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Econ 208, Fall 2007

### Annotated Bibliography

I post below references to articles related to material that I have discussed along with brief summaries. I will update the bibliography as the course progresses. Let me know if you would like additional commentary or more references.

**Paternalism:** There are several ways to read articles.

1. You can read linearly, stopping to figure out anything that does not make sense.
2. You can skim the introduction, think about what the paper promises, decide how you would go about doing this, and then check to see how your approach compares to the approach of the authors.
3. You can read the propositions, backing up only to find relevant definitions. Eventually you can look at the introduction to see what the authors claim are the significance of their results.
4. You can skim quickly looking for results on a specific topic. In my opinion, the first way is not a good way to learn material. The second way forces you to think about what you are reading. If you guess the approach correctly, then the body of the paper becomes easy to read. If not, you may find that your approach is superior (and so you have a research project). The third causes you to think about the motivation for the analysis. The fourth is an efficient way to sort through a lot of work if you have a specific objective in mind.

Comments on papers:

- [4] [This paper introduces rationalizability.]
- [15] [This paper also introduces rationalizability. It has a different idea of how to refine the concept and places more emphasis on extensive-form games.]
- [2] [This paper contains a deceptively simple result that claims that “rationality” implies that agents will play correlated equilibria.]
- [1] [This paper introduces correlated equilibrium. It is straightforward to read.]
- [19] [A textbook about equilibrium refinements.]
- [8] [This paper discusses equilibrium concepts when utility fails to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis. It also has a discussion of equilibrium in beliefs.]
- [3] [Pure strategy equilibria exist (approximately) in games in which the right kind of background uncertainty substitutes for explicit randomization. This paper is technical, but the qualitative result may be intuitive.]
- [11] [This paper introduces the procedure sketched in class. This paper is hard to read and certainly outside the bounds of the class.]
- [12] [This is a difficult paper that introduces the idea of stability with respect to all trembles.]

- [14] [This paper introduces properness, a normal-form refinement of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.]
- [16] [This paper introduces trembling hand perfection. It is not easy to read.]
- [7] [This is a readable paper on signaling-game refinements.]
- [13] [This is a difficult paper that provides the first solution to the problem of defining a consistent type space.]
- [5] [This is a more accessible (but still technical) refinement of the Mertens and Zamir paper.]
- [10] [This tells you about some current research on type spaces.]
- [9] [The model for cheap-talk games.]
- [17] [A recent encyclopedia article on signaling.]
- [6] [A way to select equilibria in cheap-talk games.]
- [18] [Comments on when cheap-talk might matter.]

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