Econ 264 Winter
2007
Experimental Economics
Professor James Andreoni
andreoni@ucsd.edu - 215
http://econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/
Course Description: This course will be a survey of some of the recent literature on Experimental Economics. The background for the course is graduate microeconomic theory and game theory.
Text: There is no text for the course, but students are encouraged to purchase these:
Camerer, Colin, Behavioral Game Theory,
Format: This course will be taught in a seminar format, with plenty of interaction and discussion among the students. Students will be expected to make at least one presentation during the term, leading the discussion on a paper or topic. Students are expected to read the assigned papers before each meeting.
Course Project: There will be no exams for the course, but students will be required to submit a course project. Students must complete two projects.
PROJECT 1: Write a paper that surveys the literature on one area of interest of any topic concerning experimental economics, and to suggest tests of open questions. Topics need not be restricted to those covered in the course, but should be approved by Professor Andreoni. Maximum length should be 10 pages.
PROJECT 2: Design an experiment. The design should include a statement of the research question, a prediction based in economic theory, the task the subjects will complete, a sketch of the protocol (instructions for subjects, directions for experimenters), number of subjects per condition, and a description of how the data will be analyzed to test the prediction. Students are encouraged to work in pairs to design their studies. At the end of the semester, each team of designers must present their experimental ideas to the class.
Course Outline: Following is a course outline. This
is a living document that will likely change and evolve as the semester
proceeds-expect updates often. There are far too many papers listed here to
cover in one quarter, so as the term progresses we will respond to both time
and student interest to direct our attention and the depth of our discussions
on the topics below.
PROPOSED OUTLINE FOR
THE COURSE:
a. Linear
b. Provision Point
c. Mechanism Design
d. Fund-raising
e. Field Studies
a. Reputation building
b. Sorting
c. Punishments and rewards
a. And altruism
b. And coordination
c. And deception
a. Adaptive and Evolutionary Learning
b. Belief Based Learning
c. Reinforcement Learning
d. Combinations of Belief and Reinforcement
e. Quantile Response Equilibrium
16. Neuro-economics
Experimental
Economics
Econ 264
**CURRENT VERSION OF READING LIST: February 23, 2007 **
0.
Background
and Introduction
Roth, Alvin E. "The Early History of Experimental Economics." Journal of the History of Economic Thought,1993, 15(2), pp. 184-209. html
Samuelson,
Larry. “Economic Theory and Experimental
Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 2005,
43(1), pp. 65-107. pdf
Rubinstein,
Ariel, “Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist.” Econometrica,
74 (4), July 2006, 865-883. pdf
Rabin, Matthew. “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 1998, 36(1), pp. 11-46. pdf
Hertwig, Ralph and Andreas Ortmann. “Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24(3), pp. 383-402. pdf
Kahneman, Daniel. “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics.” American Economic Review, 2003, 93(5), pp. 1449-1475. pdf
Binmore, Ken. “Economic Man – or Straw Man?
Commentary on Heinrich, et al.” Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 2005, 28, pp. 815-818. html
Roth, Alvin E. "Lets Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ.: A Methodological Note." Empirical Economics, 1994, 19(2), pp. 279-289. html
1.
Altruism,
Fairness, Trust
Guth, Werner, R. Schmittberger and B. Schwartz. “An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Games and Economic Behavior,
1982, 3(4), pp. 367-388. pdf
Forsythe, Robert, Joel Horowitz, N.S. Savin and Martin Sefton. “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6(3), pp. 347-369. pdf
Ochs, Jack and Alvin E. Roth. “An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining.”
American Economic Review, 1989, 79(3), pp. 355-384. pdf
Roth, Alvin E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okunofujiwara and S. Zamir. “Bargaining and Market
Behavior in
Slonim,
Robert and Alvin E. Roth. “Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An
Experiment in the
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 122-142. pdf
Van Huyck, John B.; Raymond C. Battalio and Mary F. Walters. “Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 143-170. pdf
Fehr, Ernst, et al. “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108(2), pp. 437-459. pdf
Glaeser, Edward L., et al. “Measuring Trust.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(3), pp. 811–846. pdf
Cox, James C. “How to Identify
Trust and Reciprocity.” Games and
Economic
Behavior, 2004, 46(2), pp. 260–281. pdf
Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gächter and Georg Kirchsteiger. “Reciprocity as a Contract
Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence.” Econometrica, 1997, 65(4), pp. 833–860. pdf
Bohnet, Iris, Bruno S. Frey and Steffen Huck. “More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding.” American Political Science Review, 2001, 95(1), pp. 131–144. pdf
Andreoni, James. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Contract Enforcement: Experiments on Satisfaction Guaranteed."2005, Working Paper. pdf
Sobel, Joel. “Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity. ” Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, 43(2), pp. 392-436. pdf
Engelmann,
Dirk and Andreas Ortmann. “The Robustness of Laboratory Gift Exchange: A
Reconsideration.” 2002, Working Paper, CERGE-EI,
Prasnikar, V. and Alvin E. Roth. “Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, 107(3), pp. 865-888. pdf
Andreoni, James, Paul Brown and Lise Vesterlund."What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence." Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40(1), pp. 1-24. pdf
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, K. Shachat, and V. Smith. “Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 7(3), pp. 346-380. pdf
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. Smith. “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games.” American Economic Review, 1996, , pp. 653-660. pdf
Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey. “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment.” American Economic Review, 1999, 89(1), pp. 335-339. pdf
Bohnet, Iris and Frey, B. “The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1999, 38(1), pp. 43– 57. pdf
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt.“A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3), pp. 817-868. pdf
Rabin, Matthew “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American Economic Review, 1993, 83(5), pp. 1281-1302. pdf
Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin. “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(3), pp. 817-869. pdf
Levine, D. “Modelling Altruism and Spitefulness in Game Experiments.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 1998, 1(3), pp. 593–622. pdf
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger. “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 47(2), pp. 268-98. pdf
Li, Jing. "The Power of Convention: A Theory of Social Preferences."Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2005, forthcoming. pdf
Andreoni, James. “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence.” Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97(6), pp. 1447-58. pdf
Andreoni, James. “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving.” Economic Journal, 1990, 100(401), pp. 464-477. pdf
Andreoni, James and J.H. Miller. “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism.” Econometrica, 2002, 70(2), pp. 737-753. pdf
Andreoni,
James, Marco Castillo and
Andreoni,
James, Marco Castillo and
Andreoni, James. “Giving Gifts to Groups: How Congestible is Altruism?” 2006, Working Paper.
2.
Public Goods
Ledyard, John. “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” Chapter 2 in KR.
Marwell, Gerald and Ruth Ames. “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV.” Journal of Public Economics, 1981, 15(3), pp. 295-310. pdf
Isaac, R. Mark and James Walker. “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988, 103(1), pp. 179-199. pdf
Isaac, R. Mark, James Walker and Arlingtion Williams. “Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups.” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 54(1), pp. 1-36. pdf
Andreoni, James. “Why Free Ride?: Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments.” Journal of Public Economics, 1988, 37(3), pp. 291-304. pdf
Andreoni, James. “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?” American Economic Review, 1995, 85(4), pp. 891-904. pdf
Andreoni, James. “Warm-Glows versus Cold Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing in Public Goods Experiments. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, 110(1), pp. 1-21. pdf
Palfrey, Thomas and Jeffrey Prisbrey. “Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?” American Economic Review, 1997, 87(5), pp. 829-846. pdf
Palfrey, Thomas and Jeffrey Prisbrey. “Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments.” Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 61(3), pp. 409-427. pdf
Andreoni, James. “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis.” American Economic Review, 1993, 83(5), pp. 1317-1327. pdf
Palfrey, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1991, 3(2), pp. 183-220.
Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt. “A Theoretical Analysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games.” Journal of Public Economics, 1998, 70(2), pp. 297-323. pdf
Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt and S. Laury. “Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior.” Journal of Public Economics, 2002, 83(2), pp. 257-278. pdf
Davis, Douglas
and Charles Holt. Experimental Economics. Princetion:
Dawes, Robin, John Orbell, R.T. Simmons and A.J.C. van de Kragt. “Organizing Groups for Collective Action.” American Political Science Review, 1986, 80(4), pp.1171-85. pdf
Bagnoli, Mark and Michael McKee. “Voluntary Contributions Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods.” Economic Inquiry, 1991, 29(2), pp. 351-366. pdf
Bagnoli, Mark, Shaul Ben-David and Michael McKee. “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Multiple Unit Case.” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 47(1), pp. 85-106. pdf
Rondeau, Daniel, William D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe. “Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism.” Journal of Public Economics, 1999, 72(3), pp. 455-470. pdf
Rondeau, Daniel, Gregory L. Poe and William D. Schulze. “VCM or PPM? A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(8), pp. 1581-1592. pdf
Sefton, Martin and Abdullah Yavas. “Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 16(2), pp. 280-302. pdf
Chen, Yan and Charles Plott. “The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design.” Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 59(3), pp. 335-364. pdf
Chen, Yan and Fang-Fang Tang. “Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106(3), pp. 633-662. pdf
Andreoni, J. and
Morgan, John. “Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries.” Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67(4), pp. 761-784. pdf
Morgan, John and Martin
Sefton. “Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence.” Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67(4),
pp. 785-810. pdf
Andreoni,
James and
Vesterlund, Lise, Jan Potters and Martin Sefton. “After You--Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(8), pp. 1399-1419. pdf
John, Jack Ochs, and Lise Vesterlund, Lise, “Giving Little by Little: Dynamic Voluntary Contribution Games.” 2005, Working Paper. pdf
Duffy, John and Tatiana Kornienko. “Does Competition Affect Giving? An Experimental Study.” 2005, Working Paper. pdf
Cinyabuguma, Matthias, Talbot Page and Louis Putterman. “Cooperation Under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(8), pp. 1421-1435. pdf
Gailmard, Sean and Thomas R. Palfrey. “An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(8), pp. 1361-1398. pdf
Eckel, Catherine C., Philip J. Grossman and Rachel M. Johnston. “An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(8), pp. 1543-1560. pdf
Goeree, Jacob, S. Onderstal, E. Maasland and J.
Turner. “How (Not) to Raise Money.” Journal of Political Economy, 2005, 113(4), pp. 897-918. pdf
Chaudhuri A, Graziano S, Maitra P. “Social learning and norms in a public goods experiment with inter-generational advice.” Review of Economic Studies, 73 (2): 357-380, APR 2006. pdf
List, John A. and David Lucking-Reiley. “The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign.” Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110(1), pp. 215-233. pdf
Landry,
Craig, Andreas Lange, John A. List,
Michael K. Price and Nicholas G. Rupp. "Toward an Understanding of the
Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Karlan, Dean and John List. “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment” 2006, Working Paper. pdf
3.
Building
Cooperation
Selten, R. and R. Stoecker. “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s
Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach.” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization,
1986, 7(1), pp. 47-70. pdf
Andreoni, James and J.H.Miller.”Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence.” Economic Journal, 1993, 103(418), pp. 570-585. pdf
Camerer, C., and K. Weigelt. “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium
Reputation Model.” Econometrica, 1988, 56(1), pp. 1-36. pdf
Cooper, R., D. DeJong and R. Forsythe “Cooperation
Without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games.” Games
and Economic
Behavior, 1996, 12(2), pp. 187-218. pdf
Duffy, John and Jack Ochs. “Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction.” 2005, Working Paper. pdf
Dal Bó, P. “Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games.” American Economics Review, 2005, 95(5), pp. 1591-1604. pdf
Ellison, G. “Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random
Matching.” Review of Economic Studies, 1994, 61(3), pp. 567-588. pdf
Andreoni, James and
Fehr, E. and S. Gachter. “Cooperation and Punishment in
Public Goods Experiments.” American
Economic Review, 2000, 90(4), pp. 980-994. pdf
Experimental Econ paper
Andreoni, James, William H. Harbaugh and Lise Vesterlund. “The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments and Cooperation.” American Economic Review, 2003, 93(3), pp. 893-902. pdf
Masclet, David,
4.
Uncertainty
and Expected Utility
Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.'' Econometrica,
March 1979, vol 47, p263—291.
Tversky and Wakker, “Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights.'' Econometrica, November 1995, vol 63,
p1255--1280.
Rabin, Matthew, “Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem,'' Econometrica, September
2000, vol 68, 1281-1292.
Rabin and Thaler, ``Anomalies: Risk Aversion,'' J. Econ
Perspectives, Winter 2001.
Charles A. Holt; Susan K. Laury, “Risk
Aversion and Incentive Effects” American Economic Review, Vol.
92, No. 5. (Dec., 2002), pp. 1644-1655. pdf
List, John A.
“Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect
Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace.” Econometrica, 2004, 72(2), pp. 615-625. pdf
5.
Coordination
Ochs, Jack. “Coordination.” In KR.
Van Huyck, John B.; Battalio, Raymond C. and Beil, Richard O. “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure.” American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1), pp. 234–48. pdf
Van Huyck, J.B., J.M. Wildenthal and R.C. Battalio. “Tacit Cooperation, Strategic
Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence From Repeated Dominance Solvable Games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 38(1), pp. 156-175. pdf
Schotter, Andy and Barry Sopher. “Social Learning and Convention Creation in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 111(3), pp. 498-529. pdf
Holt, Charles and J. Goeree. “An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2005, 51(2), pp. 349-364. pdf
Roberto A. Weber, “Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups.” American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (1), March, 114-126. pdf
Andreas Blume, Andreas Ortmann, “The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria.” Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 2007, 274 – 290. pdf
6.
Communication
Chaudhuri A, Graziano S, Maitra P. “Social learning and norms in a
public goods experiment with inter-generational advice.” Review of Economic Studies, 73 (2): 357-380, APR 2006. pdf
Schotter, Andy, Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher. “On the Informational Content of Advice: A Theoretical and Experimental Study.” Economic Theory, 2005. pdf
Schotter, Andy and Barry Sopher. “Social Learning and Convention Creation in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 111(3), pp. 498-529. pdf
Schotter, Andy. “Decision Making with Naive Advice.” American Economic Review, 2003, 93(2), pp. 196-201. pdf
Schotter, Andy and Antonio Merlo. “Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning.” Games and Economic Behavior , 2003, 42(1), pp. 116-136. pdf
Akerlof, A.“The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84(3), pp. 488-500. pdf
Brandts, J. and G. Charness. “Truth or Consequences: An Experiment.” Management Science, 2003, 49(1), pp. 116-130. pdf
Charness, G.“Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test of Aumann’s Conjecture.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 33(2), pp. 177-194. pdf
Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg. “Promises & Partnership.” 2004, Working Paper. pdf
Cooper, R., D. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. Ross. “Communication in Coordination Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, 107(2), pp. 739-771. pdf
Crawford, V. “A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 78(2), pp. 286-298. pdf
Gneezy, U. “Deception: The
Role of Consequences.” American Economic
Review, 2005, 95(1), pp. 384-394. pdf
Duffy, John and Nick Feltovich. “Words, Deeds and Lies: Strategic Behavior in Games with Multiple Signals.” 2005, Working Paper. pdf
7.
Over-Confidence
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. “Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(3), pp. 871-915. pdf
Yildiz, Muhamet. “Wishful Thinking in Strategic Enviornments.” 2004, Working Paper. pdf
Yildiz, Muhamet. “Bargaining Without a Common Prior - An Immediate Agreement Theorem.” Econometrica, 2003, 71(3), pp. 793-811. pdf
Yildiz, Muhamet. “Waiting to Persuade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119(1), pp. 223-248. pdf
Massey, Cade and
Richard H. Thaler. “Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency in the National
Football League.” NBER Working Papers, 2005, 11270,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. pdf
Bengtsson, Claes, Mats Persson and Peter Willenhag. “Gender and Overconfidence.” Economics Letters, 2005, 86(2), pp. 199–203. pdf
DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier. “Overestimating
Self-control: Evidence from the Health Club Industry.” NBER Working
Papers, 2004, 10819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. pdf
Camerer, Colin, and D. Lovallo. “Overconfidence and Excess Entry:
An Experimental Approach.” American
Economic Review, 1999, 89(1), pp. 306-318. pdf
Barber, Brad and T. Odean. “Boys will be Boys:
Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(1), pp. 261-292. pdf
Odean, T. “Do Investors Trade Too Much?”American Economic Review, 1999, 89(5),
pp. 1279-1298. pdf
Malmendier, Ulrike and Geoffrey Tate. “CEO Overconfidence and Corporate
Investment.” 2002, Working Paper. pdf
Malmendier, Ulrike and Geoffrey Tate. “Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence
and the Market's Reaction.” 2003, Working
Paper. pdf
8.
Belief
Polarization
9.
Information
and Signalling
Holt, Charlie and Lisa Anderson. “Information Cascades in the Laboratory." American Economic Review, 1997, 87(5), pp. 847-862. Received a 1999 ANBAR Citation of Excellence. pdf
10.
Time
Consistency/Hyperbolic Discounting
The time-additive stationary model: Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd ed., pp 358-359.
Strotz, Robert. “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization.”
Review of Economic Studies, 1956, 23(3), pp. 165-180. pdf
Battigali, P. “Dynamic Inconsistency and Imperfect Recall.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 20(1), pp. 31-50. pdf
Laibson, D. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112(2), pp.443-477. pdf
Gruber, J. and B. Köszegi. “Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(4), pp. 1261-1303. pdf
O'Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin. "Choice and
Procrastination." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 116(1), pp.
121-160. pdf
O’Donaghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin. “Doing It Now or Later.” American Economic Review, 1999, 89(1), pp. 103-124. pdf
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer. “The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing
Tastes.” Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72, pp. 429-448. pdf
Ok, E. and Y.
Masatlioglu. “A General Theory of Time Preferences.” 2003, Working Paper. pdf
11.
Endowment
Effect
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch and R. Thaler. “Anamolies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, 5(1), pp. 193-206. pdf
List, J. “The Effect of Market Experience on the WTA/WTP disparity: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Sports Memorabilia.” 2000, Working Paper. pdf
Knetsch, Jack
L. “The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves.”American Economic Review, 1989, 79(5), pp.
1277-1284. pdf
Jack L. Knetsch “The Endowment Effect and Evidence of
Nonreversible Indifference Curves” The
American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 5. (Dec., 1989), pp. 1277-1284. [Article ]
Harbaugh, William T., Kate Krause and Lise Vesterlund. “Are Adults Better Behaved Than Children? Age, Experience, and the Endowment Effect.” Economics Letters, 2001, (70)2, pp. 175-181. pdf
Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein. “Libertarian Paternalism.” American Economic Review, 2003, 93(2), pp. 175-179. pdf
12.
Sex and
Beauty
Andreoni, J. and L. Vesterlund. “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116 (1), pp. 293–312. pdf
Vesterlund,
Lise and Muriel Niederle. “Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete
Too Much?” NBER Working Papers, 2005, 11474, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc. pdf
Andreoni,
James and
Mobius, Markus
M.and Rosenblat, Tanya S. “Why Beauty Matters.” The American
Economic Review, 2006, 96(1), pp. 222-235 pdf
13.
Auctions
Kagel, John. “Auctions.” Chapter 7 in KR.
Thaler, Richard H. “Anomalies: The Winner's Curse.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,1988, 2(1), pp. 191-202. pdf
Milgrom, Paul. “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (in Symposia: Auctions).” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3(3), pp. 3-22. pdf
Lucking-Reiley, David. “Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet.” American Economic Review, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1063-1080. pdf
Riley, John G. “Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions (in Symposia: Auctions).” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3(3), pp. 41-50. pdf
Kagel, J., R. Harstad and D. Levin. “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study.” Econometrica, 1987, 55(6), pp. 1275-1304. pdf
Andreoni, James and John H. Miller. “Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 39-64. pdf
Levin, Dan,
Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt. “Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction.” Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106(4), pp. 828-853. pdf
List, John A. and David Lucking-Reiley. “Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment.” American Economic Review, 90(4), 2000, pp. 961-972. pdf
Kagel, John H. and Dan Levin. “Common Value Auctions with Insider Information.” Econometrica, 1999, 67(5), pp. 1219-1238. pdf
Andreoni,
James,
14.
Errors and
Learning
Andreoni, James and John H. Miller. “Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments?” Economics Letters, 1991, 36(1), pp. 9-15. pdf
Andreoni, James and John H. Miller. “Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 39-64. pdf
Binmore, Ken,
John Gale, and
Crawford, Vincent P. “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games.” Econometrica, 1995, 63(1), pp. 103-143. pdf
Van Huyck, John B., Joseph Cook and Raymond C. Battalio. “Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102(5), pp. 975-1005. pdf
Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine. “Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112(2), pp. 507-536. pdf
Mookherjee, Dilip and Barry Sopher. “Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 19(1), pp. 97-132. pdf
Stahl, Dale O. “Boundedly
Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game.” Games and Economic Behavior,
1996, 16(2), pp. 303-330. pdf
Roth, Alvin E. and Ido Erev. “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 8(1), pp. 164-212. pdf
Erev, Ido and Alvin E. Roth. “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria.” American Economic Review, 1998, 88(4), pp. 848-881. pdf
Slonim, Robert
and Alvin E. Roth. “Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in
the
Camerer, Colin
and Teck-Hua Ho. “Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in
Feltovich, Nick. “Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information Games.” Econometrica, 2000, 68(3), pp. 605-642. pdf
McKelvey and
Palfrey. “Quantal Response Equilibria for
Charles Holt,
Jacob Goeree and
Holt, Charlie
and Jacob Goeree. “A Model of Noisy Introspection.” Games and Economic
Behavior, 2004, 46(2), pp. 281-294.
pdf
Holt, Charlie and Jacob Goeree. “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory, and Ten Intuitive Contradictions.” American Economic Review, 2001, 91(5), pp. 1402-1422. pdf
15.
Neuroeconomics
Camerer, Colin, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec. “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, 43(1), pp. 9-64. pdf
Bernheim, D. and A. Rangel. “Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes.” American Economic Review, 2004, 94(5), pp. 1558-1590. pdf