office: 311 Economics
phone: (858) 534-4367
9500 Gilman Dr. #0508
fax: (858) 534-7040
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
email: jsobel at ucsd dot edu
Contact me if you would like a copy of any of these articles.
“A Note on Preplay Communication,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2017.
“Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation,” (with N. Roux) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015.
“On the Relationship between Group and Individual Decisions,” Theoretical Economics, 2014.
“Ten Possible Experiments on Communication and Deception,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2013.
“Giving and Receiving Advice,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano, and E. Dekel (eds.), 2013.
“Complexity versus Conflict in Communication,” in Proceedings of 46th Annual CISS (Conference on Information, 2012.
“Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium,” (with M. Dufwenberg, P. Heidues, G. Kirchsteiger, and F. Riedel), Review of Economic Studies, 2011.
See: R. Velez, “Inequity-averse preferences in general equilibrium,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017 Corollary 2 for a correction.
“Comments on Neuroeconomics,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009.
“Generous Actors, Selfish Actions: Markets with Other-Regarding Preferences,” International Review of Economics, 2009.
“ReGale: Some Memorable Results,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.
“Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria,” Econometrica (with Y. Chen and N. Kartik), 2009.
“Signaling Games,” in Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Science, R. Meyers (ed.), 2009.
“David Gale,'' in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.), 2008.
“A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity,” International Journal of Game Theory, (with U. Segal), 2008.
“Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings,” Journal of Economic Theory (with U. Segal), 2007.
“For Better or Forever: Formal versus Informal Enforcement,” Journal of Labor Economics, 2006.
“A Model of Positive Self-Image in Subjective Assessments,” American Economic Review (with L. Santos-Pinto), 2005.
“Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2005.
“Putting Altruism in Context,” Brain and Behavioral Science, 2002.
“Can We Trust Social Capital?” Journal of Economic Literature, 2002. Correction
“Min, Max, and Sum: Characterization Theorems,” Journal of Economic Theory (with U. Segal), 2002.
“On the Dynamics of Standards,” Rand Journal of Economics, 2001.
“Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2001.
“Another View of Trust and Gossip,'' in Networks and Markets, J. Rauch and A. Casella (eds.), 2001.
“Economists' Models of Learning,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2000.
“A Model of Declining Standards,” International Economic Review, 2000.
“A Re-Examination of Yardstick Competition,” Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, 1999.
“Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 (with M. Rabin).
“An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication,'' Econometrica, 1995 (with Y.-G. Kim).
“Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 (with A. Blume).
“Signalling,” in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume II, R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), 1994 (with D. M. Kreps).
“Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency,” Economics Letters, 1993.
“Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1993 (with A. Blume and Y.-G. Kim).
“Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem,” International Economic Review, 1993.
“Hierarchical Design and Enforcement of Income Tax Policies,” Journal of Public Economics, 1993 (with I. Sánchez).
“On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 (with A. Cabrales).
“How (and When) to Communicate to Enemies,” in Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale, M. Majumdar (ed.),1992.
“How to Count to One Thousand,” Economic Journal, 1992.
“Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers,” Econometrica, 1991.
“It’s Not What You Know, It’s Who You Play,” in Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets, R. Selten (ed.), 1991.
“On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical,” Review of Economic Studies, 1991 (with W. Emons).
“Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 (with L. Stole and I. Zapater).
“Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 (with I.-K. Cho).
“An Analysis of Discovery Rules,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 1989.
“Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder,” Review of Economic Studies, 1987 (with K. C. Border).
“Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games,” Econometrica, 1987 (with J. S. Banks).
“Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of Disputes: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proof?” in Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, A. Roth (ed.), 1985.
“A Theory of Credibility,” Review of Economic Studies, 1985.
“The Timing of Sales,” Review of Economic Studies, 1984.
“Nonlinear Prices and Price-Taking Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1984.
“Bargaining, Strategic Reserves and International Trade in Exhaustible Resources,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1984 (with V. P. Crawford and I. Takahashi).
“Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984 (with J. Conlisk and E. Gerstner).
“The Structure of Industry with Endogenous Skill Levels,” in Vol. 1B Article Conference Papers, X Earie Conference, B. Carlson et al (eds.). Bergen, Norway: The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 1983 (with J. L. Guasch).
“Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, 1982 (with V. P. Crawford).
“Breeding and Raiding: A Theory of Strategic Production of Skills,” European Economic Review, 1983 (with J. L. Guasch).
“A Multistage Model of Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies, 1983 (with I. Takahashi).
“On the Optimal Distribution of Output from a Jointly Owned Resource,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982 (with D. Gale).
“Proportional Distribution Schemes,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1981.
“Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, 1981.
“Monopoly and Product Selection,” Economics Letters, 1980 (with J. L. Guasch).
“Fair Allocation of a Renewable Resource,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1979.
“Fair Division of a Random Harvest,” in General Equilibrium, Growth, and Trade: Essays in Honor of Lionel McKenzie, J. Green and J. Scheinkman (eds.), 1979 (with D. Gale).