfrey, “The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes,” Journal of Public Economics, February 2002, 153-173.
5. Local Public Finance
5.1 Theoretical Issues: The Tiebout Hypothesis
* Tiebout, C., “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, 1956, 416--424.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., “The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-five Years After Tiebout: A Perspective,” in G.R. Zodrow, ed., Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Hypothesis After 25 Years, Academic Press (New York), 1983.
Bewely, T., “A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures,” Econometrica, 1982, 713--737.
* Scotchmer, Suzanne, “Public Goods and the Invisible Hand”, in Quigley and Smolensky, eds., Modern Public Finance, Harvard Univ:Boston, 1994.
Scotchmer, Suzanne and Myrna H. Wooders, “Competitive Equilibrium and the Core in Club Economies with Anonymous Crowding,” Journal of Public Economics, 1987, 34, 59--73.
* Epple, Dennis and Allen Zelenitz, “The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?” Journal of Political Economy, 1981, 1197--121.
Oates, Wallace E., and Robert M. Schwab, “Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?” Journal of Public Economics, v 25, 1988, 333--354.
Levinson, Arik, “A Note on Environmental Federalism: Interpreting Some Contradictory Results,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33 (3), 1997.
* Nechyba, Tom, “Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion,” Journal of Political Economy, v.105, 1997, 351--384.
* Conley, John P. and Hideo Konishi, “Migration-Proof Tiebout Equilibrium: Existance and Asymptotic Efficiency,” Journal of Public Economics,
5.2 Empirical Issues: Private Demands, Federalism
Bergstrom, T. C. and R. Goodman, “Private Demands for Public Goods,” American Economic Review, 1973.
Bergstrom, T. C., D. Rubinfeld, and P. Shapiro, “Micro-based Estimates of Demand Functions for Local Public School Expenditures,” Econometrica, Vol. 50, September 1982, 1185--1205.
* Bergstrom, Roberts, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro, “A Test for Efficiency in the Supply of Public Education,” Journal of Public Economics, 1988, Vol. 35, 289--307.
* Epple, Dennis, and Holger Sieg, “Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions,” Journal of Political Economy, 1999, 107(4), 645-681.
Levinson, Arik, “NIMBY Taxes Matter: The Case of Hazardous Waste Disposal Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics, 1999, 74.
Moffitt, Robert, “The Effects of Grants-In-Aid on State and Local Expenditures: The Case of AFDC,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 23, 1984, 279--306.
Hines, James and Thaler, Richard, “Anomolies: The Flypaper Effect,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1995, 9, 217--227.
Roemer, John E. and Joaquim Silvestre, “The `Flypaper Effect’ is not an Anomaly,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, January 2002, 1-18.
* Knight, Brian, “Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program,” American Economic Review, March 2002, 92(1), 71-92.
Case, Anne C., Rosen, Harvey S., and Hines, James R., Jr., “Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy Interdependence: Evidence from the States”, Journal of Public Economics, vol 52(3), October 1993, 285-307.
5.2 Empirical Issues: Education
Hoxby, Caroline M. "The Productivity of Schools and Other Local Public Goods Producers," Journal of Pubic Economics, October 1999, 1-31.
* Hoxby, Caroline M. “Does Competition Among Schools Benefit Students or Taxpayers?” American Economic Review, December 2000, 1209-1238.
Lazear, Edward, “Educational Production.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 2001, 777-804.
* Nechyba, Thomas J., “Mobility, Targeting and Private School Vouchers,” American Economic Review, March 2000, 130-146.
Barrow, Lisa, “School Choice Through Relocation: Evidence from the Washington, D.C. Area,” Journal of Public Economics, November 2002, 86(2), 155-190.
6. Economics of the Family
Becker, Gary, “Altruism in the Family,” in Treatise on the Family, Enlarged Edition, 1991, Chapter 8.
* Bergstrom, T.C., “A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem --- And Other Household Mysteries,” Journal of Political Economy, 1989.
Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollack, “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market,” Journal of Political Economy, v.101 (6), 988--1010.
** Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollack, “Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), Fall 1996, pages 139-58.
* Lundberg, Shelly, Robert A. Pollack and T.J. Wales, “Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit,” Journal of Human Resources, 22, 1996, 463-480.
Chiaporri, P.-A. and Martin Browning, “Efficient Intra-Household Allocation : A General Characterization and Empirical Tests" Econometrica, 66 6, 1998, 1241-78
**Chiaporri, P.-A, F. Bourguignon, M. Browning , and V. Lechene "Incomes and Outcomes : a Structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation", Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 1067-97.
Andreoni, James, Eleanor Brown, and Isaac Rischall, “Charitable Giving by Married Couples: Who Decides and Why Does it Matter?” Journal of Human Resources, 38(1), Winter 2003, 111-133.
Bergstrom, T.C. and M. Bagnoli, “Courtship as a Waiting Game,” Journal of Political Economy, February 1993.
Bergstrom, T. C., “On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings,” American Economic Review, March 1995, 85, 58--81.
Bergstrom, T.C., “Economics in a Family Way,” Journal of Economic Literature, December 1996, 1903--1934.
Dickert-Conlin, Stacy. and A. Chandra, “Taxes and the Timing of Births,” Journal of Political Economy, v. 107(1), 161--177.
* Dickert-Conlin, Stacy. “Taxes and Transfers: Their Effect on the Decision to End a Marriage.” Journal of Public Economics, v 73, 1999, 217--240.
7.
Transfers
7.1 Transfers In-Kind
Bruce, Neil and Michael Waldman, “The Rotten Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, 155-165.
** Bruce, Neil and Michael Waldman, “Transfers in Kind, Why they can be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic,” American Economic Review, December 1991, 1345--1351.
Coate, Stephen, Stephen Johnson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Pecuniary Redistribution trough In-kind Programs,” Journal of Public Economics, September 1994, 19--41.
* Coate, Stephen, “Altruism, Samaratin's Dilemma and Government Transfer Policy,” American Economic Review, March 1995, 46--57.
Besley, Tim and Stephen Coate, “The Design of Income Maintenance Programmes,” Review of Economic Studies, 1995, 62, 187--221.
.
Peltzman, Sam, “The Effects of Subsidies In-kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education,” Journal of Political Economy, 1973, 1--27.
7.2
Mandated
Benefits
* Summers, Larry, “Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits,” American Economic Review, May 1989, 177-183.
Gruber, Jonathan, “State-Mandated Benefits and Employer-Provided Health Insurance,” Journal of Public Economics, v. 55(3), 433--64.
Gruber, Jonathan, “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits,” American Economic Review, v. 84(3), 1994, 622-41.
7.3 Tax and Expenditure Programs for the Poor
Moffitt, Robert, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, March 1992, 1--61.
Fraker, Thomas and Robert Moffitt, “The Effect of Food Stamps on Labor Supply: A Bivariate Selection Model,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 1988, 25--56.
* Hoynes, Hillary Williamson, “Welfare Transfers in Two-Parent Families: Labor Supply and Welfare Participation Under AFDC-UP,” Econometrica, 64(2), March 1996, 295-332.
Scholz, John Karl, “The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and Anti-Poverty Effectiveness,” National Tax Journal, March 1994, 59--81.
* Besley, Tim and Stephen Coate, “Workfare versus Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty Alleviation Programs,” American Economic Review, 1992, 249--61. 62, 187—221
Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainthan, “Network Effects and Welfare Culture,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2000, 1019-1056.
Moffitt, Robert, “An Economic Model
of Welfare Stigma,” American Economic Review, 73, 1983, 1023--1035.
Grogger, Jeffrey and Charles Michalopoulus, “Welfare Dynamics under Time Limits,” Journal of Political Economy, June 2003, 111(3), 530-554.
7.4 Public
Provision of Private Goods
Besley, T. and Stephen Coate, “Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income,” American Economic Review, v. 81 (4), September 1991, 979--984.
** Epple, D. and R.E. Romano, “Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects,” American Economic Review, v.88 (1), March 1998, 33--62.
Epple, D. and R.E. Romano, “Ends Against the Middle: Determining Public Service Provision When There Are Private Alternatives,” Journal of Public Economics, v.62(3), November 1996, 297--325.
** Epple, D. and R.E. Romano, “Public Provision of Private Goods,” Journal of Political Economy, v.104 (1), February 1996, 57--84.
8. Intergenerational Transfers [SKIP -- Karl will cover this next semester.]
Barro, Robert, “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,” Journal of Political Economy, 1974.
Bernheim and Bagwell, “Is Everything Neutral?,” Journal of Political Economy, April 1988.
* Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, “The Strategic Bequest Motive,” Journal of Political Economy, December, 1985.
* Perozek, Maria, “A Reexamination of the Strategic Bequest Motive,” Journal of Political Economy, v. 106 (2), April 1998, 423--445.
* Bernheim, B. Douglas, “How Strong are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities,” Journal of Political Economy, October 1991, 899--927.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and Avia Spivak, “The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market” Journal of Political Economy, 89 (2), April 1981, 372--91.
Abel, Andrew and B. Douglas Bernheim, “Fiscal Policy with Impure Intergenerational Altruism,” Econometrica, 59, 1991, 1687--1712.
Altonji, Joseph, Fumio Hayashi and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests using Micro Data,” American Economic Review, Dec 1992, 1177--1199.
** Altonji, Joseph, Fumio Hayashi, and Laurence Kotlikoff, “Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, December 1997, v. 105 (6), 1121--66.
** Altonji, Joseph, Fumio Hayashi, and Laurence Kotlikoff, “Risk-Sharing Between and Within Families,” Econometrica, March 1996, v.64 (2), 261--94.
Gale, William G. and John Karl Scholz, “Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994.
* Wilhelm, Mark O., “Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs’ Earnings: Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests,” American Economic Review, v. 86 (4), September 1996, 874--892.
Kaplow, Louis, “Tax Policy and Gifts,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, v. 88 (2), May 1998, 283--288.
* Kaplow, Louis, “A Note on Subsidizing Gifts,” Journal of Public Economics, November 1995, v. 58 (3), 469--477.
9. The Theory of the Second Best
9.1 Optimal Commodity Taxation
** Laffont, Chapter 7.
Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, Ch. 12, 13, 14.
Baumol and Bradford, “Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing,” American Economic Review, 1970.
Samuelson, P.A., “Optimal Taxation,” U.S. Treasury 1951, reprinted, Journal of Public Economics, 1986, 137--143.
** Sandmo, Agnar, “Optimal Taxation --- An Introduction to the Literature,” Journal of Public Economics, 1976, 37--54.
Diamond, P. A. and D. L. McFadden, “Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in Public Finance,” Journal of Public Economics, v 3, 1974, 3--21.
Diamond, P. A., and J. A. Mirrlees, “Optimal Taxation and Public Production, I & II,” American Economic Review, 1971, 8--27 and 261--278.
Deaton, A., “The Distance Function in Consumer Behavior with Applications to Index Numbers and Optimal Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 1979.
Goulder, Lawrence H. and Roberton C. Williams III. “The Substantial Bias from Ignoring General Equilibrium Effects in Estimating Excess Burden, and a Practical Solution.” Journal of Political Economy, August 2003, 111(4), 898-927
9.2 Optimal Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A., “An Exploration of the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 175--208.
* Stiglitz, J. E., “Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 1982, 213--240.
Piketty, Thomas, “Implementation of First-best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules” Journal of Economic Theory, Oct 1993; Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 23-41.
Stiglitz, J. E., “Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 1976.
Varian, Hal R., “Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance,” Journal of Public Economics, 1980, 49--68.
Slemrod, Joel, S. Yitzhaki and J. Mayshar, “The Optimal Two-bracket Linear Income Tax,” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 53, 269--290.
Saez, Emmanuel, “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” MIT working paper, 1998.
* Diamond, Peter, “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates,” American Economic Review, 1998, v. 88 (1), 83--95.
Feldstein, Martin, “The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act,” Journal of Political Economy, 1995, v. 103 (3), 551--572.
Saez, Emmanuel, “The Desirability of Commodity Taxation under non-linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes,” Journal of Public Economics, February 2002, 83(2), 217-230.
* Jon Gruber and Emmanuel Saez, “The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications,” Journal of Public Economics, April 2002, 84(1), 1-32.
* Slemrod, Joel and Wojciech Kopczuk, “The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income,” Journal of Public Economics, April 2002, 84(1), 91-112.
* Diamond, Peter, "Optimal Tax Treatment of Private contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences" working paper, MIT, 2003
9.3 Pigou, Samuelson and Distortionary Taxation
Atkinson, A.B. and N.H. Stern, “Pigou, Taxes, and Public Goods,” Review of Economic Studies, 1974, 119--128.
* Ballard, Charles L. and Don Fullerton, “Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1992, 117--131.
Kaplow, Louis, “The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation,” National Tax Journal, 49, 1996, 513—533.
Gaube, Thomas, “When Do Distortionary Taxes Reduce the Optimal Supply of Public Goods?” Journal of Public Economics, May 2000, 151-180.
Cremer, Helmut and Firouz Gihvari, “Second-Best Taxation of Emissions and Polluting Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, v 80, 2001, 169-198.
10. Law and Economics
Becker, Gary, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 1968, 169--217.
Polinsky and Shavell, ``The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, December 1979, 880--891.
Andreoni, J., “Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty fit the Crime?,” RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 1991.
* Polinsky and Shavell, “The Economic Theory of the Public Enforcement of Law,” Journal of Economic Literature, March 2000.
Polinsky and Shavell, “The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy,” American Law and Economics Review, V 2, 2000, 223-237.
* Polinsky and Shavell, “Corruption in Optimal Law Enforcement,” Journal of Public Economics, v 81, 2001, 1-24.
Donohue, John J. and Steven D. Levitt, “The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001, 379-420.
11. Tax Compliance
* Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein, “Tax Compliance,” Journal of Economic Literature, v. 36(2), June 1998, 818-860.
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo, “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 1972, 323--338.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo, “A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 3, 1974, 201--202.
Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Louis L. Wilde, “Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance,” IER, 27, 1986, 739--760.
Border, Kim and Joel Sobel, “Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Audit and Plunder,” Review of Economic Studies, 54, 1987, 525--540.
Erard, Brian, “Taxation With Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax Practitioners in Tax Compliance,” Journal of Public Economics, 52, 1993, 163—97.
Andreoni, James, “The Desirability of a Permanent Tax Amnesty,” Journal of Public Economics, 45, 1991, 143--159.
Slemrod, Joel “Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1990, 157--178.
Feinstein, J. S. “An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection,” RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 1991, 14--35.
12. The Political Economy of Career Advancement (Independent Reading)
** Hamermesh, Daniel S., “The Young Economist's Guide to Professional Etiquette,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 6, no 1, Winter 1992, 169--179.
** Thomson, William, “The Young Person’s Guide to Writing Economic Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature, March 1999, 157--183.