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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

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CONTACT INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, University of California, San Diego, 2013 - 2019 (expected)
Advisors: S. Nageeb Ali (Chair), Christopher P. Chambers, Joel Sobel, Joel Watson

B.A. in Economics, University of Hong Kong, 2010 - 2013

REFERENCES

S. Nageeb Ali Department of Economics Penn State University (814) 867-4822 nageeb@psu.edu	Christopher P. Chambers Department of Economics Georgetown University (202) 687-7559 cc1950@georgetown.edu	Joel Sobel Department of Economics UC San Diego (858) 534-4367 jsobel@ucsd.edu
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FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS AND AWARDS

Clive Granger Research Fellowship	2016
UCSD Department of Economics CPhil Fellowship	2016
UCSD Graduate Summer Research Fellowship	2014 - 2016
UCSD Department of Economics Travel and Research Grant	2015
China Soong Ching Ling Foundation Undergraduate Fellowship	2009 - 2013

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Repeated Games, Matching, Revealed Preference, Decision Theory, Information Economics

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

Research Assistant	UCSD (Prof. Joel Sobel)	2018
Research Assistant	UCSD (Prof. S. Nageeb Ali)	2014

WORKING PAPERS

“Stability in Repeated Matching Markets” (**Job Market Paper**)

Abstract: I develop a framework for studying repeated matching markets, where in every period, a new generation of short-lived agents on one side of the market is matched to a fixed set of long-lived institutions on the other. Within this framework, I characterize self-enforcing arrangements for two types of environments. When wages are rigid, as in the matching market for hospitals and medical residents, players can be partitioned into two sets: regardless of patience level, some players can only be assigned according to a static stable matching; when institutions are patient, the other players can be assigned in ways that are unstable in one-shot interactions. I discuss

these results' implications for allocating residents to rural hospitals. When wages can be flexibly adjusted, institutions can be divided into a hierarchy of congested and uncongested segments. I use this hierarchical structure to characterize equilibrium payoffs, and as an application, show that repeated interaction resolves well-known non-existence issues: while static stable matchings may fail to exist with complementarities and/or peer effects, self-enforcing matching processes always exist if institutions are sufficiently patient.

“Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games” (with Nageeb Ali)

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of repeated games for settings where coalitions may choose actions. We assume that members of coalitions cannot commit to long-run behavior (on and off the path) but coalitions can engage in short-term deviations. A convention reflects players' shared understanding of how history influences future behavior. We say that a convention is stable if at every history, no coalition of players can find profitable one-shot deviations. We prove that when monitoring is perfect in both non-transferable and transferable utility games, stable conventions can implement any payoff that is feasible and strictly individually rational so long as players are arbitrarily patient. Accordingly, coalitional deviations do not refine behavior beyond the folk theorem for sub-game perfect equilibria. By contrast, if members of a deviating coalition can transfer utility to each other secretly, a stable convention implements payoffs only within the β -core of the stage-game, and all such outcomes can be implemented as players become arbitrarily patient. We use these results to interpret how legal institutions can shape the behavior of individuals and coalitions through their expectations of future behavior, and why laws may be undermined when transfers are secret.

“Costly Information Acquisition” (with Christopher P. Chambers and John Rehbeck) *R&R Journal of Economic Theory*

Abstract: We provide revealed preference characterizations for choices made under various forms of costly information acquisition. We examine nonseparable, multiplicative, and constrained costly information acquisition. In particular, this allows the possibility of unknown time delay for acquiring information. The techniques we use parallel the duality properties in the standard consumer problem.

PUBLICATION

“A Test for Risk-Averse Expected Utility” (with Christopher P. Chambers and Seung-Keun Martinez) *Journal of Economic Theory* 163 (2016), 775-785

Abstract: We provide a universal condition for rationalizability by risk-averse expected utility preference in a demand-based framework with multiple commodities. Our test can be viewed as a natural counterpart of a classical test of expected utility, due to Fishburn (1975), in a demand setting.

TEACHING

Teaching Assistant, UC San Diego

ECON 200C	Microeconomics	Graduate
ECON 205	Mathematics for Economists	Graduate
ECON 171	Decisions under Uncertainty	Undergraduate
ECON 172B	Operations Research B	Undergraduate
ECON 131	Economics of the Environment	Undergraduate
ECON 120B	Econometrics B	Undergraduate

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Conference Presentations

2018: ASSA Annual Meeting, NSF/NBER/CEME Mathematical Economics Conference

2016: Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society

Referee Service

Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Social Science, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Social Choice and Welfare

OTHER INFORMATION

Citizenship: China

Date of Birth: April 2nd, 1991

Languages: Mandarin Chinese (Native), English (Proficient)

Updated: December 3, 2018