

Monetary policy at the zero lower bound: Theory

A. Theoretical channels

1. Conditions for complete neutrality (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003)
 2. Market frictions
 3. Preferred habitat and risk-bearing (Hamilton and Wu, 2012)
- B. Shadow rate (Wu and Xia, 2016)

1

C. Theoretical channels

1. Conditions for complete neutrality

Suppose preferences are

$$E_t \left\{ \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau} [U(C_{t+\tau}, H_{t+\tau}/P_{t+\tau}; \xi_{t+\tau}) - \int_0^1 v(L_{t+\tau}(j, \xi_{t+\tau})) dj] \right\}$$

$$C_t = \left[\int_0^1 c_t(i)^{\theta(\theta-1)} di \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \quad (\text{real consumption})$$

$$P_t = \left[\int_0^1 p_t(i)^{1-\theta} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \quad (\text{Calvo sticky prices})$$

H_t = nominal monetary base

ξ_t = preference shocks

$$y_t(i) = A_t f[L_t(i)]$$

no investment, govt spending: $C_t = Y_t$

2

pricing kernel:

$$M_{t+1} = \frac{\beta U_c(Y_{t+1}, H_{t+1}/P_{t+1}, \xi_{t+1})}{U_c(Y_t, H_t/P_t, \xi_t)(1+\pi_{t+1})}$$

first-order condition:

$$\frac{U_h(Y_t, H_t/P_t, \xi_t)}{U_c(Y_t, H_t/P_t, \xi_t)} = \frac{r_t}{1+r_t}$$

r_t = risk-free nominal rate

3

Liquidity trap (zero lower bound):

There is a saturation level $\bar{h}(C, \xi)$

such that $U_h(C, h; \xi) = 0$ for all $h \geq \bar{h}(C, \xi)$.

Implies $r_t = 0$ whenever $H_t/P_t \geq \bar{h}(Y_t, \xi_t)$.

4

Define $L(Y_t, r_t; \xi_t) =$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} h_t : \frac{U_h(Y_t, h_t, \xi_t)}{U_c(Y_t, h_t, \xi_t)} = \frac{r_t}{1+r_t} & \text{if } r_t > 0 \\ \bar{h}(Y_t, \xi_t) & \text{if } r_t = 0 \end{array} \right.$$

5

Monetary policy rule in normal times:

$$r_t = \phi(\pi_t, Y_t; \xi_t)$$

(Taylor type rule)

6

Monetary policy at the ZLB is choice for a rule $\psi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t)$ such that

$$H_t = P_t L(Y_t, \phi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t); \xi_t) \psi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t)$$

$$\psi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t) \begin{cases} = 1 & \text{if } \phi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t) > 0 \\ \geq 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where the excess reserves created by $\psi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t)$ are used by the central bank to purchase *any* assets.

7

Proposition: choice of $\psi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t)$ has no effect on nominal prices, inflation, interest rates, or real activity.

Reason: operations at the ZLB have no effect on the pricing kernel M_{t+1} .

Implication: all the Fed's operations in phase I and phase II were completely pointless.

8

How could Fed have an effect?

By changing $\phi(\pi_t, Y_t; \tilde{\xi}_t)$, the rule it will use to set interest rates once we're away from the ZLB, that would alter behavior today.

But how do we do this in practice?

9

- In theoretical model, simply announce the change and it happens.
- In real world, perhaps LSAP or forward guidance persuade markets the Fed is really changing its future policy rule.
- For example, LSAP may alter state-contingent path of future tax receipts (Fed promises to monetize more of debt in some states)

10


C. Theoretical channels

2. Market frictions

- During financial crisis in fall of 2008, arbitrage broke down in some markets
- No pricing kernel existed

11

Gürkaynak and Wright, JELit, 2012, yield curve during 2008-10



Watch the movie at http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Wright/loop_repealed.mpg

12

C. Theoretical channels

3. Preferred habitat and risk-bearing

Why does Treasury issue 10-year debt at 3% when it could borrow by rolling over 3-month debt at much lower rate?

Answer: Treasury is risk averse, and is willing to compensate government creditors for assuming this risk.

13

Consider representative "arbitrageur"

q_{t+1} = total return on portfolio

$$\max E_t(q_{t+1}) - (\gamma/2)\text{Var}_t(q_{t+1})$$

first-order condition:

$$r_{1t} = E_t(q_{n,t+1}) - \gamma \mathcal{G}_{nt}$$

where r_{1t} = return on riskless asset

$q_{n,t+1}$ = 1-period-holding yield for asset n

\mathcal{G}_{nt} = (1/2) change in variance from one more unit of asset n

14

If portfolio allocates share z_{nt} to n -period pure discount bonds with maturity n and price P_{nt} ,

$$q_{n,t+1} = \frac{P_{n-1,t+1}}{P_{nt}} - 1$$

$$q_{t+1} = \sum_{n=1}^N z_{nt} q_{n,t+1}$$

15

Suppose we conjecture:

$$p_{nt} = \alpha_n + \beta'_n \xi_t$$

$$\xi_{t+1} = \mathbf{c} + \rho \xi_t + \Sigma \mathbf{u}_{t+1}$$

$$\mathbf{u}_{t+1} \sim \text{i.i.d. } N(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I}_r)$$

Then:

$$\frac{\partial E_t(q_{t+1})}{\partial z_{nt}} \simeq \alpha_{n-1} + \beta'_{n-1} (\mathbf{c} + \rho \xi_t) - \alpha_n - \beta'_n \xi_t + (1/2) \beta'_{n-1} \Sigma \Sigma' \beta_{n-1}$$

$$\frac{\partial \text{Var}_t(q_{t+1})}{\partial z_{nt}} \simeq 2 \beta'_{n-1} \Sigma \Sigma' \sum_{l=2}^N z_{lt} \beta_{l-1}$$

16

$$\frac{\partial \text{Var}_t(q_{t+1})}{\partial z_{nt}} \simeq 2 \beta'_{n-1} \Sigma \Sigma' \sum_{l=2}^N z_{lt} \beta_{l-1}$$

Let $\mathbf{q}_t = \Sigma \Sigma' \sum_{l=2}^N z_{lt} \beta_{l-1}$

= (3 × 1) vector of arbitrageur's risk exposure

$$\frac{\partial \text{Var}_t(q_{t+1})}{\partial z_{nt}} \simeq 2 \beta'_{n-1} \mathbf{q}_t$$

So expected excess return from increasing

z_{nt} by one unit must be $\gamma \beta'_{n-1} \mathbf{q}_t$

$$\Rightarrow \text{price of risk } \lambda_t = \gamma \mathbf{q}_t = \gamma \Sigma \Sigma' \sum_{l=2}^N z_{lt} \beta_{l-1}$$

17

Suppose that:

- Arbitrageurs correspond to entire private sector

- U.S. Treasury debt is sole asset held by arbitrageurs

Then:

z_{nt} = share of publicly held Treasury debt of maturity n should enter as factor in risk pricing


18

Hamilton and Wu (2012)

- Historical variations in composition of publicly held Treasury debt (as summarized by \mathbf{q}_t , as measured using 3-factor affine weights) were associated with detectable (but small) changes in predicted excess returns
- Total stock of Treasury securities 10 years or longer held by public in 2006 was about \$400 B
- What would affine model incorporating Treasury debt holdings imply would happen to yields if supply of 3m Treasuries increased \$400B and all long-term debt retired?


19

Hamilton-Wu estimates of effect on yield (in %) as function of maturity (in weeks)



20

How apply to ZLB?



21

Long rates are still responding to daily news, short rates are not.
 Interpretation: there are still some factors ξ_t changing daily that matter for long yields but not short.

22

Suppose latent factors following same dynamics as estimated historically:

$$\xi_t = \mathbf{c} + \rho \xi_{t-1} + \Sigma \mathbf{u}_t$$

23

Suppose once we escape from ZLB all yields will behave same as before:

$$\tilde{p}_{nt} = \tilde{\alpha}_n + \tilde{\beta}'_n \xi_t$$

$$\{\tilde{\beta}_1, \tilde{\beta}_2, \dots, \tilde{\beta}_N, \tilde{\alpha}_1, \tilde{\alpha}_2, \dots, \tilde{\alpha}_N\}$$

as historically estimated

24

But if we are at ZLB at date t ,

$$y_{1t}^* = a_1^*$$

$$p_{nt}^* = \alpha_n^* + \beta_n^{*'} \xi_t$$

$$\beta_1^* = \mathbf{0}$$

25

$\pi^Q = Q$ -measure probability
that will escape ZLB next period

$$\exp(y_{1t}^*) = \pi^Q E_t^Q \left(\frac{\tilde{p}_{n-1,t+1}^*}{p_{nt}^*} \right) + (1 - \pi^Q) E_t^Q \left(\frac{p_{n-1,t+1}^*}{p_{nt}^*} \right)$$

$$\tilde{p}_{n-1,t+1}^* = \tilde{a}_{n-1} + \tilde{\beta}_{n-1}' \xi_{t+1}$$

$$p_{n-1,t+1}^* = \alpha_{n-1}^* + \beta_{n-1}^{*'} \xi_{t+1}$$

$$\xi_{t+1} = \mathbf{c} + \rho \xi_t + \Sigma \mathbf{u}_{t+1}$$

\mathbf{c}, ρ, Σ and $\{\tilde{a}_n, \tilde{\beta}_n\}_{n=1}^N$ estimated from pre-ZLB data.


26

Know $\beta_1^* = \mathbf{0}$ by definition.

Can calculate $\{\alpha_n^*, \beta_n^*\}_{n=2}^N$ as functions of α_1^* and π^Q .


Choose α_1^*, π^Q to fit ZLB data by MCS. Slightly better fit if also allow \tilde{a}_1 (governs level interest rates return to once exit ZLB) to be different from historically estimated α_1 .

27




28

Factor loadings in normal times (solid blue) and at the ZLB (dashed red)



29

Effect of swap \$400 B short-term for long-term in normal times (blue) and ZLB (red)



30

D. Shadow rate model (Wu and Xia, 2016)

Again assume there is a latent vector of factors that follow same dynamics in normal times as at ZLB:

P-measure:

$$\xi_{t+1} = \mathbf{c} + \rho \xi_t + \Sigma \mathbf{u}_{t+1}$$

Q-measure:

$$\xi_{t+1} = \mathbf{c}^\varrho + \rho^\varrho \xi_t + \Sigma \mathbf{u}_{t+1}^\varrho$$

$$\mathbf{c}^\varrho = \mathbf{c} - \Sigma \lambda$$

$$\rho^\varrho = \rho - \Sigma \Lambda$$

31

s_t = shadow rate

$$= \delta_0 + \gamma_0' \xi_t$$

r_t = short-term interest rate

$$= \max\{s_t, \theta\}$$

$\theta = 0$ (or some positive lower bound)

32

$$P_{nt} = E_t^\varrho \{ \exp[-(r_t + r_{t+1} + \dots + r_{t+n-1})] \}$$

$$s_t = \delta_0 + \gamma_0' \xi_t$$

$$r_t = \max\{s_t, \theta\}$$

$$\Rightarrow p_{nt} = q_n(\xi_t)$$

One approach: calculate $q_n(\cdot)$ by simulation

33

Wu and Xia show an excellent approximation to the forward rate f_{nt} is given by

$$f_{nt} \approx \theta + \sigma_n^Q g\left(\frac{\delta_n + \gamma_n' \xi_t - \theta}{\sigma_n^Q}\right)$$

$$g(z) = z\Phi(z) + \phi(z)$$

$$\phi(z) = N(0, 1) \text{ density}$$

$$\Phi(z) = N(0, 1) \text{ cdf}$$


$$\gamma_n' = \gamma_0' (\rho^\varrho)^n$$

$$\sigma_n^2 = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \gamma_0' (\rho^\varrho)^j \Sigma \Sigma' (\rho^\varrho)^j \gamma_0$$

$$\delta_n = \delta_0 + \gamma_0' \mathbf{H}_n \mathbf{c}^\varrho - (1/2) \gamma_0' \mathbf{H}_n \Sigma \Sigma' \mathbf{H}_n' \gamma_0$$

$$\mathbf{H}_n = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (\rho^\varrho)^j$$

34



35

Estimate with nonlinear state-space model.

State equation:

$$\xi_{t+1} = \mathbf{c} + \rho \xi_t + \Sigma \mathbf{u}_{t+1}$$

Observation equation:

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_{n_1,t} \\ \vdots \\ f_{n_N,t} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \theta + \sigma_{n_1}^Q g\left(\frac{\delta_{n_1} + \gamma_{n_1}' \xi_t - \theta}{\sigma_{n_1}^Q}\right) \\ \vdots \\ \theta + \sigma_{n_N}^Q g\left(\frac{\delta_{n_N} + \gamma_{n_N}' \xi_t - \theta}{\sigma_{n_N}^Q}\right) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{n_1,t} \\ \vdots \\ \varepsilon_{n_N,t} \end{bmatrix}$$

36

Normalization:


$$\gamma_0 = (1, 1, 0)', c^Q = \mathbf{0}, \Sigma \text{ lower triangular}$$

$$\rho^Q \text{ in Jordan Normal form}$$


37

Linear GATSM puts in odd curves at short end
(average yield curve during 2012)

Figure 3: Observed and fitted forward curves




38




39

Yield curve on May 21, 2013




40

May 22: Bernanke tells Congress Fed may decrease the size of monthly large-scale asset purchases




41

Might summarize effect by shift in shadow rate



42

Question: can we use movements in shadow rate as similar summary of Fed actions as fed funds rate provided historically?



$$h_t = \begin{cases} \text{fed funds rate} & \text{before 2009} \\ \text{Wu-Xia shadow rate} & \text{since 2009} \end{cases}$$

44

Consider using h_t in place of fed funds rate in Bernanke, Boivin, Elias (2005) FAVAR:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \xi_t \\ h_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \Phi_{11}(L) & \Phi_{12}(L) \\ \Phi_{21}(L) & \Phi_{22}(L) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \xi_t \\ h_t \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{1t} \\ \varepsilon_{2t} \end{bmatrix}$$

45

Fail to reject $H_0 : \Phi_{12}(L)$ is same before and after Great Recession

⇒ shadow rate helps forecast macro variables same way that fed funds rate did

Fail to reject $H_0 : \Phi_{21}(L)$ is same before and after Great Recession

⇒ same coefficients that used to predict fed funds rate now predict shadow rate

46

Implication: might use Wu-Xia shadow rate to update earlier studies that had been based on the historical fed funds rate

