

This paper is co-taught by Johannes Abeler and Pawel Dziewulski, who will post separate syllabi. There will be approximately 24 hours of lectures in total, of which I will do the first 12. All lectures will be in Seminar Room A. The schedule for my lectures is as follows:

Outline of lectures (the order is exact, but the timing within lecture slots is approximate)

Overview of behavioural decision and game theory Wed. 14:00-16:00 (Oct. 11, week 1)

Present bias and time-inconsistency: evidence and theory Fri. 16:00-18:00 (Oct. 13, week 1)

Reference-dependence and loss aversion: evidence and theory Wed. 14:00-16:00 (Oct. 18, week 2)

Applications of behavioural decision theory Fri. 16:00-18:00 (Oct. 20, week 2)

(No lecture Wed. 14:00-16:00 (Oct. 25, week 3), for which I have an unavoidable conflict.)

Strategic thinking: evidence and theory; applications of behavioural game theory Fri. 16:00-18:00 (Oct. 27, week 3)
Wed. 14:00-16:00 (Nov. 1, week 4)

The remaining lectures in weeks 4 through 8, Wednesdays and Fridays, will be given by Pawel Dziewulski on social preferences and applications, and Johannes Abeler on behavioural welfare economics and applications to public economics. Exact schedules are on the Department's Weblearn page for the course. Please note that Abeler's Wednesday and Friday timings are slightly different.)

My course materials are posted near the top of my home page at <http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~v2crawford/> which you can reach by googling me or from my Oxford Department page. All three instructors' course materials are also linked through the Department's page for the course.

My office hours are by email appointment, and are normally held at All Souls College.

Overview of behavioural decision and game theory

Behavioural economics is a blend of traditional neoclassical microeconomics and empirically motivated assumptions whose goal is a better understanding of economic behavior and welfare. It can be divided into behavioural decision theory and behavioural game theory. Each subfield differs from its mainstream counterpart by paying particular attention to the psychological realism of behavioural assumptions and their consistency with empirical evidence. The goal is to identify empirically important deviations from traditional assumptions, to use the alternative assumptions the evidence suggests to build tractable formal models, and to use the models to better understand standard microeconomic questions. (Much of the empirical evidence used is experimental, but this is not a course in experimental economics: Experimental methods are considered only as needed to interpret evidence; and connections with field evidence will be made whenever they are helpful.)

Behavioural decision theory includes present-bias and time-inconsistency in intertemporal choice; reference-dependence and loss aversion in choice under certainty or uncertainty; ambiguity aversion in choice under uncertainty; social preferences such as altruism, envy, spite, fairness, or reciprocity; overconfidence, identity, and self-image; and heuristics and biases in probabilistic judgment.

Behavioural game theory in principle includes “behavioral decisions in games”, but the theory has so far followed the “divide and conquer” strategy of focusing on topics unique to games. It covers learning; models of bargaining; and models of strategic thinking in initial responses to games.

The course will cover selected topics, about 2/3 decision theory (like the profession) and 1/3 game theory. Specific topics will vary from year to year.

This year I will cover present-bias and time-inconsistency in intertemporal choice, reference-dependence and loss aversion, and strategic thinking.

Readings (the most important of these are marked *. I give readings even for topics not covered this year, in case they are helpful. **They are optional: you will be tested only on material in lectures.**)

These books are worth owning if you have a special interest in this field, but the Social Science Library (lending and reference) has at least half a dozen copies of each:

Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, editors, *Advances in Behavioral Economics*, Princeton 2003 (“*Advances*” in the reading list)

Colin Camerer, *Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction*, Princeton 2003 (“*BGT*”)

These books may also be of interest:

Sanjit Dhami, *The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis*, Oxford, 2016

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, editors, *Choices, Values, and Frames*, Cambridge 2000

Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. Farrar, Strauss, Giroux 2011

David Kreps, *Game Theory and Economic Modelling*, Oxford 1990

Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Oxford 1960 or Harvard 1980

Richard Thaler, *The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life*, Princeton 1994

Behavioural Decision Theory: General Background (covered this year)

- *Matthew Rabin, "A Perspective on Psychology and Economics," *European Economic Review* 46 (2002), 657-685; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921%2801%2900207-0>.
- *Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein, "Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future," Chapter 1 in *Advances*; manuscript at <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/ribe239.pdf>
- Daniel Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," *American Economic Review* 93 (2003), 1449-1475; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132137>
- Teck-Hua Ho, Noah Lim, and Colin Camerer, "Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics," *Journal of Marketing Research* 43 (2006), 307-331; manuscript at <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/JMRFinal.pdf>, published version at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.43.3.307>
- Matthew Rabin, "Psychology and Economics," *Journal of Economic Literature* 36 (1998), 11-46; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564950>
- Stefano DellaVigna, "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 47 (2009), 315-372; <http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/01-DellaVigna-4721.pdf>.

Present-Bias and Time-Inconsistency in Intertemporal Choice (covered this year)

- *George Loewenstein and Richard Thaler, "Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 3 (1989), 181-193; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1942918>
- Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue, "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," *Journal of Economic Literature* 40 (2002), 351-401; Chapter 6 in *Advances*; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2698382> or <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/NYU/03-LowensteinODonoghueFrederick+.pdf>
- *Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, "Doing it Now or Later," *American Economic Review* 89 (1999), 103-124; Chapter 7 in *Advances*; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/116981>
- Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, "Incentives for Procrastinators," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (1999), 769-816; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586884>
- Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, "Choice and Procrastination," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116 (2001), 121-160; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696445>
- David Laibson, "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1997), 443-478; Chapter 15 in *Advances*; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951242>
- George-Marios Angeletos, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen Weinberg, "The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15 (2002), 47-68; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696556> or <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/NYU/03-Angeletos.pdf>
- Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch, "Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment," *Psychological Science*, 13 (2002): 219-224; <http://pss.sagepub.com/content/13/3/219.short>
- Jesse Shapiro, "Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle," *Journal of Public Economics*, 89 (2005): 303-25; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.003>
- Sharon Oster and Fiona Scott Morton, "Behavioral Biases Meet the Market: The Case of Magazine Subscription Prices," *Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy* 5 (2005), Article 1; <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol5/iss1/art1>
- Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier, "Paying Not To Go To the Gym", *American Economic Review*, 96 (2006): 694-719; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034067>
- *Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler, "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents," *Review of Economic Studies* 73 (2006), 689-714; www.jstor.org/stable/20185025

*Paul Heidhues and Botond Köszegi, “Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market,” *American Economic Review* 100 (2010), 2279-2303; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2279> or <http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~botond/credit.pdf>

Hanming Fang and Yang Wang, “Estimating Dynamic Discrete Choice Models with Hyperbolic Discounting, with an Application to Mammography Decisions”, *International Economic Review* 56 (2015), 565-596; <http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~hfang/WorkingPaper/wang/hyperbolic12-REStud-R1.pdf> or <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12115/epdf>.

Reference-Dependence and Loss Aversion (covered this year)

*Colin Camerer, “Three Cheers—Psychological, Theoretical, Empirical—for Loss-Aversion,” *Journal of Marketing Research*, 42 (2005), 129-133; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.42.2.129.62286>; manuscript at <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/lossaversionJMR2.doc>

*Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5 (1991), 193-206; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1942711>

Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” *Journal of Political Economy* 98 (1990), 1325-1348; Chapter 2 in *Advances*; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2937761>

Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford University Press, 1995, Chapters 1, 3A–C, 6 (as background)

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” *Econometrica* 47 (1979), 263-292; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914185> or www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/EC101/ProspectTheory.pdf

Colin Camerer, “Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field,” in Kahneman and Tversky, editors, *Choices, Values, and Frames*, Cambridge 2002; Chapter 5 in *Advances*; <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1037.pdf>.

*Matthew Rabin and Richard Thaler, “Anomalies: Risk Aversion,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15 (2001), 219-232; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696549>

Matthew Rabin, “Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem,” *Econometrica* 68 (2000), 1281-1292; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999450>

Paul Samuelson, “Comments on the Favorable-Bet Theorem,” *Economic Inquiry* 12 (1974), 345-55; reprinted in his *Collected Scientific Papers*, vol. IV, 550-560

Paul Samuelson, “Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers,” *Scientia* 98 (1963), 108-113; reprinted in his *Collected Scientific Papers*, vol. I, 153-158

*Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin, “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121 (2006), 1133-1165; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098823> or <http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~botond/refdep.pdf>

Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, Lorenz Goette, and David Huffman, “Reference Points and Effort Provision,” *American Economic Review* 101 (2011), 470-492; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.470> or

<https://sites.google.com/site/johannesabeler/AbelerFalkGoetteHuffman2011%20-%20Reference%20points%20and%20effort%20provision.pdf?attredirects=0>

Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin, “Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes,” *American Economic Review* 97 (2007), 1047-1073; http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~botond/refdep_risk.pdf or <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034084>

Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin, “Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans,” *American Economic Review* 99 (2009), 909-936; <http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~botond/drp.pdf> or <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592487>

- Richard Thaler and Eric Johnson, “Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice,” *Management Science* 36 (1990), 643-660; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2631898>
- *David Genesove and Christopher Mayer, “Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116 (2001), 1233 – 1260; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696458>
- Terrance Odean, “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize their Losses?,” *Journal of Finance* 53 (1998), 1775-1798; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/117424>
- Justin Sydnor, “(Over)Insuring Modest Risks,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 2 (2010), 177–199; <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.4.177> or <http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/sydnor/deductibles.pdf>
- Thierry Post, Martin van den Assem, Guido Baltussen, and Richard Thaler, “Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show,” *American Economic Review* 98 (2008), 38-71; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29729963>
- *Colin Camerer, Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Richard Thaler, “Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1997), 407-441; Chapter 19 in *Advances*; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951241>
- *Vincent Crawford and Juanjuan Meng, “New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income,” *American Economic Review* 101 (2011), 1912-1932; <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.5.1912> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/%7Evcrawfor/CrawfordMengAER11>
- Jeremy Siegel and Richard Thaler, “Anomalies: The Equity Premium Puzzle,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11 (1997), 193-205; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138259>
- Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler, “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110 (1995), 73-92; Chapter 22 in *Advances*; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118511>
- *Paul Heidhues and Botond Köszegi, “Competition and Price Variation when Consumers are Loss Averse,” *American Economic Review* 98 (2008), 1245-1268; <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.4.1245> or http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~botond/pricing_comp.pdf
- Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey C. Ely. “A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and State-contingent Reference Points,” *Theoretical Economics* 11 (2016), 455–485; <https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20160455>
- Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler, “Reference Dependence and Labor-Market Fluctuations,” *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 28 (2013), 159-200; <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/674596>

Probabilistic Judgment (not covered this year)

- *Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science* 185 (1974), 1124 – 1131; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1738360>
- Colin Camerer, pages 590-616 of Individual Decision Making, Chapter 8 in John Kagel and Alvin Roth, editors, *Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton 1995
- Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, “The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence,” *Cognitive Psychology* 24 (1992), 411-435; http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/griffin_tversky92_cognitive_psychology_weighing-evidence-confidence.pdf
- *Matthew Rabin, “Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2002), 775-816; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132489>

- Matthew Rabin and Dimitri Vayanos, “The Gambler’s and Hot-Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applications,” *Review of Economic Studies* 77 (2010), 730-778;
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40587644.pdf>
- Joshua Miller and Adam Sanjurjo, “Surprised by the Gamblers and Hot Hand Fallacies? A Truth in the Law of Small Numbers”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2627354
- Joshua Miller and Adam Sanjurjo, “A Primer and Frequently Asked Questions for ‘Surprised by the Gamblers and Hot Hand Fallacies? A Truth in the Law of Small Numbers’”;
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2728151> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2728151>; also see
<http://fae.ua.es/FAEX/the-hot-hand-is-back/>
- Benjamin, Daniel J., Collin Raymond, and Matthew Rabin, “A Model of Non-Belief in the Law of Large Numbers,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 14 (2016), 515–544;
https://benjamin.economics.cornell.edu/Barney2014-12-11_Body.pdf
- Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein, “Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11 (1997), 109-126; Chapter 11 in *Advances*;
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138254>
- Henry Blodget, “Wall Street Self-Defense: Born Suckers: The Greatest Wall Street Danger of All: You,” *Slate*, December 14, 2004 (amusing optional reading)
<http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/WallStreetBiases.html>
- Leonard Mlodinow, “Meet Hollywood’s Latest Genius: Then again, in 6 months he could be a loser. Box-office success is more random than you may think,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 2, 2006 (amusing optional reading) <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/la-tm-random27jul02,1,1850294,full.story.html>

Behavioural Game Theory: General Background (covered this year)

- **BGT*, Chapter 1, Introduction; Appendix 1.1, Basic Game Theory; and Appendix 1.2, Experimental Design; manuscript of Chapter 1 at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Camerer_Ch1intro.pdf.
- Vincent Crawford, Sections 1, Introduction; 2, Theoretical Frameworks and Unresolved Questions; 3, Experimental Designs; and 7, Conclusion in “Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction” (“*TE*”), Chapter 7 in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, Editors, *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. I*, Cambridge 1997;
<http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawfordThExp97.pdf>; Chapter 12 in *Advances*

Adaptive Learning: Reinforcement, Beliefs-Based, and Experience-Weighted Attraction (not covered this year)

- **BGT*, Chapter 3, Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Games; Chapter 6, Learning; Sections 7.4, Payoff-Asymmetric Order-Statistic Games; 7.6, Applications: Path-Dependence, Market Adoption, and Corporate Culture; 8.1, Simple Signaling Games and Adaptive Dynamics; and 8.4, Conclusion *TE*, Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 6
- Vincent Crawford, “Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games,” in Pagano and Nicita, editors, *The Evolution of Economic Diversity*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 133-163; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/ucsd9719.pdf>
- Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth, “Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” *American Economic Review* 88 (1998), 848-881; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/117009>
- Vincent Crawford, “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,” *Econometrica* 63 (1995), 103-143;
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951699> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/Crawford95EMT.pdf>

Vincent Crawford and Bruno Broseta, "What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play," *American Economic Review* 88 (March 1998), 198-225; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/116825> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawBro98AER.pdf>.

Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho, "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," *Econometrica* 67 (1999), 827-874; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999459>

Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho, "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Coordination Games: Probability Rules, Heterogeneity, and Time-Variation," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology* 42 (1998), 305-326; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1998.1217>.

Crawford, "Introduction to Experimental Game Theory," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 1-15, especially 8-12; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2909> or <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~7Evcrawfor/IntroEGTSym.html>

Camerer, Ho, and Juin-Kuan Chong, "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 137-188; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2927> or <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/jeth2927.pdf>

Dale Stahl, "Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game," *Games and Economic Behavior* 16 (1996), 303-330; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0088>

Bargaining (not covered this year)

*BGT, Chapter 4.1, Unstructured Bargaining

*TE, Section 5.3, Unstructured Bargaining

Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Oxford 1960 or Harvard 1980: Chapter 3, Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War, and Appendix C

Alvin Roth, "Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory," Chapter 2 in Roth (ed.), *Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View*, Cambridge, 1987

Alvin Roth, "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining," Chapter 12 in Roth, (ed.), *Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining*, Cambridge, 1985

Strategic Thinking (covered this year)

*Vincent Crawford, Miguel Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri, "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," *Journal of Economic Literature* 51 (March 2013), 5-62, Sections 1, Introduction, and 2 Alternative Models of Strategic Thinking; <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~7Evcrawfor/CCGJEL13.pdf>

BGT, Chapters 5, Dominance-Solvable Games; and 7, Coordination

TE, Sections 4, Dominance and Iterated Dominance; and 5, Simultaneous Coordination

Adam Brandenburger, "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 6 (1992), 83-101; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138270>.

Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey, "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal-Form Games," *Games and Economic Behavior* 10 (1995), 6-38; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023>.

Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson, "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," *Games and Economic Behavior* 10 (1995), 218-254; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1031>.

Rosemarie Nagel, "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," *American Economic Review* 85 (1995), 1313-1326; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950991>.

Teck-Hua Ho, Colin Camerer, and Keith Weigelt, "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental 'p-Beauty Contests'," *American Economic Review*, 88 (1998), 947-969; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/117013>.

Colin Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, and Juin Kuan Chong, "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (2004), 861-898; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098704>.

- Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Bruno Broseta, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: an Experimental Study,” *Econometrica* 69 (2001), 1193-1235; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692219> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CGCrBr01EMT.pdf>).
- Miguel Costa-Gomes and Vincent Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” *American Economic Review* 96 (2006), 1737-1768; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034993> or <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CGCAER06.pdf>.
- Miguel Costa-Gomes and Georg Weizsäcker, “Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 75 (2008), 729-762; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20185053>.
- Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Nagore Iriberri, “Comparing Models of Strategic Thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination Games,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7 (2009), 377-387; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CGCIJEEA17Oct08.pdf>.
- Isabelle Brocas, Juan Carrillo, Stephanie Wang, and Colin Camerer, “Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games,” *Review of Economic Studies* 81 (2014), 944-970; <http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~brocas/Research/mousebetting.pdf> or <http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/81/3/944.full.pdf+html>.
- Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin, “Cursed Equilibrium,” *Econometrica*, 73 (2005), 1623-1672; www.jstor.org/stable/3598885.
- Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri, “Level- k Auctions: Can Boundedly Rational Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?,” *Econometrica* 75 (2007), 1721–1770; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawfordIriberriEMT07.pdf> or www.jstor.org/stable/4502047.
- Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri, “Fatal Attraction: Saliency, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games,” *American Economic Review* 97 (2007), 1731-1750; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034582>.
- Vincent Crawford, “Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions,” *American Economic Review* 93 (2003), 133-149; <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawAER03.pdf> or <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132165>.
- Tore Ellingsen and Robert Östling, “When Does Communication Improve Coordination?,” *American Economic Review* 100 (2010), 1695–1724; <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.4.1695> .
- Vincent Crawford, “Efficient Mechanisms for Level- k Bilateral Trading”; <http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~7Ev2crawford/LkBilateralTrading12Jan16.pdf>