What follows is an annotated bibliography for the December lectures.

References


[Observes that Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold with strategic voter. Distinguishes informative, naive, and strategic voting. Straightforward argument.]


[Shows in a very special model different ways in which full information revelation is less likely under unanimity than majority rule models with deliberation. The paper is long. The arguments are intricate but not general.]


[A short paper that shows, roughly, if full disclosure during deliberation followed by unanimous voting is possible if and only if preferences are “minimally diverse.” More general voting environment than is standard. Note: minimal diversity assumption is strong.]


[Two observations: There are no problems with getting the right answer in voting models with homogeneous preferences if deliberation is possible. (This result is trivial, but reminds us some of the insights from strategic voting literature are more interesting as technical insights than as substantive observations.) Second, the paper notes that informative voting under unanimity is “more likely” to be an equilibrium if retrials are necessary following a non-unanimous vote.]


[Uncertainty about the population of voters makes uniformed voters prefer to abstain. Nevertheless, full information equivalence under strategic voting.]


[Fancier version of previous paper.]

[Strategic voting under unanimous rule may lead to too many convictions.]


[Investigation of incentives to gather information in a binary outcome, majority voting environment. Gersbach has a series of papers that illustrate the welfare implications of the possibility of acquiring information either individually or as a group in the binary outcome, majority voting framework.]


[All non-unanimous voting rules are equivalent in game in voting follows one round of communication. Demonstrates that equilibria can be strange in voting models.]


[Shows that one can regain sincere voting in large populations by perturbing preferences. Underlying idea similar to Meirowitz, but context is different.]


[General version of straightforward observation that in common-interest games strategic voting is consistent with efficiency.]


[Variation of 2006 paper. It contains results on effectiveness of deliberation as a function of group size.]


[Several ways to modify voting environment to obtain or regain full revelation in deliberative voting model.]